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ABSTRACT
GANG WANG: Strategic Operational Decisions in a Supply Chain with Demand and
Recall Risks
(Under the direction of Lauren Xiaoyuan Lu and Jayashankar M. Swaminathan)
Among supply chain risks, both demand risk and recall risk have been recognized as
critical challenges firms have to face. Making proper operational decisions to mitigate
these two types of risks is of great importance to every firm. This dissertation “Strategic
Operational Decisions in a Supply Chain with Demand and Recall Risks” focus on capac-
ity related decisions, which tackles the demand risk, and quality related decisions, which
tackles the recall risk. Specifically, we conduct our research along three dimensions: (i)
optimizing capacity decisions or quality decisions; (ii) the interaction between capacity
and quality decisions; (iii) the impact of supply chain factors on these decisions. In Chap-
ter 2, we examine quality choice and capacity timing of start-ups and established firms.
In Chapter 3, we focus on procurement contracting under product recall risk to manage
product quality and mitigate the financial impact of product recalls. In Chapter 4, we
investigate strategies to improve product quality and to make proper recall decisions.
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION
In this dissertation, we study strategic operational decisions in a supply chain with
demand and recall risks.
1.1 Overview of Chapter 2
In Chapter 2, we examine quality choice and capacity timing of start-ups and estab-
lished firms. Many industries have experienced disruptive innovations that create new
products and markets displacing old ones. Some innovations are based on a transforma-
tive technology that provides novel product features or dimensions appealing to high-end
customers, while other innovations target at low-end customer segments initially. Al-
though many disruptive innovations have been led by start-ups, some established firms
have also led innovations and brought radical technologies to market. This variation of
innovation strategies inspires us to investigate whether start-ups and established firms
differ in their quality choice and investment timing of market entry when making inno-
vations.
To this end, we build a stylized duopoly model in which a start-up and an estab-
lished firm compete in a market with quality differentiation and demand uncertainty.
The firms may choose to make a high-quality product or a low-quality product. They
may also choose a capacity-leading strategy, i.e., invest before demand realization, or
a capacity-lagging strategy, i.e., invest after demand realization. We assume that the
start-up maximizes its survival probability whereas the established firm maximizes its
expected profit. Our analysis yields the following main insights: (1) When the market
size increases, the established firm is more likely to choose high quality. Moreover, the
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start-up is more likely to choose high quality when the threshold of the start-up’s survival
probability increases. (2) The presence of a start-up in the market tends to increase qual-
ity differentiation. (3) The firms’ quality choice and capacity timing are interdependent.
Specifically, we find that quality differentiation is more likely to arise when the two firms
choose different capacity timing. (4) We also identify an interesting equilibrium in which
the established firm with a low-quality product chooses a capacity-leading strategy when
the start-up with a high-quality chooses a capacity-lagging strategy. This equilibrium is
consistent with anecdotal evidence on established firms being disruptive innovators.
1.2 Overview of Chapter 3
In Chapter 3, we focus on procurement contracting under product recall risk. Product
recall is commonly observed in various industries with production outsourcing. Manag-
ing product quality and mitigating the financial impact of product recalls pose great
challenges to manufacturers due to demand uncertainty and non-contractibility of sup-
pliers’ quality effort. To understand the interdependence of supply chain quantity and
quality decisions, we develop a procurement contractual framework under both demand
and recall risks. We consider a model in which a manufacturer outsources to a supplier
the production of a component, which is subject to potential quality failure leading to
a product recall. The manufacturer acts as the Stackelberg leader offering a recall cost
sharing contract to the supplier. We analyze two settings: a pull system in which the
supplier makes the quantity decision and a push system in which the manufacturer makes
the quantity decision. We find that the manufacturer achieves a higher production quan-
tity and induces a higher quality effort of the supplier in the push system than in the
pull system. Therefore, the manufacturer can improve quality by taking on the demand
risk of the supply chain. Moreover, the presence of product recall risk decreases the pro-
duction quantity in the push system but does not affect the production quantity in the
pull system. Interestingly, the manufacturer can improve quality and profit by decreasing
2
her share of the total recall cost without affecting the production quantity of the supply
chain in both the push and pull systems.
1.3 Overview of Chapter 4
In Chapter 4, we investigate recall decisions under quality contracting framework.
When outsourcing production to suppliers, ensuring product quality is of great challenge
to a manufacturer because suppliers’ quality effort cannot be directly observed and it
is unrealistic to have a clear-cut assignment of fault to each firm involved in the prod-
uct development and manufacturing processes. Therefore we are interested in studying
strategies to improve product quality and to make proper recall decisions. Specifically,
we consider a recall cost sharing contract proposed by the manufacturer to align the
incentive of the supplier in ensuring the product quality, and also examine two types of
recall decisions: (1) voluntary recall, which is issued by the manufacturer voluntarily at a
relatvely early stage; (2) mandatory recall, which is forced by the government agency at
a relatively late stage. We characterize the firms’ decisions in equilibrium. Surprisingly,
we find that, as a Stackeberg leader, the manufacturer does not always push all the recall
cost to the supplier. His decision depends on whether he will issue a voluntary recall
or not. Furthermore, we find two cost sharing percentage thresholds that determines
the equilibrium solutions. Specifically, the lower cost sharing percentage is always as-
sociated with voluntary recall, while the higher one is always associated to mandatory
recall. We conduct comparative statics study to see how the equilibrium solutions evolve
with the change of parameters. To faciliate comparision, we study the first-best problem
where the supply chain is integrated, and find that the recall cost sharing contract cannot
coordinate the supply chain.
3
CHAPTER 2 HIGH-END OR LOW-END INNOVATION?
QUALITY CHOICE AND CAPACITY TIMING OF START-UPS AND
ESTABLISHED FIRMS
2.1 Introduction
Many industries have experienced innovations that create new products and markets
displacing old ones. Some innovations are based on a transformative technology that
provides novel product features or dimensions appealing to high-end customers. One such
example is Tesla Motors, which is an American electric vehicle manufacturer. Founded
in 2003 by a team of entrepreneurs in Silicone Valley, Telsa was aimed to enter the
automotive market with expensive electric vehicles targeted at aﬄuent buyers. It gained
widespread attention by introducing the first fully electric vehicle, Tesla Roadster. The
success of Telsa has inspired major automakers to enter the electric vehicle market with
lower-priced electric cars. Unlike Telsa’s strategy to enter a new market at the high
end, the disk drive industry has seen innovations that target at price-sensitive customer
segments initially. For example, in the early 80’s, Seagate, back then still a start-up,
introduced the first 5.25-inch disk drive to compete in the established and more expensive
8-inch disk drive market. In both examples, the start-ups led innovations to create new
products but differed in their quality positioning in the new market.
In the case of Seagate, the 5-inch disk drive market eventually replaced the 8-inch
disk drive market completely, which is a classic example of low-end disruptive innovation
(Schmidt and Van Mieghem 2005). Disruptive innovations may not always undertaken by
start-ups. In some cases, well-established firms also bring to market radical technologies
that create new markets (Yu and Hang 2010). Success stories include HP’s inkjet printers,
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Intel’s Centrino chip-sets, as well as Apple’s iPods and iPhones.
Whether being a high-end or a low-end innovation, a new product’s market potential
is often highly unpredictable because historical sales of existing products may not be
good predictors for new products due to their novel functionalities and characteristics.
Such demand uncertainty poses a great challenge to the capacity planning process of both
start-ups and established firms. Two capacity investment timing strategies are commonly
adopted by firms: (1) a capacity-leading strategy, i.e., to build capacity in anticipation
of demand; (2) a capacity-lagging strategy, i.e., to install capacity only after demand
has occurred. The capacity-leading strategy gives a firm the first-mover advantage of
commanding a favorable position in the marketplace. However, excess capacity may occur
should the prospect of a large market demand fail to materialize, or product shortages
may occur should market demand exceed the installed capacity. The strategic need for
market leadership and the operational need for matching supply with demand create an
apparent tradeoff between the two capacity timing strategies.
Academic research suggests that start-ups and established firms behave differently in
making capacity investment decisions (Swinney, Cachon and Netessine 2011). Because
start-ups are generally at the early stage of product and market development, they are
constrained by limited cash flows, and thus are faced with a vital challenge whether they
could earn enough money to sustain until the next round of funding becomes available.
Therefore, the ability to reach a sustainable level of profit seems to matter a great deal to
start-ups. In contrast, the financial objectives of established firms can be quite different
due to factors such as the ability to bear risk, access to credit, and cash availability, etc.
In general, established corporations are viewed as profit maximizers.
In light of the different financial objectives of start-ups and established firms, the
aforementioned innovation examples raise several interesting questions. First, when do
firms choose to target at the high-quality or the low-quality market segment when mak-
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ing innovations? Second, are firms’ quality choices and capacity timing strategies in-
terdependent? Third, does a start-up choose a quality level different from a competing
established firm? Moreover, does a start-up in the market increase or decrease product
differentiation? To answer these questions, we study firms’ innovation strategies along
two dimensions: quality choice and capacity timing. We build a stylized duopoly model
in which a start-up and an established firm compete in a market with quality differen-
tiation and demand uncertainty. The firms may choose to make a high-quality product
or a low-quality product. They may also choose to invest early, i.e., before demand re-
alization, or to invest late, i.e., after demand realization. We assume that a start-up
maximizes its survival probability, which is defined as the probability that the firm’s
profit is no smaller than the minimum profit needed for survival. By contrast, an estab-
lished firm maximizes its expected profit. To simplify analysis, we consider two games:
(1) a capacity timing game in which the firms with different quality levels make capacity
timing decisions; (2) a quality choice game in which the firms choose their quality levels
under different capacity timing scenarios.
Analyzing the capacity timing game allows us to find interesting innovation patterns.
For example, we find that the start-up with a low quality product always behaves aggres-
sively and takes a capacity-leading strategy as long as late capacity investment is more
expensive than early capacity investment. This pattern is consistent with the classical
examples of low-end disruptive innovation by start-ups, such as Seagate’s 5.25-inch disk
drives and Dell direct in the early 1980’s (Govindarajan and Kopalle 2006). However,
when the start-up produces a high quality product, the dynamics can be drastically
different—a surprising equilibrium may arise in which when the capacity cost increases
over time, the start-up with a high quality product invests late whereas the established
firm with a low quality product invests early. This observation is consistent with the
anecdotal evidence that disruptive innovations may not always be carried out by start-
ups, and established firms may also take the lead in innovation with low-end disruption,
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e.g., Sony’s Walkman and HP’s inkjet printers (Yu and Hang 2010). Interestingly, we
note that this equilibrium would never arise in the model of Swinney et al. (2011), in
which the start-up’s and the established firm’s products are homogenous. The emergence
of this equilibrium in our model stems from the fact that quality differentiation affects
not only the first-mover advantage of early capacity investment but also the resulting
variability of firm profits, thereby impacting start-ups’ survival probability.
The equilibrium analysis of the quality choice game also yields fruitful insights about
firms’ innovation strategies in the presence of demand uncertainty. We find that when the
market size increases, the established firm is more likely to choose high quality. Moreover,
the start-up is more likely to choose high quality when the threshold of the start-up’s
survival probability increases. Interestingly, we find that the presence of a start-up in
the market tends to increase quality differentiation.
The quality equilibrium patterns also suggest that quality differentiation is more likely
to arise when the start-up and the established firm choose different capacity timing, i.e.,
one invests early while the other invests late. In contrast, as long as the firms’ capacity
timing decisions are symmetric, investing early or investing late does not seem to make
a significant impact on the quality choices.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 conducts a brief literature
review on relevant works. We introduce the model in §3. We present the results for the
capacity timing game in §4 and the results for the quality choice game in §5. We conclude
in §6.
2.2 Literature Review
There are four streams of literatures related to our work. The first stream is the
operations literature on timing strategies of capacity investment under uncertainty. For
a comprehensive review on this subject, see Van Mieghem (2003). Some researchers
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investigate whether it is worthwhile to postpone capacity investment until after obtaining
accurate demand information (see, e.g., Van Mieghem and Dada 1999, Anand and Girotra
2007, Anupindi and Jiang 2008a). They study the effect of postponement strategies in
the context of monopoly or duopoly settings, and show that postponement makes the
optimal capacity decision more sensitive to uncertainty and mitigates the destructive
effect of competition, and the effect of postponement may be diminished by strategic
effects.
The second stream our work is related to is the literatures on quality differentiation.
The marketing literatures on this topic generally concentrates on the effects of quality
differentiation on product line design and market competition. For instance, Moorthy
(1984) considers a monopolist firm providing different quality levels to multiple consumer
segments with different valuations for quality. Kim and Chhajed (2002) examine a similar
problem but incorporate multiple quality-type attributes. Vandenbosch and Weinberg
(1995) consider product and price competition in the context of two competing firms with
products vertically differentiated in two dimensions. Desai (2001) investigates whether
the cannibalization problem affects firms’ price and quality decisions in both monopoly
and duopoly settings. Our work focuses on examining the effect of quality differentiation
on capacity investment decisions for competing firms, which has not been explored by the
marketing literatures. Different from these literatures that assume given quality levels,
there are also literatures that endogenize quality choices. Chan and Leland (1982) con-
sider the scenario where sellers select price and quality levels, while buyers can acquire
price/quality information about sellers at a cost. Wauthy (1996) provide complete de-
scription of quality choices in a duopoly model with vertical differentiation where firms
first choose the quality of products simultaneously and then compete in prices. This
paper also considers endogenized quality choices and examines it as an alternate setting.
Our setting is similar as in Wauthy (1996) but differs in that we capture demand un-
certainty in our model, and the start up and the established firm compete in capacity
8
quantity instead of price.
Third, our work is related to the strategic management literature on disruptive in-
novation. Disruptive innovation refers to an improvement in the product or service that
radically refines the performance, related costs, or its target market in a new way. A
commonly held notion in this literature is that start-ups, instead of established firms,
tend to bring innovations to the market. Christensen and Bower (1996), Christensen
(1997), and Druehl and Schmidt (2008) construct a framework on disruptive innovation
and provide a thorough review of this topic.
Lastly, our work is related to the bankruptcy theory in the economics literature.
Radner and Shepp (1996) and Dutta and Radner (1999) both argue that a firm subject
to the risk of bankruptcy will fail with probability one if it purely maximizes its expected
profit over an infinite horizon. Greenwald and Stiglitz (1990) and Walls and Dyer (1996)
adopt a utility function that incorporates both the operating profit and the risk of failure.
Chod and Lyandres (2011) point out that private firms (e.g., start-ups) tend to be more
sensitive to risk and the chance of failure than public firms (e.g., established firms),
and hence it is reasonable for start-ups and established firms to have different objective
functions.
There are extensive literatures studying the impact of bankruptcy risk on operational
decisions such as inventory decisions, process development, capacity levels, financial sub-
sidies to suppliers, contracting and sourcing strategies. Some representatives of this liter-
ature are Archibald, Thomas, Betts and Johnston (2002), Babich, Burnetas and Ritchken
(2007), Babich (2008), Swinney et al. (2011), Boyabatli and Toktay (2011), and Tanri-
sever, Erzurumlu and Joglekar (2008). Our work is most closely related to Swinney et al.
(2011). They investigate the impact of bankruptcy risk on capacity investment timing
decisions under demand uncertainty. They find that when demand uncertainty is high
and capacity investment costs do not decline too severely over time, a start-up tends to
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invest early while an established firm tends to invest late. The distinction of our work is
to incorporate quality differentiation and study the interdependence of a firm’s quality
choice and capacity timing. Our analysis yields a new capacity timing pattern in which
the established firm invest early while the start-up invests late. This pattern is consis-
tent with the anecdotal observation that disruptive innovation may also be carried out
by established firms (Yu and Hang 2010). A more important differentiation of our work
with respect to Swinney et al. (2011) is the fact that we endogenize quality differentiation
and derive insights about a disruptive innovator’s quality choice and its dependence on
capacity timing.
2.3 Model
We consider a start-up competing against an established firm. Both firms plan to
launch a new product. Their products may differ in quality. We denote the quality
levels of the start-up and established firm by Ss and Se, respectively. Assume Ss, Se ∈
{Sl, Sh}, where Sl denotes the low quality level and Sh denotes the high quality level,
thus Sh > Sl. The firms need to build capacities for making the products. The products’
market demands are uncertain, and the firms can follow two different capacity investment
strategies: (1) invest early, i.e., invest before demand realization; (2) invest late, i.e.,
invest after observing the demand. Depending on the capacity timing strategies, the
firms’ unit capacity costs may be different and are denoted by Cik, where i ∈ {1, 2}
represents investing early and late, respectively, while k ∈ {l, h} represents the firms’
quality levels. Let Kl and Kh denote the capacity quantity for the low quality product
and the high quality product, respectively. Any capacity investment is irreversible once
being made.
We assume that the firms’ capacity investment costs are linear in quantity. This is
a common assumption in the capacity management literature (see, e.g., Swinney et al.
2011, Van Mieghem 2003). We further assume that the marginal capacity cost of the
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high quality product is larger than that of the low quality product, i.e., Cih
Sh
≥ Cjl
Sl
, where
i, j ∈ {1, 2}. This assumption ensures the potential existence of quality differentiation
in the market. Otherwise, the firm would find it profitable to only produce and sell the
high quality product.
2.3.1 Consumer Utility and Market Demand
We derive the inverse demand function from a consumer utility model. Consider a
market of consumers with different quality valuations. Let θ denote a consumer’s taste
parameter, which is heterogenous among the consumers. Assume that consumer tastes
are uniformly distributed over an interval [0, θˆ] with density one, hence the market size
is θˆ.1
Following the convention of the quality differentiation literature, we specify the con-
sumer utility function:
U =
{
θS − P, if he purchases a good with quality S and price P , (2.3.1)
0, if he does not purchase. (2.3.1′)
Given the two quality levels, Sh and Sl, the above utility function gives rise to the
following inverse demand functions:Pl = Slθˆ − SlQl − SlQh, (2.3.2)
Ph = Shθˆ − SlQl − ShQh, (2.3.2′)
where Ql and Qh denote the quantities of the low and high quality products released to
the market.
To capture demand uncertainty, we adopt the additive demand shock model, which is
commonly used in the operations and marketing literatures (see, e.g., Swinney et al. 2011,
1To ensure the existence of vertical differentiation in the market, we assume that the customer with the
highest taste value θˆ achieves higher utility by purchasing high quality product at a price of its cost
than that from low quality product, i.e., Shθˆ − Cih ≥ Slθˆ − Cjl, where i, j ∈ {1, 2}. In other words,
θˆ ≥ Cih−Cjl(Sh−Sl) , where i, j ∈ {1, 2}.
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Desai, Koenigsberg and Purohit 2007, Anupindi and Jiang 2008b). To do that, assume θˆ is
a positive random variable defined on the support of
[
maxi,j∈{1,2}
{
Cih−Cjl
(Sh−Sl)
}
,+∞
)
, with
a continuous distribution function G(θˆ), whose mean µ = E(θˆ) and variance σ2 = V ar(θˆ).
We shall point out that this formulation of uncertainty leads to a demand function that
closely resembles Swinney et al. (2011)’s linear demand function with additive random
shocks. The similarity of the demand formulations makes it reasonable to compare our
equilibrium results with those of Swinney et al. (2011). 2
Naturally, the firms’ production decisions are subject to the capacity constraints.
To simplify analysis, we assume that the firms adopt a production clearance strategy,
i.e., they always produce up to their capacity limits and release all products to the
market. This is a common assumption adopted in the capacity-constrained competition
models in the operations management literature (see, e.g., Swinney et al. 2011, Goyal
and Netessine 2007).
2.3.2 Firm Objective Functions
Start-ups are generally at an early stage of development and tend to face cash-flow
constraints. Therefore, earning a sufficient amount of profit to survive is more important
than pursuing high expected profit. There are studies (see, e.g., Radner and Shepp 1996,
Dutta and Radner 1999) pointing out that a firm prone to bankruptcy will fail with
probability one if it simply aims at maximizing expected profit. This intuitively leads
to the idea of incorporating the risk of bankruptcy into a start-up’s financial objective.
In this paper, we borrow a utility structure from the bankruptcy literature (see, e.g.,
2An alternative approach to model demand uncertainty is the so-called multiplicative demand shock
model. In such a model, the taste distribution is fixed, while the market size is a random variable.
The economics literature suggests that the additive and the multiplicative approaches capture different
market characteristics, but conclusive empirical studies are rare while the theory literature on demand
uncertainty continues to use both types of demand shocks (see, e.g., Cowan 2004).
12
Greenwald and Stiglitz 1990, Walls and Dyer 1996):
total utility = operating profit− cost of bankruptcy × probability of bankruptcy
For analytical simplicity, we examine two extreme forms of this general utility func-
tion. If a firm has a very small chance of bankruptcy, the first term in the utility
function, i.e., the profit term, dominates the second term, i.e., the bankruptcy cost term.
Then the firm may safely ignore the second term and focus on maximizing the expected
profit. This leads to profit maximization in the case of an established firm. If the cost of
bankruptcy is large compared to the assets of the firm, or the probability of bankruptcy
is high, the second term dominates the first term. Under a fixed cost of bankruptcy,
the firm should aim at minimizing the probability of bankruptcy. This leads to survival
probability maximization in the case of a start-up firm.
Specifically, we assume that a start-up will survive if its total profit is greater than
α, an exogenous parameter. The start-up’s objective is to maximize its survival proba-
bility, i.e., the probability that its total profit is above α. Denote the optimal survival
probability for early investment as
ψ∗ = max
K
Pr{profit ≥ α}. (2.3.3)
Similarly, the optimal survival probability for late investment is
ψ∗ = Pr{max
K
profit ≥ α}, (2.3.4)
which is equivalent to maximizing profit. For late investment, the maximum can be
moved into the parentheses because the start-up faces no demand uncertainty at the stage
of capacity investment, and hence maximizing profit leads to optimal ex-ante survival
probability. This formulation of survival probability as a start-up’s objective function is
identical to the one used in Swinney et al. (2011). Note that if the value of α is very
low, the star-up will survive whatever strategy it takes, which is not of our interest. To
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Figure 2.1: Sequence of Events: The Capacity Timing Game
avoid this case, we assume the value of α is reasonably large. Specifically, we assume
α ≥ (SlCih−ShCjl)2
4Sl(Sh−Sl)2 , where i, j ∈ {1, 2}.
2.3.3 Sequence of Events
Our goal is to study the interdependence between firms’ quality choices and their
capacity timing strategies. To do that, we first study a capacity timing game by fixing
the quality choices and then consider a quality choice game by fixing the capacity timing
decisions.
The Capacity Timing Game
In this setting, the firms’ quality choices, i.e., Ss and Se, are exogenous. The capacity
timing game proceeds in three stages, as shown in Figure 2.1. In stage 1, the firms decide
on capacity timing in terms of whether to invest early or late. In stage 2, the firm(s)
who have decided to invest early determine their capacity quantities. By the end of this
stage, demand uncertainty is resolved. In stage 3, the firm(s) who have decided to invest
late determine their capacity quantities.
Two scenarios will be analyzed: (1) the start-up produces a high quality product
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Figure 2.2: Sequence of Events: The Quality Choice Game
while the established firm produces a low quality product; (2) the start-up produces a
low quality product while the established firm produces a high quality product. We will
also consider the benchmark case where two established firms compete with different
quality levels.
The Quality Choice Game
In this setting, the firms’ capacity timing decisions are exogenous. The quality choice
game proceeds in three stages, as shown in Figure 2.2. In stage 1, both firms choose their
quality levels: Ss and Se, respectively. In stage 2, the firm(s) who invest early determine
their capacity quantities. By the end of this stage, demand uncertainty is resolved. In
stage 3, the firm(s) who invest late determine their capacity quantities. By the end of
stage 3, the firms produce and release the products to the market. We assume the unit
capacity cost is given by: Cik = βiS
2
k , where i ∈ {1, 2}, k ∈ {l, h}, and β1 is the coefficient
for early capacity investment while β2 is the coefficient for late capacity investment. To
make the problem feasible, we have made an assumption as specified in footnote 3, which
can now be transformed into Sh ≤ µ2βi , where i, j ∈ {1, 2}. We will consider four different
timing scenarios, which will be specified later.
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2.4 Equilibrium of the Capacity Timing Game
In this section, we analyze the capacity timing game. We also examine the benchmark
case wherein two established firms compete against each other. We solve the game by
backward induction: given each pair of timing decisions, we solve the capacity quantity
subgame first, and subsequently derive the capacity timing equilibrium.
In the following analysis, we use notation T fq to denote the capacity investment timing
strategy of a firm. T ∈ {E,L} represents the timing of capacity investment being early
(E) or late (L). f ∈ {e, s} denotes the attribute of the firm, where e or s refers to
established firm or start-up, respectively. Lastly q ∈ {l, h} stands for the quality level
with l and h denoting low and high quality, respectively. For instance, (Esl , L
e
h) denotes
the equilibrium in which the low quality start-up invests early while the high quality
established firm invests late. We summarize the notations in Table 2.1.
High-quality Es.Firm Early High-quality Es.Firm Late
Low-quality Start-up Early (Esl , E
e
h) (E
s
l , L
e
h)
Low-quality Start-up Late (Lsl , E
e
h) (L
s
l , L
e
h)
Low-quality Es.Firm Early Low-quality Es.Firm Late
High-quality Start-up Early (Esh, E
e
l ) (E
s
h, L
e
l )
High-quality Start-up Late (Lsh, E
e
l ) (L
s
h, L
e
l )
High-quality Es.Firm Early High-quality Es.Firm Late
Low-quality Es.Firm Early (Eel , E
e
h) (E
e
l , L
e
h)
Low-quality Es.Firm Late (Lel , E
e
h) (L
e
l , L
e
h)
Table 2.1: Notations for the Capacity Timing Equilibria
2.4.1 High-quality Established Firm vs. Low-quality Start-up
We first examine the scenario in which the start-up produces a low quality product
while the established firm produces a high quality product. We focus on the situations
when both firms are able to make profits in this market, which requires an additional
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restriction on the distribution of θˆ.3
ψ∗ E(pi∗)
(Esl , E
e
h) 1−G
(
2
√
α
Sl
+ Shµ−
√
Slα−C1h
2Sh
+ C1l
Sl
)
(Shµ−
√
Slα−C1h)2
4Sh
(Esl , L
e
h) 1−G
(
2
√
2(2Sh−Sl)
SlSh
α− C2h
Sh
+ 2C1l
Sl
) Sh
4
(µ2 + σ2)−
(√
SlShα
2(2Sh−Sl) +
C2h
2
)
µ
+ Slα
2(2Sh−Sl) +
C22h
4Sh
+
√
Slα
2Sh(2Sh−Sl)C2h
(Lsl , E
e
h) 1−G
(
µ
2
+ C2l−2C1h
2(2Sh−Sl) +
C2l
Sl
+ 2
√
α
Sl
)
2Sh−Sl
8
µ2 + (C2l−2C1h)µ
4
+ (C2l−2C1h)
2
8(2Sh−Sl)
(Lsl , L
e
h) 1−G
(
2C2lSh−C2hSl+(4Sh−Sl)
√
Slα
SlSh
) Sh (1− 2Sh4Sh−Sl)2 (µ2 + σ2) + (C2l−2C2h4Sh−Sl )2 Sh
+2Sh
(
1− 2Sh
4Sh−Sl
)(
C2l−2C2h
4Sh−Sl
)
µ
Table 2.2: Optimal Survival Probability and Expected Profit When a Low-quality Start-
up Competes Against a High-quality Established Firm
In Table 2, we present the optimal survival probability for the start-up and the optimal
profit for the established firm in the capacity quantity subgame given each pair of timing
decisions. With these results, we are ready to derive the equilibria of the supergame.
Taking one case for instance, we find that when ψ∗(Esl , L
e
h) ≥ ψ∗(Lsl , Leh) and E(pi∗)(Esl ,
Leh) ≥ E(pi∗)(Esl , Eeh) are both satisfied, (Esl , Leh) is an equilibrium. For brevity, we do
not list all the equilibria and the corresponding conditions. In the following proposition,
we present some important and interesting equilibria.
Proposition 2.4.1. Suppose that a start-up with a low quality product competes against
an established firm with a high quality product. If C1l < C2l,
i) There exists a threshold σ¯se such that for all σ > σ¯se, a unique equilibrium arises in
which the start-up invests early while the established firm invests late.
ii) Neither an equilibrium in which the start-up invests late while the established firm
invests early nor an equilibrium in which both firms invest late arises.
3To ensure that both firms would make nonnegative profits, we further assume θˆ ≥ max{
√
2Slα
Sh(2Sh−Sl) +
C2h
Sh
, 2C2lSh−C2hSlSlSh ,
µ
2 +
C2l−2C1h
2(2Sh−Sl) +
C2l
Sl
,
√
Slα
Sh
+ C1hSh ,
√
2α
2Sh−Sl +
C2l
Sl
, SlShµ+C2hSl−2C1lSh2Sh(2Sh−Sl) +
C2h
Sh
, 2C1lSh−C2hSlSlSh ,
√
α
Sh
+ C1lSl }.
17
To explain the results of Proposition 2.4.1, we compute a numerical example in Figure
2.3(a). It shows that as the capacity cost for the low quality product increases over time,
neither (Lsl , L
e
h) nor (L
s
l , E
e
h) would ever arise in equilibrium, which implies that the
low quality start-up always behaves aggressively and takes a capacity-leading strategy.
Furthermore, Figure 2.3(a) indicates that when the demand volatility exceeds some level,
(Esl , L
e
h) becomes a unique equilibrium, which is consistent with the result in Proposition
2.4.1. In other words, when the demand is highly volatile, the established firm chooses a
capacity-lagging strategy. This shows that the established firm cares more about demand
uncertainty than the start-up.
(a) Low-quality Start-up and High-quality Es. Firm (b) High-quality Start-up and Low-quality Es. Firm
Figure 2.3: Capacity Investment Timing Equilibria, C1h < C2h, C1l < C2l, Sl = 5, C1h =
25, C1l = 10, α = 10, µ = 10
2.4.2 Low-quality Established Firm vs. High-quality Start-Up
In this scenario, we switch the product quality level of the start-up and the established
firm, i.e, the start-up now produces a high quality product while the established firm
produces a low quality product. We are curious whether this change would substantially
affect the investment dynamics we have observed previously. The results for the capacity
subgame are summarized in Table 2.3, and the equilibria are presented in Proposition
2.4.2.
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ψ∗ E(pi∗)
(Esh, E
e
l ) 1−G
(
2
√
α
Sh
+
Slµ−Sl
√
α/Sh−C1l
2Sh
+ C1h
Sh
)
(Slµ−Sl
√
α/Sh−C1l)2
4Sl
(Esh, L
e
l ) 1−G
(
2
√
2α
2Sh−Sl +
2C1h−C2l
2Sh−Sl
) Sl
4
(µ2 + σ2)−
(
Sl
√
α
2(2Sh−Sl) +
C2l
2
)
µ
+ Slα
2(2Sh−Sl) +
C22l
4Sl
+
√
α
2(2Sh−Sl)C2l
(Lsh, E
e
l ) 1−G
(
SlShµ+SlC2h−2ShC1l
2Sh(2Sh−Sl) +
C2h
Sh
+ 2
√
α
Sh
)
(SlShµ+SlC2h−2ShC1l)2
8SlSh(2Sh−Sl)
(Lsh, L
e
l ) 1−G
(
−Sh(C2l−2C2h)+(4Sh−Sl)
√
Shα
Sh(2Sh−Sl)
) SlS2h
(4Sh−Sl)2 (µ
2 + σ2)− 2Sh(2C2lSh−C2hSl)
(4Sh−Sl)2 µ
+ (2C2lSh−C2hSl)
2
Sl(4Sh−Sl)2
Table 2.3: Optimal Survival Probability and Expected Profit When a Low-quality Es-
tablished Firm Competes Against a High-quality Start-up
Proposition 2.4.2. Suppose that an established firm with a low quality product competes
against a start-up with a high quality product.
i) If C1l < C2l and C2h − C1h < Slµ4 , there exists a threshold σ¯es > 0 and a threshold
S¯h > 0 such that for σ < σ¯es and Sh > S¯h, is a unique equilibrium arises in which
the start-up invests late while the established firm invests early. If C2h − C1h > Slµ4 ,
an equilibrium in which the start-up invests late while the established firm invests
early never arises.
ii) If C1h < C2h, an equilibrium in which both firms invest late never arises. Further-
more, there exists a threshold σ˜es(σ˜es ≥ σ¯es) such that for σ > σ˜es, a unique equi-
librium arises in which the start-up invests early while the established firm invests
late.
Proposition 2.4.2 deals with the case when a high quality start-up competes against
a low quality established firm. Again, we use a numerical example to illustrate the
findings and intuitions, which is displayed in Figure 2.3(b). When the capacity cost for
the high quality product increases over time, we can see from the figure that (Lsh, L
e
l )
is never an equilibrium. Among the equilibria displayed in Figure 2.3(b), (Lsh, E
e
l ) is
the most interesting one. As both indicated in the Proposition 2.4.2 and Figure 2.3(b),
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with increasing investment costs over time, (Lsh, E
e
l ) becomes a unique equilibrium when
the following conditions hold: the capacity cost for the start-up does not increase too
much over time, the quality differential is sufficiently large, and the demand volatility is
sufficiently low.
This observation contrasts sharply with the findings in Swinney et al. (2011). In their
setting, when a start-up competes against an established firm, and when the capacity
cost increases over time, the equilibrium with established firm investing early and start-
up investing late never exists. However, when quality differentiation is incorporated into
the model, this equilibrium emerges in the scenario described above. We shall emphasize
that the condition C2h −C1h < Slµ4 in Proposition 2.4.2 is critical in deriving the unique
equilibrium (Lsh, E
e
l ). We show this by presenting a numerical counterexample in Figure
3.4. We see that equilibrium (Lsh, E
e
l ) no longer exists when this condition is violated.
Equilibrium (Esh, L
e
l ) is also worth noticing. As stated in Proposition 2.4.2, when demand
volatility is sufficiently high, this equilibrium becomes a unique equilibrium. This reflects
that the high quality start-up could also be aggressive and adopt a capacity-leading
strategy when the demand is highly volatile.
Last but not least, in Figures 2.3(a) and 2.3(b), when demand volatility is high, there
exist a unique equilibrium in which the start-up chooses the capacity-leading strategy
when facing a highly volatile demand, while the established firm acts as a follower. This
result is consistent with the results in Proposition 2.4.1(i) and Proposition 2.4.2(ii). This
equilibrium of start-up investing early and established firm investing late replicates the
result of Swinney et al. (2011), but in a setting of quality differentiation.
2.4.3 Two Established Firms
We now proceed to the benchmark case of two established firms competing against
each other. By comparing it to the start-up vs. established firm scenario, we can isolate
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Figure 2.4: A Special Case When a Low-quality Established Firm Competes Against a
High-quality Start-Up, C2h − C1h > Slµ4
the effect of bankruptcy risk on capacity investment timing strategies. The results for
the capacity subgame are summarized in Table 2.4, and the equilibria are presented in
Proposition 2.4.3.
E(pi∗l ) E(pi
∗
h)
(Eel , E
e
h) Sl
(
Sh
4Sh−Slµ−
2C1lSh−C1hSl
Sl(4Sh−Sl)
)2
Sh
(
2Sh−Sl
4Sh−Slµ+
C1l−2C1h
4Sh−Sl
)2
(Eel , L
e
h)
(SlShµ+SlC2h−2ShC1l)2
8SlSh(2Sh−Sl) Sh
(
µ
2
− SlShµ+SlC2h−2ShC1l
4(2Sh−Sl)Sh −
C2h
2Sh
)2
+ Sh
4
σ2
(Lel , E
e
h) Sl
(
µ
4
− C2l−2C1h
4(2Sh−Sl) −
C2l
2Sl
)2
+ Sl
4
σ2
(
2Sh−Sl
2
) (
µ
2
+ C2l−2C1h
2(2Sh−Sl)
)2
(Lel , L
e
h)
Sl
(
Sh
4Sh−Slµ−
2C2lSh−C2hSl
Sl(4Sh−Sl)
)2
Sh
(
2Sh−Sl
4Sh−Slµ+
C2l−2C2h
4Sh−Sl
)2
+
SlS
2
h
(4Sh−Sl)2σ
2 +Sh
(
2Sh−Sl
4Sh−Sl
)2
σ2
Table 2.4: Two Established Firms
Proposition 2.4.3. When two established firms, one with low quality and the other with
high quality, compete against each other, there exists a threshold σ¯ee such that for all
σ > σ¯ee, a unique equilibrium in which both firms invest late arises.
Figure 2.5 illustrates the results of Proposition 2.4.3. Notice that (Lel , L
e
h) arises as
an equilibrium in Figure 2.5, which does not appear in Figures 2.3(a) and 2.3(b). As
indicated in Proposition 2.4.3, this unique equilibrium occurs when demand volatility
exceeds a threshold value. In Figure 2.5, this equilibrium occurs in the upper right cor-
ner. The emergence of this unique equilibrium is caused by the change of competition
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Figure 2.5: Capacity Investment Timing Equilibria, C1h < C2h, C1l < C2l, Sl = 5, C1h =
25, C1l = 10, µ = 10. Two Established Firms
structure from a start-up vs. an established firm to two established firms. From Figures
2.3(a) and 2.3(b), we see that a start-up competing against an established firm always
chooses a capacity-leading strategy whenever the demand is highly volatile. But com-
peting established firms choose a capacity-lagging strategy when facing a highly volatile
demand.
2.5 Equilibrium of the Quality Choice Game
In this section, we analyze the equilibrium of the quality choice game. Given the
two-level quality choices, there are four possible quality equilibria. We use (Ssl , S
e
h) to
represent the equilibrium in which the start-up chooses the low quality level while the
established firm chooses the high quality level. The other three equilibria are similarly
specified in Table 2.5.
Es.Firm chooses Low-quality Es.Firm chooses High-quality
Start-up chooses Low-quality (Ssl , S
e
l ) (S
s
l , S
e
h)
Start-up chooses High-quality (Ssh, S
e
l ) (S
s
h, S
e
h)
Table 2.5: Notations for the Quality Equilibria
We solve the problem backwardly by solving the subgame first. That is, given the
quality choices of both firms, we solve the capacity quantity subgame and derive equilib-
ria. Note that when both firms choose different quality levels, the subgame is identical
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to what we have solved in the previous section. But we need to consider a new scenario
here, that is, when both firms choose the same quality level, i.e., Ss = Se. In this case,
the subgame is reduced to a Cournot game with no product differentiation(see Appendix
A.1).
There are four different capacity timing scenarios: (1) (Es, Ee), representing that
both the start-up and the established firm invest early; (2) (Ls, Le), representing that
both the start-up and the established firm invest late; (3) (Es, Le), representing that the
start-up invests early while the established firm invests late; (4) (Ls, Ee), representing
that the start-up invest late while the established firm invest early.
In this section we focus on the analysis for (Es, Ee), i.e., both the start-up and the
established firm invest early. This case is relatively more interesting than the other cases
because it keeps the firms symmetric in term of capacity timing and at the same time
preserves the effect of demand uncertainty, which helps us better understand the outcome
of the quality choice game. The subgame equilibrium analysis of the (Es, Ee) scenario
is given in Table 2.6. For brevity, we provide the subgame analysis of the other three
timing scenarios in the Appendix.
Quality Choices ψ∗ E(pi∗)
(Ssl , S
e
l ) 1−G
(
2
√
α
Sl
+
Slµ−
√
Slα−β2S2l
2Sl
+ β1Sl
)
(Slµ−
√
Slα−β2S2l )2
4Sl
(Ssl , S
e
h) 1−G
(
2
√
α
Sl
+
Shµ−
√
Slα−β2S2h
2Sh
+ β1Sl
)
(Shµ−
√
Slα−β2S2h)2
4Sh
(Ssh, S
e
l ) 1−G
(
2
√
α
Sh
+
Slµ−Sl
√
α/Sh−β2S2l
2Sh
+ β1Sh
)
(Slµ−Sl
√
α/Sh−β2S2l )2
4Sl
(Ssh, S
e
h) 1−G
(
2
√
α
Sh
+
Shµ−
√
Shα−β2S2h
2Sh
+ β1Sh
)
(Shµ−Sh
√
α/Sh−β2S2h)2
4Sh
Table 2.6: The Start-Up’s Optimal Survival Probability and The Established Firm’s
Expected Profit When Both Firms Make Early Capacity Investment
2.5.1 Asymmetric and Symmetric Quality Equilibria
Next we characterize the equilibria of the quality choice game. Note that (Ssl , S
e
h) is
an equilibrium if and only if ψ∗(Ssl , S
e
h) ≥ ψ∗(Ssh, Seh) and E(pi∗)(Ssl , Seh) ≥ E(pi∗)(Ssl ,
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Sel ) are both satisfied. Similar arguments can be applied to the other three equilibria:
(Ssl , S
e
l ), (S
s
h, S
e
l ) and (S
s
h, S
e
h). An immediate observation is that if there exist multiple
equilibria, at most two equilibria are possible: either the symmetric multiple equilibria:
(Ssl , S
e
l ) and (S
s
h, S
e
h), or the asymmetric multiple equilibria: (S
s
l , S
e
h) and (S
s
h, S
e
l ). The
next proposition characterizes conditions under which an asymmetric equilibrium arises.
Proposition 2.5.1. Suppose both firms invest early. When the following conditions are
satisfied, an asymmetric equilibrium arises. Specifically,
1. An equilibrium arises in which the start-up chooses the low quality level while the
established firm chooses the high quality level if Sl > (
5
√
α
4β1
)2/3 and Sh <
µ
3β1
.
Furthermore, this equilibrium is unique if Sl > Sl or Sh ∈ [Sh, S¯h] holds, where
Sl is the solution to µ(Sl)
−1 +
√
α(Sl)
− 3
2 = 3β1 and Sh, S¯h are the solutions to
Sh +
√
α√
Sh
1
3β1
= µ
3β1
.
2. A unique equilibrium arises in which the start-up chooses the high quality level, while
the established firm chooses the low quality level if Sl >
µ
3β1
and Sh < (
3
√
α
4β1
)2/3.
Proposition 2.5.1 provides sufficient conditions for the existence of asymmetric equi-
libria. Comparing the conditions of part 1 and part 2 of Proposition 2.5.1 yields two
interesting observations. First, when µ, the market size, increases, the conditions of part
1 are more likely to be satisfied while the conditions of part 2 are less likely to be satisfied.
This implies that (Ssl , S
e
h), the equilibrium in which the start-up chooses low quality and
the established firm chooses high quality, is more likely to arise when the market size
increases. Second, when α, the threshold of the start-up’s survival probability, increases,
the the conditions of part 1 are less likely to be satisfied while the conditions of part 2
are more likely to be satisfied. This implies that (Ssh, S
e
l ), the equilibrium in which the
start-up chooses high quality and the established firm chooses low quality, is more likely
to arise when the threshold increases.
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Proposition 2.5.2. Suppose both firms invest early. When the following conditions are
satisfied, a symmetric equilibrium arises. Specifically,
1. An equilibrium arises in which both firms choose high quality if Sh < (
5
√
α
4β1
)2/3 and
Sh ∈ [Sh, S¯h], where Sh and S¯h are the solutions to Sh+
√
α√
Sh
1
3β1
= µ
3β1
. Furthermore,
this equilibrium is unique if Sh < (
3
√
α
4β1
)2/3 or Sh <
µ
3β1
holds.
2. A unique equilibrium arises in which both firms choose low quality if Sl >
µ
2β1
and
Sl > Sl, where Sl is the solution to µ(Sl)
−1 +
√
α(Sl)
− 3
2 = 3β1.
Proposition 2.5.2 provides sufficient conditions for the existence of symmetric equi-
libria. By comparing the conditions of part 1 and part 2 of Proposition 2.5.2, we observe
that when µ or α increases, the conditions of part 1 are more likely to be satisfied while
the conditions of part 2 are less likely to be satisfied. This implies that (Ssh, S
e
h), the equi-
librium in which both firm choose high quality, is more likely to arise when the market
size or the threshold of the start-up’s survival probability increases.
Taken together, Propositions 2.5.1 and 2.5.2 suggest that when the market size in-
creases, the established firm is more likely to choose high quality. Moreover, the start-up is
more likely to choose high quality when the threshold of the start-up’s survival probability
increases.
2.5.2 Comparative Statics of Quality Levels
So far we have assumed the two quality levels are given. Next, we conduct comparative
statics of quality levels. We use Figure 2.6 to help illustrate the results. The equilibria
are marked in the upper triangular region since Sh is assumed to be larger than Sl. As
indicated in the figure, when Sh is relatively small (note that relatively small Sh also
implies relatively small Sl), or when Sl is extremely small and Sh is relatively high,
a unique symmetric equilibrium occurs in which both firms choose high quality. As
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Sl and Sh increase, the equilibrium changes to the asymmetric case, in which quality
differentiation helps both firms improve profits. Interestingly, in part of this region, we
also observe two equilibria co-exist, both of which are asymmetric. Finally, in the right
upper corner of the triangular area, the unique symmetric equilibrium arises with both
firms choosing the low quality.
(a) Early Start-up and Early Es. Firm (b) Late Start-up and Late Es. Firm
(c) Early Start-up and Late Es. Firm (d) Late Start-up and Early Es. Firm
Figure 2.6: Quality Equilibria under the Four Capacity Timing Scenarios: Relatively
Small Demand, µ = 6, σ2 = 1, α = 10, β1 = 0.25
2.5.3 The Interdependence between Quality Choice and Capacity Timing
Next we study the interdependence between quality choice and capacity timing. To
this end, we carry out similar numerical analysis for the other three capacity timing
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scenarios. The results are presented in Figure 2.6 (b), (c) and (d).
Comparing Figure 2.6 (a) and (c) leads to an interesting observation: the (Ssh, S
e
h)
region in (a) mostly changes to (Ssh, S
e
l ) in (c). This implies when the start-up invests
early, the established firm’s low quality choice seems to be correlated with its late invest-
ment timing. In this situation, quality differentiation arises in the market. Interestingly
when the potential quality differentiation (i.e., when the difference between Sh and Sl
is large), the start-up tends to choose high quality while the established firm tends to
choose low quality. Moreover, we observe that symmetric quality equilibria do not exist
in (c), which suggests that asymmetric quality equilibria are correlated with asymmetric
capacity timing.
(a) Early Start-up and Early Es. Firm (b) Late Start-up and Late Es. Firm
(c) Early Start-up and Late Es. Firm (d) Early Start-up and Late Es. Firm
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Figure 2.7: Quality Equilibria under the Four Capacity Timing Scenarios: Relatively
High Demand, µ = 10, σ2 = 1, α = 10, β1 = 0.25
Comparing Figure 2.6 (a) and (b), we observe that the equilibrium patterns are
similar, except that the region with multiple equilibria shrinks. This implies that as long
as the firms’ capacity timing decisions are symmetric, investing early or investing late do
not seem to make a significant impact on the quality choices.
The asymmetric quality equilibria in Figure 2.6 (c) are particularly interesting because
the (Es, Le) capacity timing pattern resembles disruptive innovations in various indus-
tries. Empirical evidence suggests that start-ups may take either high-end or low-end
encroachment strategies. Our results suggest that two conditions may make start-ups
more likely to choose high-end encroachment strategies: (1) when the potential qual-
ity differentiation (i.e., when the difference between Sh and Sl) is large; (2) when the
potential quality differentiation is small and the absolute quality level is small.
Next we examine how quality choices of firms depend on the market size. The nu-
merical results are displayed in Figure 2.7. Comparing it with Figure 2.6 suggests that
(Ssh, S
e
h) and (S
s
l , S
e
h) are more likely to arise when the market size increases. This ob-
servation is consistent with the results of Proposition 2.5.1 and Proposition 2.5.2. (see
the discussion after Proposition 2.5.1 and Proposition 2.5.2)4
2.5.4 Quality Choices of Two Established Firms
One of research questions asks whether the presence of a start-up in the market
increase or decrease product differentiation. To answer this question, we analyze the
benchmark of two established firms. The results are displayed in Figure 2.8. Comparing
the quality choice equilibria of this figure with Figure 2.7 yields the following observation:
4For Figure 2.7 (c), there are more than two equilibria displayed in the graph. If we continue to increase
µ, (Ssh, S
e
h) and (S
s
l , S
e
h) will be the only two equilibria left.
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the presence of start-up increase product differentiation. For instance, Figure 2.7(a)
has the equilibrium in which the start-up chooses high quality and the established firm
chooses low quality (Ssl , S
e
h). This asymmetric equilibrium does not exists in Figure
2.8(a), which only has the symmetric equilibrium in which both firms choose high quality.
(a) Early Es. Firm 1 and Early Es. Firm 2 (b) Late Es. Firm 1 and Late Es. Firm 2
(c) Early Es. Firm 1 and Late Es. Firm 2 (d) Late Es. Firm 1 and Early Es. Firm 2
Figure 2.8: Two Established Firms, Quality Equilibria under the Four Capacity Timing
Scenarios: Relatively High Demand, µ = 10, σ2 = 1, α = 10, β1 = 0.25
2.6 Concluding Remarks
Inspired by various disruptive innovations observed in practice, we study the inno-
vation strategies of start-ups and established firms along two dimensions: quality choice
and capacity timing. We build a stylized duopoly model in which a start-up and an es-
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tablished firm compete in a market with quality differentiation and demand uncertainty.
Our analysis generate valuable insights that can be applied to understand the drivers
of high-end vs. low-end disruptive innovations taken by either start-ups or established
firms in the market. For instance, we find that when the market size increases, the
established firm is more likely to choose high quality. Moreover, the start-up is more
likely to choose high quality when the threshold of the start-up’s survival probability
increases. Second, we find that the presence of a start-up in the market tends to increase
quality differentiation. Third, our results suggest that the firms’ quality choice and
capacity timing are interdependent. Specifically, we find that quality differentiation is
more likely to arise when the two firms choose different capacity timing. Fourth, we
also identify an interesting equilibrium in which the established firm with a low-equality
product chooses a capacity-leading strategy when the start-up with a high-quality chooses
a capacity-lagging strategy. This equilibrium is consistent with anecdotal evidence on
established firms being disruptive innovators.
Limitations exist in our model. First, our model does not capture the setting when
both the quality choices and the capacity timing decisions are endogenous. Endogenizing
both decisions in our model with demand uncertainty inevitably leads to an intractable
model. To overcome this, we focus on the quality choice game and the capacity timing
game separately, but consider different timing and quality scenarios in the two games,
respectively. This simplification leads to interesting managerial insights about the in-
terdependence between quality choice and capacity timing. One issue may arise when
endogenizing both the quality choices and the timing decisions together in a model—it
is not clear whether the quality choices should be determined before or after the timing
decisions, or both should be determined concurrently. Relevant anecdotal evidence needs
to be collected to validate such an assumption on the sequence of events.
Second, we adopt a production clearance strategy. A more realistic assumption would
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be that the production quantity is bounded by the capacity level, and hence is not nec-
essarily equal to it. Thus, holdback may happen. Although we find it difficult to obtain
analytical results under such an assumption, further work in this area is worthwhile.
Third, the objective functions we adopt for start-ups and established firms only de-
scribe the extreme cases, i.e., start-ups only care about bankruptcy risk while established
firms only care about profit. Nevertheless, in reality, all firms would care about not only
profit but also bankruptcy risk. And they may differ in the relative weight of these two
factors.5
5Swinney et al. (2011) show that the main results still hold when using a combined form of objective
function.
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CHAPTER 3 PROCUREMENT CONTRACTING UNDER PRODUCT
RECALL RISK
3.1 Introduction
In today’s competitive global markets, product quality and consumer satisfaction
are raised to an unparalleled status. However, product recalls are commonly observed
in various industries. When a major product quality failure is detected, either due to
design flaws or production defects, the manufacturer may recall all the affected batches of
products that may potentially contain the defect. Leading manufacturers, renowned for
high quality, may still suffer from massive product recalls. As a legend in the automobile
industry, Toyota has long been recognized as a leader in manufacturing and quality
management. However, it ran into serious challenges in recent years: a series of recalls
were issued by Toyota between 2009 and 2010. The first recall, happened in September
2009, including eight models and 3.8 million vehicles, was due to gas pedals sticking on
floor mats that may cause dangerous sudden acceleration. Later that year, two additional
recalls followed and 4.2 million more vehicles were called back. At the beginning of 2010,
Toyota issued two additional recalls which amount to 3.39 million cars in the U.S., and
then decided to expand the recall to cover over 1.8 million cars across Europe and China.
Meanwhile, Toyota temporarily suspended US sales and production of all the eight models
involved in the recall. As a result, Toyota lost five percent market share in the US, which
may further rise as an aftershock of the crisis. To make the matter worse, a group of
law firms sued Toyota to compensate losses due to deaths and injuries related to the
quality issues. Product recalls are not unique to the automobile industry, they are also
observed in the food industry (e.g. (Thomsen and McKenzie 2001)) and the medical
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device industry (e.g. (Thirumalai and Sinha 2011)). Even in the aerospace industry,
for example, Boeing announced in early 2013 that they were recalling all of their 50
manufactured 787 Dreamliner Aircraft due to a faulty Lithium Ion Battery outsourced
from a supplier. As a consequence, over 1900 flights were rescheduled. Product recalls
are not necessarily restricted to manufacturers, they can also happen to retailers. An
example is Lululemon Athletica, an athletic apparel retailer, which recalled its yoga
pants in the spring of 2013 1. An extensive review on product recalls can be found in
(Marucheck, Greis, Mena and Cai 2011).
Typically, the financial impact of product recalls is enormous in magnitude. Once a
recall is issued, the number of products involved could be numerous. There are direct
costs from repairs, recall logistics, and litigation fees, and indirect costs due to lost sales,
damaged reputation, and manufacturing downtime. (see also (Hendricks and Singhal
2003), (Rupp 2004) and (Jarrell and Peltzman 1985)). Product recalls are generally
caused by product quality failures. In many cases, the defects lie in the components or the
products outsourced from an external supplier. In the presence of outsourcing, ensuring
product quality become particularly challenging because quality failures could result from
the use of low-quality raw materials, design flaws, or manufacturing defects, which are
managed by different parties of a supply chain. As a result, information asymmetry and
moral hazard make it impossible for manufacturers to rely on supplier’s self-motivation to
achieve quality. There are different ways to induce suppliers to invest in quality. One way
is through quality inspection, but it can be costly and time consuming. An alternative
and complementary way is providing financial incentives to suppliers through structured
contracts on quality. The challenge of quality contracting is that in general the suppliers
quality effort cannot be directly observed and the quality output is uncertain. What
complicates quality contracting even further is the fact that it is often times unrealistic
1http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323415304578369812787114262.html
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to have a clear-cut assignment of fault to each firm involved in the product development
and manufacturing processes. It is not uncommon for a manufacturer and a supplier
to point fingers at each other when product failures occur. Lululemons yoga pants were
recalled in 2013 because they became too thin when being stretched. The apparel retailer
blamed the defective batches of yoga pants on its Taiwanese supplier, Eclat Textile, who
manufactured the products. The supplier, however, refused to accept this blame and
argued that it followed Lululemons design specifications in choosing the fabrics, and the
products went through a certification process approved by the retailer. Such quality
disputes may also arise when product architecture is complex and ambiguity in fault
determination. A classical story was the one between Ford and its tire supplier Firestone
in a massive recall of Ford Explorer in 2000.2 Ford claimed that the tires were faulty
and could, under certain conditions, cause vehicles to roll over. Firestone claimed that
the problem was with the vehicle. Some suspected that the quality failure lied in the
interfacing area of the vehicle and the tires.
Due to the challenge of directly contracting on quality effort and output, some manu-
factures have used recall cost sharing contracts to incentivize suppliers quality effort. For
instance, in August 2013, General Motors announced that it would start sharing recall
costs with its suppliers even if their products initially passed GM’s quality inspection
but later were found to be defective.3 In this paper, we will focus on recall cost sharing
contracts and investigate their effectiveness in improving quality.
Naturally, the financial impact of product recalls also depends on the total sales,
creating an inherent dependence between quality and quantity decisions. As a result,
2http://www.people.vcu.edu/∼dbromley/firestoneLink.htm, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Firestone and
Ford tire controversy
3http://www.autonews.com/article/20130805/OEM10/308059934/gm-presses-suppliers-for-future-
recall-costs
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demand uncertainty further complicates manufacturers effort in managing product recall
risks. With the demand risk, a careful quantity decision needs to be made, and who
decides the quantity makes a difference. In a push system, the manufacturer commits
to an order quantity before observing demand; while in a pull system, the manufacturer
places an order after demand uncertainty is resolved while the supplier commits to a
production quantity before demand realization.
Motivated by GM’s practice, we center our research questions on how to mitigate recall
risk under demand uncertainty. What is the interaction between quality and quantity
decisions in the supply chain? To address this problem, we consider a model in which a
manufacturer outsources to a supplier the production of a component, which is subject
to potential quality failure leading to a product recall. The manufacturer acts as the
Stackelberg leader offering a recall cost sharing contract to the supplier. We consider
two regimes: (1) a push system in which the manufacturer sets both the wholesale price
and the quantity before observing demand, leaving only the quality effort decision to
the supplier; (2) a pull system, in which the manufacturer only determines the wholesale
price while the supplier makes both the quantity decision and the quality effort decision
before demand realization. The essential difference between the two regimes lies in who
bears the demand risk. We find that the manufacturer achieves a higher production
quantity and induces a higher quality effort of the supplier in the push system than
in the pull system. Therefore, the manufacturer can improve quality by taking on the
demand risk of the supply chain. Moreover, the presence of product recall risk decreases
the production quantity in the push system but does not affect the production quantity
in the pull system. Interestingly, the manufacturer can improve quality and profit by
decreasing her share of the total recall cost without affecting the production quantity of
the supply chain in both the push and pull systems.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a review of related
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literatures. Section 3 presents the model while Sections 4 and 5 present the analysis for
the model with and without the product recall risk, respectively. Section 6 concludes our
work.
3.2 Literature Review
By incorporating both the recall risk and the demand risk in a procurement contract-
ing setting, our work contributes to two streams of literatures in supply chain contracting:
quality contracting and newsvendor contracting. There exists a considerable amount of
related literature on newsvendor contracting literature in supply chains. This stream of
literature mainly focuses on demand risk. (Lariviere and Porteus 2001) consider a simple
wholesale price contract in which a manufacturer sells to a retailer facing a newsvendor
problem. (Cachon and Lariviere 2001) study a manufacturer-retailer outsourcing setting
in which the supplier need to construct capacity in advance of receiving order from the
manufacturer. They consider both forced compliance and voluntary compliance regimes
and study contracts that allow the supply chain to share demand forecasts credibly.
(Cachon 2004) investigate both push and pull systems based on wholesale price based
contracts and focus on how the allocation of inventory risk influences a supply chains
performance and its division of profit. There are a number of papers which study more
complicated supply chain coordinating contracts (buy-back contracts, revenue sharing
contracts et al.). The focus is on how to design a contract between downstream and up-
stream players to eliminate double marginalization and maximize supply chain efciency.
(Cachon 2003) provides an excellent review on the management of incentive conflicts
with contracts in various newsvendor settings. There is a growing literature on quality
contracting in supply chains. This stream of literature focuses on modeling the quality
improvement incentives of supply chain members. Quality could be improved either by
inspection or by investment from multiple players. (Reyniers and Tapiero 1995) consider
a model in which a supplier makes a unobservable quality-related choice while Producer
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independently decides on his inspection policy for both non-cooperative and cooperative
settings. (Lim 2001) also consider a product quality inspection problem. They investigate
the contract design of a producer when he purchases parts from a supplier, and there is in-
complete information regarding the quality of the parts. Similarly, (Baiman, Fischer and
Rajan 2000) and (Baiman, Fischer and Rajan 2001) consider a setting where a supplier,
who incurs quality improvement costs, sells an intermediate product to a buyer, who
incurs appraisal costs to identify defects, and examine the relationship between product
architecture, supply-chain performance metrics, and supply-chain efficiency. There are
papers modeling quality improvement investment by both the supplier and the buyer.
(Balachandran and Radhakrishnan 2005) examine a supply chain in which the nal prod-
uct consists of components made by a buyer and a supplier in a double moral hazard
situation. (Zhu, Zhang and Tsung 2007) focus on supply risk and consider a buyer who
designs a product and outsources the production to a supplier and both players have
options to invest in quality improvement. They also investigate the interaction between
quality-improvement decisions interact and operational quantity decisions such as the
buyer’s order quantity and the supplier’s production lot size using an EOQ model. In
addition, all papers listed out above examine the fixed sharing rate contracts covering
the external quality costs. As a more general case, (Chao, Iravani and Savaskan 2009) fo-
cus on recall instances, and discuss two external quality cost sharing contracts, in which
product recall costs can be shared between a manufacturer and a supplier to induce
effort from both sides to improve final product quality. They characterize the quality
improvement effort decisions which are subject to moral hazard and even when there is
information asymmetry regarding to the existing process capability. To summarize our
contribution to the existing literatures, we are the first paper to establish the linkage be-
tween the product recall risk and the demand risk. Secondly we derive novel managerial
insights into quality decisions in both push and pull systems.
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r = market selling price
c = unit quantity cost
u = unit recall cost
s = quality effort marginal cost
λ = exponential rate
exp{−λe} = recall probability
g = density distribution
G = demand distribution
G¯ = complementary demand distribution
d = demand mean
l = demand lower bound
θ = recall cost sharing percentage
w = wholesale price
e = quality effort by the supplier
q = order quantity
q˜ = order quantity for the setting without product recall risk
S(q) = ED[min(q,D)] =
∫ q
0
G¯(x)dx = expected sales
Π = manufacturer’s profit
pi = supplier’s profit
Σ = supply chain profit
Table 3.1: Notations
3.3 Model
We consider a single period, single sourcing setting where a downstream manufacturer
outsources to an upstream supplier the production of a customized component. After
receiving the components from the supplier, the manufacturer finishes assembling and
releases the finished products to the market at price r. The market demand is assumed
to be random with distribution function G(x) and density function g(x). Assume G(x)
to be continuous and differentiable. Let G¯(x) = 1−G(x) denote complementary demand
distribution.
The components produced by the supplier are subject to potential quality failure.
Once a quality failure occurs, the manufacturer need to issue a product recall. This
product recall risk is characterized by a recall probability in an exponential form of
exp{−λe}, where e denotes the supplier’s quality effort, and λ is a given constant. Note
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that the recall probability is decreasing and convex in e, which also resembles the realistic
case. By deciding how much to invest in the quality effort e, the supplier can affect the
possibility of product recall. Besides, we assume that e is not contractible, which implies
the manufacturer, as a Stackelberg leader, faces a moral hazard problem and need to
incentivize the supplier to invest more in quality effort.
A linear cost structure is adopted with unit quantity cost c, unit recall cost u, and
unit quality effort cost s. In terms of the contract that the manufacturer provides to
the supplier, we consider a simple recall cost sharing contract (wholesale price based
contract), which is commonly used in the literatures. There are two parameters in this
contract, the unit wholesale price w and the recall cost sharing percentage θ. In other
words, the manufacturer offers the supplier with a wholesale price and the percentage of
the total recall cost that he will share in case a recall happens.
In this paper we study and compare two schemes, namely the push system and the pull
system ((Cachon 2004)). The sequence of events are as follows (displayed in Figure 3.1).
We begin with the push system. At the beginning of the time horizon, as a Stackelberg
leader, the manufacturer offers a recall cost sharing contract to the supplier, including
the unit wholesale price w and the recall cost sharing percentage θ. We treat the cost
sharing percentage θ as an exogenous decision first and then investigate the impact of θ.
The reason lies in the observation that the cost sharing percentage is often a long-term
strategic decision, while both the quantity and quality decisions are short-term decisions
and need to be revised periodically.
In the pull system, the manufacturer determines both the wholesale price w and
the order quantity q, leaving only the quality effort decision to the supplier. After the
supplier chooses the quality effort level, the demand D is realized. Then min{D, q}
units of products are sold to the market and the manufacturer is subject to recall risk.
Once a recall occurs, both parties (manufacturer and supplier) share the total recall
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Figure 3.1: Sequence of Events
cost according to the sharing scheme specified in the contract. In the pull system, the
demand risk is transferred from the downstream manufacturer in the former setting to the
upstream supplier, who now decides the quantity decision q before demand realization,
while the manufacturer does not order until the demand uncertainty is resolved.
3.4 Analysis
In this section, we first analyze the first-best benchmark case and then examine the
push and pull systems separately. After that we study the impact of recall risk and cost
sharing percentage. We close the section with a discussion on the range of cost sharing
percentage.
Denote the Π and pi as the profits for the downstream manufacturer and the upstream
supplier, respectively. Let Σ be the total profit for the supply chain, i.e. the sum of both
manufacturer’s and supplier’s profits. In the following analysis, we use superscript FB
to denote first-best variables, use superscript S to denote push system variables, and use
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superscript L to denote pull system variables.
3.4.1 First-Best Benchmark
To facilitate our understanding of the two schemes, we establish the first-best bench-
mark first, where the integrated supply chain maximizes the sum of both the manufac-
turer’s and supplier’s profits. The decision variables are the order quantity q and the
quality effort e, and the first-best optimization problem is given by
ΣFB = max
e,q
rS(q)− exp{−λe}uS(q)− cq − se,
where
S(q) = ED[min(q,D)] =
∫ q
0
G¯(x)dx.
In the following lemma, we provide the first-best optimal solution.
Lemma 3.4.1. If the demand distribution satisfies the IFR property and l ≥ s/uλ holds,
the optimal solution {eFB, qFB} for the first-best benchmark is given by
eFB =
1
λ
ln
(
S(qFB)uλ
s
)
,
and
rG¯(qFB)− s
λ
G¯(qFB)
S(qFB)
− c = 0.
The following corollary presents how the solution set {eFB, qFB} change when param-
eters alter.
Corollary 3.4.1. In the integrated supply chain, there are,
(i) qFB is increasing in r and λ, decreasing in c and s, and independent of u.
(ii) eFB is increasing in u and r, and decreasing in c and s.
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Corollary 3.4.1 provide the monotone properties of order quantity and quality effort
when the parameters change. The dependence on r and c accord with the results in
classic newsvendor problem. When unit quantity cost c increases, the overage cost for
the newsvendor is essentially higher, hence qFB decreases accordingly. With less order
quantity, the incentive for putting in quality effort is lowered, so eFB is reduced too.
Similarly, a higher selling price r means a higher underage cost, and therefore qFB and
eFB increases with r. The recall related parameters are λ, s and u. As the quality effort
marginal cost s increases, it costs more for the supplier to put in same amount of effort
than before. Therefore eFB decreases in s, resulting in higher recall probability. Similarly,
qFB decreases in s too. As λ increases, with same amount of effort as before, the recall
probability is lower, so the manufacturer has the incentive to release more product to
the market. With higher unit recall cost u, the potential penalty from recall is higher,
which incentivizes the supplier to put in more quality effort to reduce the possibility of
recall. Interestingly, we find that the unit recall cost u does not affect qFB. Intuitively,
higher unit recall cost should hinder from ordering more. However, the probability of
recall is reduced in the meantime, which contributes to reduce the expected recall cost
and encourage a higher product quantity. The effects of these two conflicting factors
cancel out.
3.4.2 Push System
With first-best benchmark established, we now move to examine the decentralized
settings. We start with the push system first, i.e., the manufacturer decides the order
quantity, which can be formulated as a stylized principle-agent problem, with individual
rationality (IR) and incentitive compatibility (IC) constraints:
ΠS = max
w,q
Π(w, e∗, q)
s.t. pi(w, e∗, q) ≥ 0 (IR)
e∗ ∈ argmax
e
pi(w, e, q) (IC),
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where
Π(w, e, q) = rS(q)− exp{−λe}θuS(q)− wq,
pi(w, e, q) = wq − exp{−λe}(1− θ)uS(q)− cq − se.
We solve this problem backwardly by first solving the supplier’s problem given wholesale
price w and order quantity q provided by the manufacturer, and then substituting the
supplier’s reactive function into the manufacturer’s problem to determine the optimal
solutions. We characterize the optimal solutions in the following proposition.
Lemma 3.4.2. If the demand distribution satisfies the IFR property and θ < θ¯ = 1 −
s/(uλl) holds, then the unique optimal solution is given by the following equations:
rG¯(qS)− s
λ
G¯(qS)
S(qS)
− c = 0,
eS =
1
λ
ln
(
S(qS)(1− θ)uλ
s
)
,
and
wS = c+
s
λqS
+
s
λqS
ln
(
S(qS)(1− θ)uλ
s
)
.
Note that the first equation in Lemma 3.4.2 is the same as that in the first-best
benchmark, and the second equation in Lemma 3.4.2 is different by only a coefficient of
(1− θ) from that in the first-best benchmark. By comparing with the first-best solution
in previous section, we further obtain the following result:
Lemma 3.4.3. In the push system, we have
(i) qFB = qS, and eFB > eS, thus the recall cost sharing contract cannot attain the
first-best solution.
(ii) piS = 0, and ΣS = ΠS, i.e., the supplier’s profit is pushed to zero, and the manu-
facturer takes all the supply chain’s profit.
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Lemma 3.4.3 shows that, under the decentralized push system when the manufacturer
bears the demand risk, he or she choose to order the same quantity as in the first-best
case, but the supplier chooses a lower quality effort than in the first-best case. Note
that the equations for determining qS and eS have the same structures as those in the
first-best benchmark, therefore all the qualitative properties in Corollary 3.4.1 carry over
here. Apart from the solution, we are also interested in the profit allocation in the push
system. According to Lemma 3.4.3, the supplier ends up with zero profit under the
optimal solution. Therefore, under this setting, the maunfacuter’s objective is aligned
with the supply chain profit, and thus she, as a stackberlg leader, has the incentive to
push both quantity and quality decisions as close as possible to the first-best solution.
With both quantity q and wholesale price w as decision variables, the manufacturer has
more flexibility to incentivize the supplier compared with the pull system we are about to
examine later. To summarize, qS is chosen to equal qFB, however, the suppier’s decision
eS is smaller than eFB due to the effect of double marginization. As a consequence, recall
cost sharing contract cannot attain the first-best, or in other words, this contract is not
efficient. Next we aim to further study this gap. Define δS(L) = ΣFB − ΣS(L), which
represents the supply chain profit loss (compared with integrated system) for the push
(pull) system, and we have the following result:
Proposition 3.4.1. In the push system, the supply chain profit loss is given by
δS =
s
λ
(
ln(1− θ) + θ
1− θ
)
.
Remark 3.4.1. Note that δS ≥ 0, dδS
dθ
≥ 0, and both inequalities are binding if and only
if θ = 0. Therefore, the supply chain profit loss is increasing in θ. In other words, the
larger percentage of recall costs the manufacturer is paying, the larger the supply chain
profit loss is. Ideally, the supply chain become most efficient if the manufacturer can to
the largest extent push recall risk upward the supply chain to the supplier.
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3.4.3 Pull System
Next we move to the pull system. Now the decision of q is up to the upstream supplier,
who takes the demand risk in the current setting. The problem becomes convoluted
since the agent now faces a two-dimensional decision problem, which is rarely seen in
most supply chain contracting literatures. Traditionally the agent is often faced with an
one-dimensional problem, which is easy to be solved with an explicit solution so that it
can be substituted back into the principle’s problem.
We formulate decentralized optimization problem as follows:
ΠL = max
w
Π(w, e∗, q∗)
s.t. pi(w, e∗, q∗) ≥ 0 (IR)
(e∗, q∗) ∈ argmax
e,q
pi(w, e, q) (IC),
where
Π(w, e, q) = rS(q)− exp{−λe}θuS(q)− wS(q), (3.4.1)
pi(w, e, q) = wS(q)− exp{−λe}(1− θ)uS(q)− cq − se. (3.4.2)
Note that the agent’s objective in our case is challenging too, because it is not concave,
and not even unidomal except that in some cases its first derivative is unimodal. Nev-
ertheless, we are able to prove both the existence and the uniqueness for the optimal
solutions in this setting.
We follow the similar procedure as in the push system, and characterize the optimal
solution for the pull system first.
Lemma 3.4.4. If the demand distribution satisfies the IFR property and θ < θ¯ = 1 −
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s/(uλl) holds, then the unique optimal solution is given by
rG¯(qL)− cg(q
L)S(qL)
G¯2(qL)
− c = 0, (3.4.3)
eL =
1
λ
ln
(
S(qL)(1− θ)uλ
s
)
, (3.4.4)
and
wL =
c
G¯(qL)
+
s
λS(qL)
. (3.4.5)
As before, we examine how the optimal solutions change as the parameters vary. The
results are presented in the following corollary.
Corollary 3.4.2. In the pull system, we have
(i) qL is decreasing in c, increasing in r, and is independent of u, s, and λ.
(ii) eL is increasing in u and r, and decreasing in c and s.
Compared with both the first-best benchmark and the push system, the changes are
the dependence of qL and eL on s and λ. As quality effort marginal cost s increase, the
supplier’s quality effort is likely to decrease, and hence lead to potentially higher recall
cost. Therefore the supplier has the incentive to reduce order quantity. However, as the
manufacuter’s profit is increasing in qL, he has the incentive to provide higher wholesale
price to compensate the supplier and obstruct him from lowering the order quantity. As a
result, qL appears to be independent of s. The argument for λ is similar. As λ decreases,
same amount of quality effort results in larger recall probability, so the supplier is more
conservative torwards ordering quantity and want to choose lower qL. But again, the
manufacturer has the incentive to stop him from lowering it, so qL also appears to be
independent of λ.
We further compare the solutions and profits in the pull system with those in the
first-best benchmark, and the results are summarized in the following lemma.
46
Lemma 3.4.5. The pull system yields lower order quantity and quality effort than the
integrated supply chain, and the supplier could yield a nonzero profit under this setting:
(i) qFB > qL, and eFB > eL, thus the recall cost sharing contract cannot attain the
first-best solution.
(ii) piL > 0, and ΣL > ΠL.
Therefore we see that when the supplier bears the demand risk, both the quantity
and quality effort are lower than the first-best solution. Here in the pull system, we
obtain the similar conclusion that the contract cannot coordinate the supply chain. Both
product quantity and quality effort cannot attain first-best. By taking the demand risk,
the supplier in the pull system can leverage on its quantity decision and avoid being
pushed to zero profit. Essentially the supplier is better off in the pull system compared
with the push system.
Similar as in the push system, noting the contract cannot achieve first-best, we exam-
ine the supply chain profit loss again and find that the supply chain profit is even worse
off in the pull system. Hence the supply chain profit in the pull system is lower than that
in the push system. Recall that the supplier’s profit is zero in the push system, and that
Lemma 3.4.5 (ii) shows that the supplier ends with a positive profit, therefore we must
have, the manufacturer’s profit in the pull system is lower than that in the push system.
We present these results formally in the following Proposition.
Proposition 3.4.2. Compared with the push system, the pull system have larger supply
chain profit loss, lower supply chain’s profit, higher supplier’s profit, and lower manufac-
turer’s profit:
δL > δS,ΣS > ΣL, piS < piL, and ΠS > ΠL.
Next we compare the optimal solutions between the push system and the pull system,
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and we obtain the following proposition:
Proposition 3.4.3. The pull system yields both smaller order quantity and lower quality
effort: qS > qL and eS > eL.
By Proposition 3.4.3, it can be seen that the manufacturer achieves a higher output
(quantity) level and induces a higher quality effort from the supplier in the push system,
i.e., when the manufacturer makes the quantity decision. This result reveals that man-
ufacturers could take on demand risk in exchange for higher quality effort by suppliers.
Note that the manufacturer also achieves a higher profit and an output level closer to
first-best solution under the pull system.
Managerial Insights #1: The manufacturer achieves a higher production
quantity and induces a higher quality effort of the supplier in the push system
than in the pull system.
Risk aversion is commonly observed in reality, i.e., the supply chain players tend to
avoid taking risks. This also partially explains why pull system is more popular among
manufacturers, because it protects him from demand risk. However, our result shows
that, when product recall is incorported, the manufacturer may interestingly choose to
take on demand risk in order to alleviate the recall risk.
3.4.4 The Impact of Recall Risk on Quantity Decisions
To understand what the potential recall affect the quantity decision and the quality
decision in the supply chain, we further introduce the scenario without product recall risk.
Similar as previous analysis, we consider the push system and the pull system, as well
as the first-best benchmark. By comparing the results with those in previous sections,
we can isolate the effect of the feature of product recall in the model. Without potential
recall risk, the centralized first-best problem and decentralized principle-agent problem
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are both generic and we can establish the optimal solutions and related properties in
a similar procedure as we did before. The problems for the push system and the pull
system are given by
Π˜S = max
w,q
rS(q)− wq
s.t. (w − c)q ≥ 0,
and
Π˜L = max
c≤w≤r
(r − w)S(q∗)
s.t. q∗ = argmax
q
wS(q)− cq,
respectively.
Lemma 3.4.6. If the demand distribution satisfies the IFR property,
(i) for the push system, the unique optimal solution {w˜S, q˜S} for the no-recall bench-
mark is given by
q˜S = G¯−1
(c
r
)
,
w˜S = c.
(ii) For the pull system, the unique optimal solution {w˜L, q˜L} for the no-recall bench-
mark is given by
rG¯(q˜L)− cg(q˜
L)S(q˜L)
G¯2(q˜L)
− c = 0,
w˜L =
c
G¯(q˜L)
.
We can also solve the integrated first-best benchmark when there is no product recall
risk. The problem is given by
Π˜FB = max
w,q
rS(q)− cq,
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the solution to which is denoted as q˜FB. It is easy to derive q˜FB = G¯−1
(
c
r
)
.
Now we are ready to compare the solutions of the systems under consideration. The
results are summarized in Proposition 3.4.4.
Proposition 3.4.4. q˜FB = q˜S > qFB = qS > qL = q˜L.
From Proposition 3.4.4, the first observation we find is that the first-best output level
without recall is higher than that with recall. The intuition behind it is that, with recall
incorporated into the model, the underage cost for the newsvendor is essentially lower
due to the potential recall cost, and hence by the classic newvendor factile solution, the
optimal output level becomes lower. Besides, it turns out that, the potential recall risk
affects the push and pull systems differently. In the push system, qS is less than q˜S, which
represents the output level in the push system without product recall risk. This suggests
that when the manufacturer bears the demand risk, the potential recall risk decreases the
optimal output level. This is rather intuitive since incoparating the recall risk decreases
the underage cost, which makes the newsvendor, who is the manufacturer in this setting,
become more conservative. In contrast, in the pull system, we show qL is larger or equal
to q˜L, which suggests when it is the supplier who bears the demand risk, the potential
recall risk either increase or does not affect the output level. Although by incorporating
recall, the underage cost for the newsvendor is also reduced, the newsvendor in the pull
system is the supplier, who is the stackelberg follower and cannot fully control the output
level by himself. The manufacturer want to keep the optimal output level at the same
level as in the case without recall, since at that output level, the manufacturer’s profit is
maximized. We summarize these interpretations as the following managerial insights.
Managerial Insights #2: The presence of product recall risk decreases the
production quantity in the push system but does not affect the production
quantity in the pull system.
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3.4.5 The Impact of Cost Sharing Percentage
In this subsection, we focus on studying the cost sharing percentage θ, which is the
key element in the contract we considered. For now we follow the previous analysis by
restricting θ to be no greater than an upperbound θ¯ and studying the impact of θ on the
profitability, quality and quantity decisions for the manufacturer, the supplier, and the
supply chain as a whole, respectively. Later we will discuss why we impose the restriction
and further demonstrate our results by analyzing the push system with θ ranging from
0 to 1.
Assume that θ continue to satisfy 0 ≤ θ ≤ θ¯, then we obtain the following qualitative
properties.
Proposition 3.4.5. Given that θ is within the region of [0, θ¯],
(i) qS and qL are indepedent of θ;
(ii) eS and eL are decresing in θ;
(iii) ΠS, ΠL, ΣS and ΣL are decresing in θ, and piS is zero, while piL is incresing in θ.
Next we use a numerical example to illustrate Proposition 3.4.5 (see Figures 3.2 and
3.3).
Figure 3.2(a) illustrates the impact of θ on quantity decisions for both settings. To
facilitate comparison, we also plot first-best benchmark. As the figure shows, the quantity
decision is constant in both settings, which accords with Proposition 3.4.5.
Figure 3.2(b) illustrates the impact of θ on quality decisions for both settings. The
quality effort levels in both settings decrease when theta is increasing, i.e., the supplier
shares less. This is rather intuitive, because the supplier has less incentitive to invest in
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(a) q vs θ (b) e vs θ
Figure 3.2: The impact of θ on q and e
quality effort when he shares less risk. Note that the quality effort in the pull system is
consistently lower than that in the push system.
Figure 3.3 presents the impact of θ on profits for both settings and the first-best
benchmark is also included. As θ increases, i.e. when the manufacturer shares more of
the total recall cost, both the manufacturer and the whole supply chain are worse off in
terms of profits regardless of push or pull system, while in contrast the supplier’s profit is
always pushed to zero in the push system, but is positive as well as increasing in the pull
system. These observations are also consistent with Proposition 3.4.5. We summarize
them into the managerial insights below.
Managerial Insights #3: The manufacturer can improve her product qual-
ity and profit by decreasing her share of the total recall cost without affecting
the production quantity of the supply chain in both the push and pull systems.
3.4.6 The Range of Cost Sharing Percentage
We restrict our previous analysis to the scenario when θ is in the range of [0, θ¯] instead
of considering the general [0, 1] range. Because when θ is greater than θ¯, the objective
function could have two local maximizers: one corresponds to the boundary solution
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Figure 3.3: The impact of θ on profits
when the supplier chooses zero effort , and the other one corresponds to the interior
solution when the supplier chooses a positive effort level. To determine which one is
the global maximizer, we need to compare the objective function values at those two
points. Figure 3.4 displays an example for the pull system where the optimal solution
could either be an interior solution or a boundary solution depending on the parameter
values. This comparison could cause tractability issues in solving the problem. Besides,
we are more interested in the nontrivial case of interior solution, therefore we chose to
restrict θ to the range to ensure the optimal solution to be always an interior soluiton.
To demonstrate what we have argued, we conduct analysis for the push system al-
lowing θ to take values in full range of [0, 1]. Similar procedure also applies for the pull
system, except that more complex argument is required for that case. For clarity, we
demonstrate the analysis for the push system only.
To avoid repetition, we define two sets of equations that determine boundary solutions
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and interior solutions, respectively:
qS = G¯−1
(
c
r − u
)
,
eS = 0,
wS = c+
(1− θ)uS(qS)
qS
.
and
rG¯(qS)− s
λ
G¯(qS)
S(qS)
− c = 0,
eS =
1
λ
ln
(
S(qS)(1− θ)uλ
s
)
,
wS = c+
s
λqS
+
s
λqS
ln
(
S(qS)(1− θ)uλ
s
)
.
In the following we refer to these equations sets as ES1 and ES2, respectively.
The solutions for the push system allowing full range of cost sharing percentage are
summarized in Proposition 3.4.6.
Proposition 3.4.6. Suppose the demand distribution satisfies the IFR property. For the
push system, there always exists a unique optimal solution. Specifically,
(i) If
rS(qS2 )− s(1−θ1)λ − cq
S
2 − sλ ln
(
S(qS2 )(1−θ1)uλ
s
)
≤ (r − u)S(qS1 )− cqS1 ,
(i-i) further if θ ∈ [0, θ1], the solution is given by the solution to ES2,
(i-ii) further if θ ∈ [θ1, 1], the solution is given by the solution to ES1.
(ii) If
(r − u)S(qS1 )− cqS1 ≤ rS(qS2 )−
s
(1− θ2)λ
− cqS2 −
s
λ
ln
(
S(qS2 )(1− θ2)uλ
s
)
,
(ii-i) further if θ ∈ [0, θ2], the solution is given by the solution to ES2.
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(ii-ii) further if θ ∈ [θ2, 1], the solution is given by the solution to ES1.
(iii) If
rS(qS2 )− s(1−θ1)λ − cq
S
2 − sλ ln
(
S(qS2 )(1−θ1)uλ
s
)
≥ (r − u)S(qS1 )− cqS1
≥ rS(qS2 )− s(1−θ2)λ − cq
S
2 − sλ ln
(
S(qS2 )(1−θ2)uλ
s
)
,
then there exists a θ3 ∈ [θ1, θ2], which satisfies
rS(qS2 )−
s
(1− θ)λ − cq
S
2 −
s
λ
ln
(
S(qS2 )(1− θ3)uλ
s
)
= (r − u)S(qS1 )− cqS1 .
(iii-i) further if θ ∈ [0, θ3], the solution is given by the solution to ES2,
(iii-ii) further if θ ∈ [θ3, 1], the solution is given by the solution to ES1,
where we define qS1 = G¯
−1 ( c
r−u
)
, qS2 is the solution to rG¯(q
S
2 ) − sλ G¯(q
S
2 )
S(qS2 )
− c = 0, θ1 =
1− s
uλS(G¯−1(c/{r−u})) , and θ2 = 1− suλd (Note that θ¯ < θ1 < θ3 < θ2).
Proposition 3.4.6 shows that θ plays a crucial role in determing the optimal solution
structure. When θ < θ1, the opitmal solution is always an interior solution with a
positive effort level. In contrast, when θ < θ2, the opitmal solution is always a boundary
solution with zero effort. Intuitively the manufacturer always prefers a lower cost sharing
percentage in order to push more potential recall risk to the upstream supplier, and
incentivize him to put in higher quality effort. The manufacter should be aware that if
this θ is high enough, the supplier has no incentive to put in any quality effort.
In the following we move our focus to an extreme scenario when the cost sharing
percentage is relatively high. We find that under such context, it always results in
boundary solutions. The results are presented in the following proposition.
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Figure 3.4: Profit Function
Corollary 3.4.3. Suppose θ ≥ θ2 = 1− suλd , then we have,
(i) for the push system, there exists a unique optimal solution {wS, eS, qS}, which is
given by
qS = G¯−1
(
c
r − u
)
,
eS = 0,
wS = c+
(1− θ)uS(qS)
qS
.
(ii) for the pull system, there exists a unique optimal solution {wL, eL, qL}, which is
given by
(r − u)G¯(qL)− cg(q
L)S(qL)
G¯2(qL)
− c = 0,
eL = 0,
wL =
c
G¯(qL)
+ (1− θ)u.
Corollary 3.4.3 demonstrates that when the cost sharing percentage is relatively high,
the supplier chooses not to put in any effort. This arises because when the cost sharing
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percentage is high, the supplier shares less of the product recall cost, and hence does not
have enough incentive to invest in the quality effort.
3.4.7 Extentions
In this section, we focus on the push system supply chain efficiency and consider
two main exntentions. In the first part we aim to design more complicated contracts
under which both the manufacturer and the supplier make decisions in an efficient way
compared with the centralized supply chain setting, and the second part we investigate
the impact of futher market share and competition between suppliers on the supply chain
efficiency. We first consider two more variations of the recall cost sharing contract: (i)
two-part recall cost sharing contract, which is characterized by w, θ and q same as in the
recall cost sharing contract plus a lump-sum recall cost T decided by the manufacturer
that the supplier need to pay him once a recall happens, and (ii) recall-contingent revenue
sharing contract, which is characterized by w, θ and q same as in the recall cost sharing
contract plus a percentage α decided by the manufacturer that this part of his revenue
will be awarded to the supplier if no recall happens. Here we relaxed the restriction
of the exponential form of the recall probability form and assume the recall probability
is F¯ (e) = 1 − F (e), where F (e) ranges on [0, 1] with derivative f(e). Assume F (e)
to be increasing concave, i.e., f(e) is decreasing and nonnegative. In addition, we use
superscript TP representing the two-part recall cost sharing contract and RS representing
the recall-contingent revenue sharing contract.
Two-part Recall Cost Sharing Contract
Under the two-part recall cost sharing contract, the stylized principle-agent problem
could be modeled as below:
ΠTP = max
q,w,T
(r − F¯ (e∗)θu)S(q)− wq + T F¯ (e∗)
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s.t. (w − c)q − F¯ (e∗)(1− θ)uS(q)− se∗ − T F¯ (e∗) ≥ 0 (IR)
e∗ ∈ argmax
e
(w − c)q − F¯ (e)(1− θ)uS(q)− se− T F¯ (e) (IC)
Note that there is a transferred payment T F¯ (e∗) which is the penalty collected by the
manufacturer from the supplier once product recall happens. By solving the suppler’s
problem, we could obtain the following result:
Lemma 3.4.7. The optimal solution satisfies the following equation:
f(eTP ) =
s
T + (1− θ)S(qTP )u. (3.4.6)
By comparing with the first-best benchmark solution Lemma 3.4.1 analyzed previ-
ously, we have the following finding:
Proposition 3.4.7. Two-part Recall Cost Sharing Contract can achieve the first-best
solution by letting T = θuS(qFB), eTP = eFB and qTP = qFB.
Recall-contingent Revenue Sharing Contract
Under the recall-contingent revenue sharing contract, the stylized principle-agent
problem could be modeled as below:
ΠRS = max
q,w,α
(r − F¯ (e∗)θu)S(q)− wq − αrS(q)F (e∗)
s.t. (w − c)q − F¯ (e∗)(1− θ)uS(q)− se∗ + αrS(q)F (e∗) ≥ 0 (IR)
e∗ ∈ argmax
e
(w − c)q − F¯ (e)(1− θ)uS(q)− se+ αrS(q)F (e) (IC)
Note that the manufacturer will share the revenue of αrS(q)F (e∗) to the supplier if
there is product recall happen. By solving the suppler’s problem, we could obtain the
following result:
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Lemma 3.4.8. The optimal solution satisfies the following equation:
f(eRS) =
s
(1− θ)S(qRS)u+ αrS(qRS) . (3.4.7)
Again compare Lemma 3.4.8 and Lemma 3.4.1, we could obtain the following propo-
sition.
Proposition 3.4.8. Recall-contingent Revenue Sharing Contract can achieve the first-
best solution by letting α = θu/r, eRS = eFB and qRS = qFB.
In summary, we find that both the two-part recall cost sharing contract and the
recall-contingent revenue sharing contract could help improve the supply chain efficiency.
Figure 3.5: Sequence of Event for Two-Period Model
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Single Sourcing: Two Periods
Next we investigate the impact of futher market share and competition between sup-
pliers on the supply chain efficiency. We start with the consideration of the future market
share. In reality, it is common that once a recall happens, the supplier will lose the future
market share from the manufacturer, which may prevent the supplier from making low
quality effort. To examine this effect on operational decisions, we consider a two period
extension of the basic model. If a recall happens by the end of the first period, there is
no market for the manufacturer in the second period, and no production is needed for
the second period. To isolate the effect of future market share from other factors, we
suppress the possibility of recall in the second period, i.e., no recall cost incurs in the
second period. If no recall happens by the end of the first period, the manufacturer and
the supplier involve in the second period contracting and production. And the supplier
no longer needs to make effort decision for the second period since there is no potential
product recalls in the second period. This also captures the reality in that supplier in-
vests quality effort in the first contracting term, and should be able to carry over the
skills or experiences to the following contracting term. For simplicity, the demand q˜ in
the second period is assumed to be fixed. Besides, we use superscript ST representing
this single souring two-period setting.
To facilitate the understanding of the supply chain efficiency, we need to establish
first-best benchmark for the two-period model. The first-best problem is defined as
below:
ΣFB = max
e,q
(r − F¯ (e)u)S(q)− cq − se+ F (e)(r − c)q˜
Immediately we could come up with the following result:
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Lemma 3.4.9. The optimal solution satisfies the following equation:
f(eFB) =
s
S(qFB)u+ (r − c)q˜ .
Now we could model the decentralized supply chain problem. Note we focus on the
simplest recall cost sharing contract.
ΠST = max
q,w
(r − F¯ (e∗)θu)S(q)− wq + F (e∗)(r − w)q˜
s.t. (w − c)q − F¯ (e∗)(1− θ)uS(q)− se∗ + F (e∗)(w − c)q˜ ≥ 0 (IR)
e∗ ∈ argmax
e
(w − c)q − F¯ (e)(1− θ)uS(q)− se+ F (e)(w − c)q˜ (IC)
Then we derive the following lemma:
Lemma 3.4.10. The optimal solution satisfies the following equation:
f(eST ) =
s
(1− θ)S(qST )u+ (wST − c)q˜ .
To compare Lemma 3.4.10 and Lemma 3.4.9, we could establish the following propo-
sition.
Proposition 3.4.9. In the single sourcing two-period setting, recall cost sharing contract
cannot achieve the first-best solution.
In the single-period problem, we find that the recall cost sharing contract cannot
coordinate the supply chain. Even we consider the effect of the futher market share
on the supplier’s quality effort and extend the single-period model to the two-period
model, the conclusion is unchanged. The recall cost sharing contract, although great to
implement, is not a supply chain coordinated contract.
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Dual Sourcing: Two Periods
Next we consider a dual sourcing strategy for the manufacturer and investigate the
competition effect on the supply chain efficiency. And it is realistic in the sense that a
manufacturer keeps on cooperation with reliable suppliers and stop ordering from less
reliable ones. Therefore we further extend the two period model from the single sourcing
setting into dual sourcing setting, i.e., adding a competitive supplier to the original single
sourcing model. Now the manufacturer have two choices to source from. Suppose the
two suppliers are identical, who share equally the order from the manufacturer. If no
recall happens by the end of the first period, the two suppliers keep on splitting the order
from the manufacturer equally as in period 1. If a recall happens due to the failure of
components from supplier 1 (2), while the components from supplier 2 (1) work well,
the manufacturer stops sourcing from supplier 1 (2) in the following period, and all of
the manufacturer’s order goes to supplier 2 (1). However, if the recall is due to quality
failures from both suppliers’ components in the first period, then the market is lost for
the manufacturer and he stops production in the second period. We use superscript
DT representing this dual souring two-period setting. Again a new first-best benchmark
needs to be established:
ΣFB = max
e1,e2,q
rS(q)− F¯ (e1)u1
2
S(q)− F¯ (e2)u1
2
S(q)− cq
−se1 − se2 + (r − c)q˜(1− F¯ (e1)F¯ (e2))
Similarly we need to derive the relationship between the first-best solution variables.
Lemma 3.4.11. The optimal solution satisfies the following equations:
S(qFB) =
s− (r − c)q˜f(eFB)F¯ (eFB)
f(eFB)u/2
.
Next we consider the decentralized model, note that the two suppliers are indentical,
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thus they face the symmetric optimization problem.
ΠDT = max
q,w
(r − F¯ (e∗1)θu)
1
2
S(q)− 1
2
wq
+(r − F¯ (e∗2)θu)
1
2
S(q)− 1
2
wq
+(r − w)q˜(1− F¯ (e∗1)F¯ (e2∗))
s.t. (w − c)q
2
− F¯ (e∗1)(1− θ)uS(q)
1
2
− se∗1 + F (e∗1)F¯ (e∗2)(w − c)q˜
+F (e∗1)F (e
∗
2)(w − c)
q˜
2
≥ 0 (IR1)
e∗1 ∈ argmax
e1
(w − c)q
2
− F¯ (e1)(1− θ)uS(q)1
2
− se1
+F (e1)F¯ (e
∗
2)(w − c)q˜ + F (e1)F (e∗2)(w − c)
q˜
2
(IC1)
and (w − c)q
2
− F¯ (e∗2)(1− θ)uS(q)
1
2
− se2 + F (e∗2)F¯ (e∗1)(w − c)q˜
+F (e∗2)F (e
∗
1)(w − c)
q˜
2
≥ 0 (IR2)
e∗2 ∈ argmax
e2
(w − c)q
2
− F¯ (e2)(1− θ)uS(q)1
2
− se2
+F (e2)F¯ (e
∗
1)(w − c)q˜ + F (e2)F (e∗1)(w − c)
q˜
2
(IC2)
Note that the two suppliers are symmetric, and we could obtain the following lemma.
We write eDT1 = e
DT
2 = e
DT .
Lemma 3.4.12. The optimal solution satisfies the following equations:
S(qDT ) =
s− (wDT − c)q˜f(eDT )(1 + F¯ (eDT ))/2
f(eDT )(1− θ)u/2 .
By compare Lemma 3.4.11 and Lemma 3.4.12, we have the following interesting find-
ing:
Proposition 3.4.10. In the dual sourcing two-period setting, recall cost sharing contract
can achieve the first-best solution.
This result is interesting because we previously show that the effect of futher market
share is not enough to incentivize the supplier to make quality effort in a supply chain
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efficient way. However, if we add the competition into the model, then the combined effect
from both the futher market share and the competition will help the recall cost sharing
contract coordinate the supply chain. The intuition behind is that the manufacturer
could use dual scouring strategy to reduce the product recall risk.
3.5 Concluding Remarks
With increasing product recall issued in various industries, and with the aftermath
of product recall being recogonized, how to avoid the potential recall and how to assign
the fault after a recall takes place are questions that worth investigating. Noting the
challanges of demand uncertainty and non-contractability of suppliers’ quality effort, we
develop a procurement contractual framework in this paper to examine how a manufac-
turer contracts its supplier to mitigate recall risk under demand uncertainty, and how
quality and quantity decisions interact with each other in the supply chain. We focus
on examining a cost sharing contract, which is easy to implement and has industrial
applications. Two settings are analyzed here: a pull system where the supplier makes
the quantity decision and a push system where the manufacturer makes the quantity de-
cision. We also establish the centralized benchmark and no-recall benchmark, and prove
both the existence and the uniqueness for the equilibrium solutions of these two regimes.
Compared with the pull system, we find that the manufacturer achieves a higher
production quantity and induces a higher quality effort of the supplier in a push system,
where the manufacturer takes on demand risk and induces higher quality effort of the
supplier. Pull and push systems have been recogonized for a long time both by the
academia and industry. There are a couple of trade-offs in comparing these two systems
including demand uncertainty, difficulty of forecast, flexibility in adjusting inventory,
transportation lead times, etc. In recent years, it is more popular to implement a pull
system. Some successful industrial examples of introducing pull system in recent decades
include Dell and Toyota, which achieve lower inventory levels and hence reduce costs
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through using pull system. Our results indicate that quality is another dimention to
investigate when comparing these two systems. When there exists the possiblity of recall,
push system could be favored due to the incentive it provides to the supplier in inducing
higher quality effort.
Moreover, the presence of product recall risk decreases the production quantity in the
push system but does not affect the production quantity in the pull system. The decrease
in the push system accords with the intuitive explanation that the presence of potential
recall decrease the underage cost for the newsvendor, who hereafter reduces the quantity.
On the other hand, the counterintuitve increase in the pull system demonstrates that the
quantity decision need to be made with more caution by taking whether the system is
push or pull into consideration.
In addition, We also examine the impact of cost sharing percentage on the profitability,
and quality and quantity decisions for the manufacturer, the supplier, and the supply
chain. We find that the manufacturer can improve her product quality and profit as
well as the supply chain’s profit by decreasing her share of the botal recall cost without
affecting the production quantity in both the pull and push systems. This result offers a
plausible explanation for why GM insisted on sharing recall costs with its supplier even
if their products passed GM’s quality inspection. Note that the supplier is worse off, but
since the whole supply chain is better off, there must exists a more complex mechanism
with cost sharing feature such that both the manufacturer’s and supplier’s profit are
improved, which is beyond the scope of this paper and hence left as a direction for future
research.
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CHAPTER 4 VOLUNTARY RECALL? INCENTIVES FOR QUALITY
EFFORT
4.1 Introduction
Product recall is commonly observed worldwide across various industries. Famous
examples include Toyota’s vehicle recalls during 2009-2012 in the automobile industry,
Boeing’s 787 Dreamliner aircraft recall in early 2013 in the aerospace industry, and
AngioScore’s balloon catheter recall in 2010 in the medical device industry. Moreover,
product recalls are not necessarily restricted to manufacturers, they can also happen
among retailers. For example, Lululemon Athletica, an athletic apparel retailer, recalled
its yoga pants in the spring of 2013.
The consequences of product recalls are known as serious because they are usually
associated with safety issues. In this case, the recalls are highly focused by customers
and social media. Once a recall is issued, many sorts of cost occur immediately due to
repairs, recall logistics and downtime of the manufacturing. On top of this, the recall
is very likely associated with potential law suits and litigation fees. High expenses,
damaged reputation and lost sales will come up as the result. If the safety issues are
involved, the close attention from social media is often inevitable, and hence it could
lead to the widespread social impact that has long term damage to brand image. (see
also (Hendricks and Singhal 2003), (Rupp 2004) and (Jarrell and Peltzman 1985)). Due
to the negative consequences above, firms are keen on developing strategies to prevent
and alleviate the severe crisis that recall might cause. To achieve the goal, there are two
critical time points: one is during the quality control before sales, and the other is by
the time of responsive product recall decisions when there are complaints and problem
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reports after sales.
For the former time point, the complexity typically stems from the outsourcing struc-
ture of supply chain. The manufacturers outsource the production of components to
suppliers. In this case, the effort suppliers put in to ensure the products’ quality is unob-
servable and uncontractible. As a result, the risk of information asymmetry and moral
hazard arises. In addition, once a recall happens, determining which party causes the
problem and allocating the responsibility for the recall are even more difficult questions.
Due to such issues, disputes between supply chain players are common. For example, the
debate between Lululemon and its yoga pants supplier Eclat Texitile in 2013, as well as
between Ford and its tire supplier Firestone in 2000. Previous literatures propose inspec-
tion to tackle the issue, which does help improve the quality level. However, once a recall
takes place, the inspection will no longer help the allocation of duty. Our work aims to
address this problem through contracting. Although quality effort is not contractible, we
consider a cost sharing contract that specifies the percentage of recall cost the supplier
needs to undertake once a recall is issued. In this way, the supplier has more incentive
to ensure the product quality because according the contract part of the recall cost will
be paid through the responsible suppliers.
For the latter time point, the problem is also nontrivial. When there are accumulating
certain amount of complaints and problem reports, it is challenge of manufacturer’s ethic
and capability to achieve the settlement. At this time, the problem is often not publicly
known. Therefore, it is a critical decision for the manufacturer whether or not issue
a recall and hence disclose the private information about products to the customers.
According to the complex issues related to recall listed above, the recall strategies to
deal with product quality problems are various.
An up-to-date example is General Motors, who is recently penalized by the U.S.
Transportation Department for failing to report defects of ignition switches in 2.6 million
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Figure 4.1: Recall Process
cars since 2001 before being forced to start a recall early this year. This is the largest
single penalty issued by the government under the Tread Act. So far GM has ordered
recalls affecting nearly 13 million vehicles. Back to 2005, despite hundreds of complaints
and evidences, GM officials decided not to recall the problematic vehicles and redesign
the switches. Because they evaluated the savings on warranty costs and found that they
could not offset the cost associated with recall. Different from General Motors who try to
defer the recall until the government forces it to do, what Toyota did is to issue the recall
voluntarily. Although during the series of recalls Toyota initiated in the past years, it
suffered great loss in terms of recall cost, Toyota has been regaining the trust of customers
and rebuilt its brand image by handling the recalls well and taking measures in making
the product quality information more transparent to public.
Noting the different product recall decisions observed in reality, we are interested to
see what is a typical recall process, which can be illustrated using the automobile industry
as an instance.
The Safety Act of 1966 requires a manufacturer to notify the National Highway and
Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) if he has the knowledge that the vehicle or equip-
ment fails to satisfy the federal safety standards. A typical process that involves recall is
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as follows. At first, the consumers’ complaints accumulate. The complaints could go to
either the manufacturer or NHSTA. The manufacturer can choose to recall voluntarily
based on his private information of the product’s quality. If the NHTSA receive certain
amount of complaints, the safety agency would initiate a preliminary investigation. If
there is no apparent violation of safety standard, the investigation is ended. Otherwise,
the investigation escalates into engineering analysis, which takes approximately one year
to complete. During this process, the manufacturer can choose either to recall voluntar-
ily, or wait for the result of the engineering analysis. If he chooses to wait and the result
indicates that there are indeed safety standards violated, the manufacturer is forced to
issue a recall, otherwise, he does not issue a recall at all. The manufacturer is not required
to issue a press release announcing the quality problem if he chooses to recall voluntarily.
Being forced to recall is often associated with bad social impact and extra penalty, such
as the example of General Motor we have addressed before. However, choosing to wait
could avoid any recall in the hope that the engineering analysis indicates that no recall
is needed, which prevents the manufacturer from the loss of recall cost.
Motivated by these industrial practices, we are interested in studying two types of
product recall decisions: voluntary recall and mandatory recall. Voluntary recall is issued
by the manufacturer voluntarily at an early stage when the problem is noticed but not
revealed to the public yet, while mandatory recall is forced by the government agency
at later stage when the problem becomes serious and widespread. Specifically, we are
interested in answering these four research questions:
• When the manufacturer has the opportunity to issue an early recall voluntarily,
will he take it or not?
• How does the supplier choose her quality effort when she knows the manufacturer
may issue an early voluntary recall?
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• How will the cost sharing percentage offered by the manufacturer be affected under
such configuration?
• What is the interdependence between designing the recall cost sharing contract and
making product recall decisions?
To address these questions, we consider a recall cost sharing contract proposed by
the manufacturer, as a Stackelberg leader facing a moral hazard problem, to align the
incentive of the supplier in ensuring the product quality, and also examine two types of
recall decisions by the manufacturer: (1) voluntary recall, which is issued by the manu-
facturer voluntarily at a relatively early stage; (2) mandatory recall, which is forced by
the government agency at a relatively late stage. The mandatory recall is characterized
by a recall probability which depends on the supplier’s quality effort. By solving the
model, we characterize the firms’ decisions in equilibrium. Surprisingly, we find that,
as a Stackeberg leader, the manufacturer does not always push all the recall cost to the
supplier. His decision depends on whether he will issue a voluntary recall or not. Fur-
thermore, we find two cost sharing percentage thresholds that determines the equilibrium
solutions. Specifically, the lower cost sharing percentage is always associated with volun-
tary recall, while the higher one is always associated to mandatory recall. However, we do
find that when it is more costly for the supplier to make quality effort, the manufacturer
will choose a cost sharing percentage level such that it induces a voluntary recall. We
conduct comparative statics study to see how the equilibrium solutions evolve with the
change of parameters. To facilitate comparison, we study the first-best problem where
the supply chain is integrated, and find that the recall cost sharing contract cannot co-
ordinate the supply chain. We also consider an extension model with an stochastic recall
probability and conduct numerical studies on equilibrium solutions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a review of related
literatures. Section 3 presents the model while Sections 4 present the analysis for the
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model. Section 5 concludes our work.
4.2 Literature Review
By considering both the quality incentives in reducing the product recall risk and
the product recall decisions, our work naturally contributes two streams of literatures:
supply chain contracting literature and the product recall literature. There is a growing
literature on quality contracting in supply chains. This stream of literature focuses on
modeling the quality improvement incentives of supply chain members. Quality could
be improved either by inspection or by investment from multiple players. (Reyniers
and Tapiero 1995) consider a model in which a supplier makes a unobservable quality-
related choice while a producer independently decides on his inspection policy for both
non-cooperative and cooperative settings. (Lim 2001) also consider a product quality
inspection problem. They investigate the contract design of a producer when he pur-
chases parts from a supplier, and there is incomplete information regarding the quality
of the parts. Similarly, (Baiman et al. 2000) and (Baiman et al. 2001) consider a setting
where a supplier, who incurs quality improvement costs, sells an intermediate product
to a buyer, who incurs appraisal costs to identify defects, and examine the relation-
ship between product architecture, supply-chain performance metrics, and supply-chain
efficiency. There are papers modeling quality improvement investment by both the sup-
plier and the buyer. (Balachandran and Radhakrishnan 2005) examine a supply chain
in which the final product consists of components made by a buyer and a supplier in
a double moral hazard situation. (Zhu et al. 2007) focus on supply risk and consider
a buyer who designs a product and outsources the production to a supplier and both
players have options to invest in quality improvement. They also investigate the interac-
tion between quality-improvement decisions interact and operational quantity decisions
such as the buyer’s order quantity and the supplier’s production lot size using an EOQ
model. In addition, all papers listed out above examine the fixed sharing rate contracts
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covering the external quality costs. As a more general case, (Chao et al. 2009) focus on
recall instances, and discuss two external quality cost sharing contracts, in which product
recall costs can be shared between a manufacturer and a supplier to induce effort from
both sides to improve final product quality. They characterize the quality improvement
effort decisions which are subject to moral hazard and even when there is information
asymmetry regarding to the existing process capability. There are some empirical papers
studying on the topic of product recall risk, although very limited analytical research.
This stream of literature help understand how product recall is conducted by various play-
ers and what is the impact of product recall on various operations performance. (Rupp
and Taylor 2002) provide an excellent overview of product recall process and introduce
different types of product recall strategies. (Hendricks and Singhal 2003), (Rupp 2004)
and (Jarrell and Peltzman 1985) focus on product recall costs and point out that once a
recall is issued, there are immediate costs due to repairs, recall logistics and lost sales as
well as the potential litigation fees and damaged reputation. (Kalaignanam, Kushwaha
and Eilert 2013) suggest that recall magnitude lead to decreases in future number of
injuries and recalls, and also summarize the findings of the impact of product recall on
firm’s performance, future recall rates, consumer responses, market accidents and prod-
uct reliability. (Marucheck et al. 2011) explore how the field of operations management
can provide fresh views and insights in addressing the problems of product safety in the
context of global supply chain.
4.3 Model
We consider a single period, single sourcing setting where a downstream manufacturer
outsources the production of a customized component to an upstream supplier. After
receiving the components from the supplier, the manufacturer finishes assembling and
releases the finished products to a market with fixed size. The components are subject to
potential quality failure, and the customers who incur such problem may issue complaints
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Cv(e) = unit voluntary recall cost
Cm(e) = unit mandatory recall cost
αv = unit voluntary recall cost parameter
αm = unit mandatory recall cost parameter
s = quality effort marginal cost
λ = mandatory recall probability parameter
exp{−λe} = recall probability
f = density distribution of λ
F = cumulative distribution of λ
d1 = demand before recall decision point
d2 = demand after recall decision point
C¯ = supplier’s reservation cost
θ = recall cost sharing percentage
e = quality effort by the supplier
Table 4.1: Notations
to the manufacturer. In the middle of the period when there are certain amount of com-
plaints and quality failure reports, the manufacturer may conduct a private investigation
with the supplier and obtain information about the component’s quality. Based on the
information he collects, the manufacturer has the option to issue a voluntary recall and
fix the problem. Otherwise, he may withhold the information and keep selling the prod-
uct, however, by the end of the period, the product may face mandatory recall enforced
by the government agency due to either too many complaints noticed by the public or
the spot test by the government agency. If the manufacturer chooses not to issue a vol-
untary recall, the mandatory recall takes place with a recall probability characterized by
an exponential form of exp{−λe}, where e denotes the supplier’s quality effort, and λ is a
given constant. Note that the recall probability is decreasing and convex in e, which also
resembles the realistic case. By deciding how much to invest in the quality effort e, the
supplier can affect the possibility of product recall. Besides, we assume that e is not con-
tractible, which implies the manufacturer, as a Stackelberg leader, faces a moral hazard
problem and need to incentivize the supplier to invest more in quality effort. Both types
of recall- voluntary and mandatory- are costly. However, the unit voluntary recall cost
is lower than that of mandatory recall because the problem often become more serious
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as time goes by, and the government could penalize the manufacturer additionally for
withholding the information and do not recall voluntarily. Denote Cv(e) and Cm(e) to be
the unit voluntary recall cost and unit mandatory recall cost, which are both functions of
supplier’s effort e. Assume Cv(e) < Cm(e), C
′
v(e) < 0, C
′
m(e) < 0, C
′′
v (e) > 0, C
′′
m(e) > 0,
which reveals that the unit recall costs are decreasing convex in the supplier’s effort. In
addition we assume Cv(e)/Cm(e) = αv/αm. The supplier incurs marginal quality cost
s for the quality effort she invests in. In terms of the contract that the manufacturer
provides to the supplier, we consider a simple recall cost sharing contract, which is com-
monly used in the literatures. There is only one parameter in the contract, the recall
cost sharing percentage θ, where 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1. In other words, the manufacturer offers
the supplier with a percentage of the total recall cost that he will share in case a recall
happens.
The sequence of events is as follows: The manufacturer, as a stackelberg Leader,
offers a cost sharing percentage θ, and then the supplier decides his quality effort e. In
the middle of the period when there are certain amount of complaints and quality failure
reports, the manufacturer makes the decision of whether or not to issue a voluntary recall
based on the evaluation of the voluntary recall cost and expected mandatory recall cost.
Once a voluntary recall is issued, assume the problem is completely fixed by the recall
process and no mandatory recall will take place later. Otherwise, by the end of the
period, the mandatory recall happens with the probability exp{−λe}.
4.4 Analysis
In this section, we first analyze the decentralized setting, where both the manufacturer
and the supplier make decisions separately with the objectives of minimizing their own
costs. The problem is a stylized principle-agent problem under such setting. To facilitate
comparison with this setting, we next consider the centralized supply chain setting, in
which all decisions are made by a central planner with the objective of minimizing supply
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Figure 4.2: Sequence of Events
chain’s cost. Finally, we will extend the previous model to allow λ to be random.
4.4.1 Decentralized Supply Chain
We solve the problem by backward induction. After the manufacturer identifies the
recall probability, he is faced with the decision of whether or not to issue a voluntary
recall. To make the decision he needs to compare the cost of voluntary recall and the
expected cost of mandatory recall. To issue a voluntary recall results in a cost of Cv(e)d1,
while if the manufacturer chooses to wait, he will face a expected cost of Cm(e)(d1 +
d2) exp{−λe} due to the potential mandatory recall later. Specifically, the problem can
be expressed as the following principle-agent problem:
min
θ
θH(e∗(θ))
s.t. se∗(θ) + (1− θ)H(e∗(θ)) ≤ C¯ (IR)
e∗(θ) = arg min
e
se+ (1− θ)H(e) (IC),
where H(e) is the expected recall cost:
H(e) =
 Cv(e)d1, if the manufacturer issues a voluntary recall;Cm(e)(d1 + d2) exp{−λe}, if the manufacturer does not issue a voluntary recall.
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and C¯ is the reservation cost for the supplier.
Given θ and e, the manufacturer will compare the issue a voluntary recall if
θCv(e)d1 < [θCm(e)(d1 + d2)] exp{−λe}.
The above assumptions immediately yields that the manufacturer will place a voluntary
recall if
e ∈
[
0, ln
(
d1 + d2
d1
αm
αv
)/
λ
]
, (4.4.1)
and not place a voluntary recall if
e ∈
[
ln
(
d1 + d2
d1
αm
αv
)/
λ,+∞
]
. (4.4.2)
Denote
e˜ = ln
(
d1 + d2
d1
αm
αv
)/
λ,
then we have the following lemma.
Lemma 4.4.1. The manufacturer will place a voluntary recall if he identifies e < e˜,
otherwise, he chooses to face mandatory recall risk.
Note that the manufacturer’s decision of whether to issue a voluntary recall or not
only depends on the supplier’s effort, and is independent of the cost sharing percentage
θ.
Next we move to the supplier’s decision of quality effort. Given a cost sharing percent-
age θ specified by the manufacturer, the supplier determines her optimal quality effort to
invest in by minimizing her cost, which could come from either the voluntary recall cost
or the mandatory recall cost, depending on the manufacturer’s decision based on the her
effort level. Then the optimization problem for the supplier becomes:
min
e
se+ (1− θ)H(e),
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where
se+ (1− θ)H(e) =
 se+ (1− θ)d1Cv(e), if e ∈ [0, e˜],se+ (1− θ)(d1 + d2)Cm(e) exp{−λe}, if e ∈ [e˜,+∞).
Denote e∗1(θ) and e
∗
2(θ) satisfying the following equations:
s+ (1− θ)d1Cv ′(e∗1(θ)) = 0,
s+ (1− θ)(d1 + d2) exp{−λe∗2(θ)}(C ′m(e∗2(θ))− λCm(e∗2(θ))) = 0.
Then we can show that the optimal quality effort for the supplier exists and is unique,
which is presented in the following lemma.
Lemma 4.4.2. Given θ, the optimal solution e∗(θ) for the supplier exists and is unique.
Specifically,
(i) if s+ d1C
′
v(e˜) < 0, there exists a threshold θ¯ such that
e∗(θ) =
 e
∗
1(θ), if θ ∈ [θ¯, 1],
e∗2(θ), if θ ∈ [0, θ¯],
where
s(e∗1(θ¯)− e∗2(θ¯)) + (1− θ¯)[d1Cv(e∗1(θ¯))− (d1 + d2)Cm(e∗2(θ¯)) exp{−λe∗2(θ¯)}] = 0;
(ii) if s+ (d1 + d2) exp{−λe˜}(C ′m(e˜)− λCm(e˜)) > 0, for any θ ∈ [0, 1],
e∗(θ) = e∗1(θ);
(iii) if s + d1C
′
v(e˜) > 0 and s + (d1 + d2) exp{−λe˜}(C ′m(e˜) − λCm(e˜)) < 0, there exists
a threshold min{θ˜, θ¯} such that
e∗(θ) =
 e
∗
1(θ), if θ ∈ [min{θ˜, θ¯}, 1],
e∗2(θ), if θ ∈ [0,min{θ˜, θ¯}],
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where
s(e∗1(θ¯)− e∗2(θ¯)) + (1− θ¯)[d1Cv(e∗1(θ¯))− (d1 + d2)Cm(e∗2(θ¯)) exp{−λe∗2(θ¯)}] = 0,
and
s+ (1− θ˜)(d1 + d2) exp{−λe˜}(C ′m(e˜)− λCm(e˜)) = 0.
Lemma 4.4.2 indicates that the optimal solution e∗(θ)’s structure depends on the
parameters. Specifically, the parameter space is divided into three regions, each of which
corresponds to one type of optimal e∗(θ). The inequalities that describe the three regions
can be viewed as conditions of s, i.e., when s is small, moderate, and large. When
s is small or moderate, corresponding to (i) and (iii), there are two forms of e∗(θ)’s
expression depending on the θ’s value. When θ is small, e∗(θ) = e∗2(θ), which induces
the manufacturer to choose to wait; when θ is large, e∗(θ) = e∗1(θ), which induces the
manufacturer to recall voluntarily. When s is large, e∗(θ) always equals to e∗1(θ), i.e., the
manufacturer will always choose to recall voluntarily.
Next we want to discuss the relation between θ and e∗(θ), and we have the following
corollary.
Lemma 4.4.3. e∗(θ) is decreasing in θ.
Lemma 4.4.3 indicates that the supplier has less incentive to invest in quality effort
when she needs to share less of recall costs.
Now we focus on solving the manufacturer’s problem, which is
min
θ
θH(e∗(θ)).
Since e∗(θ) is decreasing in θ, thus there is one-on-one relationship between these two
decision variables. We could use e∗ represents θ, and it is equivalent for the manufacturer
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to decide on e∗ instead of θ. The feasible region of e is such that the corresponding θ lies
in the interval [0, 1]. The manufacturer’s problem could be written as below:
min
e∗
θ(e∗)H(e∗).
First, we have the following two lemmas on the monotonicity of the cost of manufac-
turer and supplier with respect to θ. For the manufacturer, we have
Lemma 4.4.4. Manufacturer’s cost is increasing in θ, respectively in the voluntary recall
and the mandatory recall settings. Namely, both θH(e∗1(θ)) and θH(e
∗
2(θ)) are increasing
in θ.
For the manufacturer, we have
Lemma 4.4.5. Supplier’s cost is decreasing in θ, respectively in the voluntary recall and
the mandatory recall settings. Namely, both se∗1(θ) + (1− θ)d1Cv(e∗1(θ)) and se∗2(θ) + (1−
θ)(d1 + d2)Cm(e
∗
2(θ)) exp{−λe∗2(θ)} are decreasing in θ.
Now we are ready to characterize the optimal solution structure for the decentralized
model, and the conclusion is presented by the following proposition.
Proposition 4.4.1. The optimal solution θ∗ for the manufacturer exists and is unique.
Specifically,
(i) if s+ (d1 + d2) exp{−λe˜}(C ′m(e˜)− λCm(e˜)) < 0, when
(d1 + d2)Cm(e
∗
2(θ2)) exp{−λe∗2(θ2)} −
sCm(e
∗
2(θ2))
λCm(e∗2(θ2))− C ′m(e∗2(θ2))
< d1Cv(e
∗
1(θ1)) +
sCv(e
∗
1(θ1))
C ′v(e
∗
1(θ1))
is satisfied, then θ∗ = θ2; otherwise, θ
∗ = θ1.
where θ1 and θ2 are solutions to the following equations respectively:
se∗1(θ1) + (1− θ1)d1Cv(e∗1(θ1)) = C¯;
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se∗2(θ2) + (1− θ2)(d1 + d2)Cm(e∗2(θ2)) exp{−λe∗2(θ2)} = C¯.
(ii) if s+ (d1 + d2) exp{−λe˜}(C ′m(e˜)− λCm(e˜)) > 0, θ∗ = θ1.
Immediately followed the proof of Proposition 4.4.1, we further have the following
corollary.
Corollary 4.4.1. The voluntary recall is always associated with θ1, while the mandatory
recall is always associated with θ2.
According to Proposition 4.4.1 and Corollary 4.4.1, there are two cost sharing per-
centage thresholds that determines the equilibrium solutions. Specifically, the lower cost
sharing percentage is always associated with voluntary recall, while the higher one is al-
ways associated to mandatory recall. However, we do find that when it is more costly for
the supplier to make quality effort, the manufacturer will choose a cost sharing percentage
level such that it induces a voluntary recall.
By adopting the specific form of unit voluntary recall cost and unit mandatory recall
cost, i.e., Cv(e) and Cm(e), we can further obtain a close-form expressions for θ1 and θ2.
Proposition 4.4.2. Assume Cv(e) = αv/e, Cm(e) = αm/e, we have the following ex-
pressions for the two optimal cost sharing percentages.
θ1 = 1−
C¯2
4sd1αv
,
and
θ2 = 1−
C¯2λ2 − (2s−
√
4s2 + C¯2λ2)2
4sλ2(d1 + d2)αm exp{− C¯λ−2s+
√
4s2+C¯2λ2
2s
}
.
Furthermore, we have
e∗1 =
C¯
2s
,
and
e∗2 =
C¯λ− 2s+
√
4s2 + C¯2λ2
2sλ
.
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By the closed-form expressions of the cost sharing percentage θ by the manufacturer
and quality effort e by the supplier, we are interesting how these optimal solutions change
with respect to operational parameters. The results are summarized by the following
proposition.
Proposition 4.4.3. In the decentralized supply chain model,
(i) e∗1 is decreasing in s, and irrelevant to λ, d1, d2 and αm;
(ii) e∗2 is increasing in λ, decreasing in s, and irrelevant to d1, d2 and αm;
(iii) θ1 is increasing in s, d1, and irrelevant to λ, d2 and αm;
(iv) θ2 is increasing in s, d1, d2, αm, decreasing in λ.
We leave the discussion of intuitions to the numerical part later in order to gain better
understanding with the aid of numerical graphs.
Comparative Statics
Next we examine how the equilibrium solutions change as the parameters change.
Specifically, we want to study how θ∗ and e∗ evolve with the parameters’ values. There
are five parameters we are interested in: mandatory recall probability parameter λ,
demand parameters d1 and d2, and cost parameters s and αm. We start with λ first and
the result is presented in Figure 4.3, where (a) and (b) show the change of e∗ and θ∗
with λ, respectively. The horizon axis represents the value of λ, and the vertical axis
refers to e∗ in (a) or θ∗ in (b). With larger λ, the resulting mandatory recall probability
with same amount of effort becomes lower. As is shown by Figure 4.3, both curve are
flat when λ is relatively small, implying both e∗ and θ∗ are independent of the value of
λ in such case. The reason is that, the mandatory recall probability is relatively high
when λ is small, and hence leads to a high expected mandatory recall cost. Therefore in
such case, the manufacturer and supplier choose the e∗ and θ∗ such that they induce a
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(a) e∗ and λ (b) θ∗ and λ
Figure 4.3: Equilibria Analysis with λ
voluntary recall, and hence are independent of the specific values of λ. However, when λ
is relatively large, e∗ is increasing in λ, while θ∗ is decreasing in λ. The intuition behind
this is similar as before. With larger λ, the mandatory recall probability is small, so
the manufacturer and the supplier choose e∗ and θ∗ in equilibrium such that mandatory
recall is induced. With smaller expected mandatory recall cost, the manufacturer can
push more percentage of recall cost to the supplier while not violating the individual
rationality condition. As a result, the supplier has the incentive to input higher quality
effort since his share of recall cost is higher.
Figure 4.4 (a) and (b) display how the equilibrium solutions evolve with the change
of quality marginal cost s. With higher quality marginal cost s, the supplier tends to
put in less quality effort, therefore the manufacturer has the incentive to increase θ to
counteract the supplier’s tendency to decrease quality effort. Note that there is jump
in the supplier’s effort level, which corresponds to the change from voluntary recall to
mandatory recall.
Figure 4.4 (c) and (d) present how the equilibrium solutions change as the unit manda-
tory recall cost parameter αm increase. When αm is small, the manufacturer and the sup-
plier will induce the mandatory recall instead of voluntary recall. In this region, as the
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(a) e∗ and s (b) θ∗ and s
(c) e∗ and αm (d) θ∗ and αm
Figure 4.4: Equilibria Analysis with Cost Parameters
unit mandatory recall cost αm increases, the the manufacturer need to increase his cost
share percentage θ so that the supplier’s individual rationality condition is not violated.
On the other hand, the supplier’s effort exibits to be constant due to two conflicting
factors: the decreasing cost share percentage induces a lower effort, while the increasing
unit mandatory recall cost promotes a higher effort. Therefore overall, it behaves as
a constant effort level. While as αm becomes large enough, the voluntary recall would
always be preferred to mandatory recall for the manufacturer and the supplier. There-
fore, they will choose e∗ and θ∗ so as to induce voluntary recall. Hence the equilibrium
solutions are independent of the specific value of αm in this region.
Figure 4.5 displays the comparative statics of equilibrium solutions as the demand
parameters d1 and d2 change. When d1 is small or d2 is large, i.e., the voluntary recall
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(a) e∗ and d1 (b) θ∗ and d1
(c) e∗ and d2 (d) θ∗ and d2
Figure 4.5: Equilibria Analysis with Demand Parameters
cost is low or the mandatory recall cost is high, the voluntary recall is preferred. In such
scenario, the supplier has no incentive to increase her quality effort level since it does not
affect the voluntary recall cost but increase her cost. Otherwise, when d1 is large or d2 is
small, the supplier will increase her effort level since now mandatory recall is preferred,
and hence her quality effort affects the recall cost she is going to share. In this region,
as d1 and d2 increase, the expected mandatory recall cost increase so the manufacturer
needs to increase his share of recall cost to guarantee the IR condition to continue to
hold. However within this region, the effort level is flat and the reason again comes
from two conflicting forces: the manufacturer increases his share of recall cost, i.e., the
cost percentage of supplier becomes smaller, while the expected mandatory recall cost
increases as d1 and d2 increase.
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Note that in all the figures we have discussed, the curves have a turning point which
divides the curve into two parts, which corresponds to voluntary recall and mandatory
recall, respectively. This is consistent with our findings in Propositions 4.4.1, 4.4.2 and
4.4.3.
4.4.2 Integrated Supply Chain
Next we move on to the integrated supply chain when a central planner takes care of
all decisions and he aims to minimize the supply chain’s total cost. Note that under this
setting, cost sharing percentage θ is no longer needed because the manufacturer and the
supplier do not consider their own cost separately.
Denote the integrated supply chain problem as below:
min
e
se+ min{Cv(e)d1, Cm(e)(d1 + d2)} exp{−λe}.
We first present the optimal solution of supplier’s quality effort in this integrated
setting.
Lemma 4.4.6. The optimal solution eFB for the central planner exists and is unique.
Specifically,
(i) if s+ d1C
′
v(e˜) < 0, then e
FB = eFB2 ,
where
s+ (d1 + d2) exp{−λeFB2 }(C ′m(eFB2 )− λCm(eFB2 )) = 0;
(ii) if s+ (d1 + d2) exp{−λe}(C ′m(e)− λCm(e)) > 0, then eFB = eFB1 ,
where
s+ d1C
′
v(e
FB
1 ) = 0;
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(iii) if s+ d1C
′
v(e˜) > 0 and s+ (d1 + d2) exp{−λe}(C ′m(e)− λCm(e)) < 0, when
seFB1 + d1Cv(e
FB
1 ) < se
FB
2 + (d1 + d2)Cm(e
FB
2 exp{−λeFB2 }
is satisfied, then eFB = eFB1 ; otherwise, e
FB = eFB2 .
Similarly as in Lemma 4.4.2, the parameter space is also divided into three regions
here, and the regions are exactly the same as before. In addition, eFB1 corresponds to
the effort level when the central planner would also choose to voluntary recall, and eFB2
corresponds to the one when he would wait and bear the potential mandatory recall.
Interestingly, we find that under the integrated setting, when s is relatively small, vol-
untary recall is never preferred, unlike the decentralized case where the decision depends
on the cost sharing percentage.
Next we establish the comparison between the decentralized supply chain setting and
the integrated supply chain setting and yield the following proposition,
Proposition 4.4.4. e∗1 < e
FB
1 and e
∗
2 < e
FB
2 , therefore in the decentralized supply chain
setting, the supplier’s optimal quality effort is lower than that in the integrated supply
chain setting, therefore the recall cost sharing contract cannot coordinate the supply chain.
This proposition shows that the quality effort made by the supplier in the decentral-
ized supply chain setting is always smaller than that made by the central planner, which
implies that the recall cost sharing contract cannot coordinate the supply chain.
4.4.3 Decentralized Supply Chain with Random λ
So far we have assumed λ to be deterministic for the sake of tractability. However,
we do notice the limitation that the supplier can fully anticipate the mandatory recall
probability based on the effort level she chooses. Therefore, in this section, we introduce
randomness to the recall probability by allowing λ to be random, and the randomness is
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Figure 4.6: Sequence of Events with Random λ
resolved by the time of the decision of whether to issue a voluntary recall or not. Now
the sequence of events is changed as follows:
The manufacturer, as a Stackelberg leader, offers a cost sharing percentage θ, and
then the supplier decides her quality effort e. At this point, λ for the mandatory recall
probability is random. By the time of the decision of voluntary recall or not, λ is realized
and the mandatory recall probability is observed. The manufacturer makes the decision
of whether or not to issue a voluntary recall based on the evaluation of the voluntary
recall cost and expected mandatory recall cost. Once a voluntary recall is issued, assume
the problem is completely fixed by the recall process and no mandatory recall will take
place later. Otherwise, by the end of the period, the mandatory recall happens with the
probability exp{−λe}.
We follow a similar backward induction procedure as before to solve this problem.
Given θ, e and realized λ, the manufacturer will issue a voluntary recall if
θCv(e)d1 < [θCm(e)(d1 + d2)] exp{−λe},
which is equivalent to
exp{−λe} > αvd1
αm(d1 + d2)
,
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or,
λ <
1
e
ln
(
αm(d1 + d2)
αvd1
)
.
Define
α(e) =
1
e
ln
(
αm(d1 + d2)
αvd1
)
,
note that α(e) is always positive, and the manufacturer chooses voluntary recall if λ ≤
α(e), and chooses to wait otherwise.
Now we are ready to analyze the supplier’s problem. For the supplier, given θ,
min
e
se+ (1− θ)H(e),
where H(e) = Cv(e)d1Fλ(α(e)) +
∫ ∞
α(e)
Cm(e)(d1 + d2) exp{−λe}f(λ)dλ.
Let e∗(θ) denote the optimal solution to the supplier’s cost minimization problem above.
Based on the above analysis, we now can move to the manufacturer’s decision of θ
and write out the whole principle-agent problem as follows:
min
θ
θH(e∗(θ))
s.t. se∗(θ) + (1− θ)H(e∗(θ)) ≤ C¯ (IR)
e∗(θ) = arg min
e
se+ (1− θ)H(e) (IC),
where H(e) is the expected recall cost:
H(e) = Cv(e)d1Fλ(α(e)) +
∫ ∞
α(e)
Cm(e)(d1 + d2) exp{−λe}f(λ)dλ,
and C¯ is the reservation cost for the supplier.
Next we conduct comparative statics analysis to help analyze this problem. Here we
assume λ is according to a uniform distribution, and the results are presented in Figures
4.7 and 4.8. Since λ is random now, a given set of θ and e could result in the choice of
voluntary recall or mandatory recall depending on the realization of λ by the time when
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(a) e∗ and s (b) θ∗ and s
(c) e∗ and αm (d) θ∗ and αm
Figure 4.7: Equilibria Analysis with Cost Parameters under Random λ
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the manufacturer needs to make the decision. Therefore, we no longer have the turning
point in the curves as we did in the fixed λ case, where the regions divided by the turning
point corresponded to preference of voluntary recall and mandatory recall, respectively.
Figure 4.7 (a) and (b) presents the trend of equilibrium solutions as the change of
quality marginal cost s. As s increases, the supplier has the incentive to decrease his
effort level, and the manufacturer will increase his cost share percentage. Figure 4.7
(c) and (d) display the trend when the unit mandatory recall cost αm changes. As αm
increases, the expected mandatory recall cost increases. Since before the realization of
λ, mandatory recall could always be preferred with some probability, the manufacturer
needs to increase his cost share percentage to ensure the IR condition to hold. While
for the supplier, the effect of manufacturer’s decreasing θ and the effect of increased
mandatory recall cost cancel out, and therefore result in constant effort level.
Figure 4.8 shows the dependence of equilibrium solutions as the demand parameters
d1 and d2 change. The general trend accords with the case with fixed λ except for
there is no turning point in the curve, and the curves are strictly monotone when λ is
uncertain. As d1 increases, both voluntary recall cost and expected mandatory recall cost
increase. The manufacturer again increases θ to keep the supplier in the game, and the
supplier increases his effort level to counteract the increase of mandatory recall cost. The
argument for d2 is similar by noting that a higher d2 leads to higher expected mandatory
recall cost.
4.5 Conclusion
In this paper, we consider a recall cost sharing contract proposed by the manufacturer,
as a Stackelberg leader facing a moral hazard problem, to align the incentive of the
supplier in ensuring the product quality, and also examine two types of recall decisions by
the manufacturer, i.e., voluntary recall and mandatory recall. We consider two settings,
90
(a) e∗ and d1 (b) θ∗ and d1
(c) e∗ and d2 (d) θ∗ and d2
Figure 4.8: Equilibria Analysis with Demand Parameters under Random λ
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both with realistic applications: we first consider the setting when the mandatory recall
probability solely depends on the supplier’s quality effort, and then consider the setting
when there is extra randomness involved in the mandatory recall probability. To facilitate
comparison, we also consider the first best problem where the supply chain is integrated.
By solving the model, we characterize the firms’ decisions in equilibrium. Surprisingly,
we find that, as a Stackelberg leader, the manufacturer does not always push all the recall
cost to the supplier. His decision depends on whether he will issue a voluntary recall or
not. Furthermore, we find two cost sharing percentage thresholds that determines the
equilibrium solutions. Specifically, the lower cost sharing percentage is always associated
with voluntary recall, while the higher one is always associated to mandatory recall. We
conduct comparative statics study to see how the equilibrium solutions evolve with the
change of parameters. In addition, we find that the recall cost sharing contract cannot
coordinate the supply chain.
There are certain limitations and possible extensions for future research with the
models considered in this paper. In our work we focus more on the decisions within
the supply chain and the interdependence between designing the product recall contract
and making product recall decisions. Actually, there are many other angles to study
the process of recall. For example, the games between the supply chain players and
the government agency are potentially interesting research questions for future study.
Besides, more analytical results for the decentralized supply chain with random λ would
be contributing.
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Appendix A SUPPLEMENTARY RESULTS AND PROOFS FOR
CHAPTER 2
Start-Up and Established Firm - No Vertical Differentiation
We first examine the new capacity subgame when both firms choose the same quality
level, either Sl or Sh, and then compete with each other in capacity quantity. It is similar
as the classic Cournot game, however, one key difference is that here two firms are not
symmetric (start up vs established firm) regarding to the objectives, besides, different
timing structures of the capacity investment are also considered. The demand function
is:
P = −SQs − SQe + Sθˆ,
where Qs and Qe denote the product quantities released to the market by the start-up
and the established firm. The production clearance strategy is carried over here, i.e.,
Qs = Ks, Qe = Ke, where Ks, Ke are the capacity quantities of start-up and established
firm. Following standard procedures, we obtain the following results1:
ψ∗ E(pi∗)
(Es, Ee) 1−G
(
2
√
α
S +
Sµ−√Sα−β2S2
2S + β1S
)
(Sµ−S
√
α/S−β2S2)2
4S
(Es, Le) 1−G
(
2
√
2α
S + (2β1 − β4)S
)
S
4 (µ
2 + σ2)−
(√
Sα+ β4S
2
2
)
µ+ α2 +
β24
4 S +
√
α
2Sβ4S
2
(Ls, Ee) 1−G
(
µ
2 +
3β3−2β2
2 S + 2
√
α
S
)
1
8Sµ
2 + β3−2β24 µS
2 + (β3−2β2)
2
8 S
3
(Ls, Le) 1−G (2β3S − β4S + 3√αS ) S9 (µ2 + σ2) + (β3−2β43 )2 S3 + 29 (β3 − 2β4)S2µ
Table A.1: No Vertical Differentiation
Table A.1 presents the survival probability of the start-up and the expected profit
for the established firm in the capacity quantity subgame, respectively, for four different
timing structures. Note that in the table we use S which could be either Sl or Sh.
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ψ∗ E(pi∗)
(Ssl , S
e
l ) 1−G
(
2β3Sl − β4Sl + 3
√
α
Sl
)
Sl
9 (µ
2 + σ2) +
(
β3−2β4
3
)2
S3l +
2
9 (β3 − 2β4)S2l µ
(Ssl , S
e
h) 1−G
(
2β3S
2
l Sh−β4S2hSl+(4Sh−Sl)
√
Slα
ShSl
) Sh (1− 2Sh4Sh−Sl)2 (µ2 + σ2)
+2Sh
(
1− 2Sh4Sh−Sl
)(
β3S
2
l −2β4S2h
4Sh−Sl
)
µ+
(
β3S
2
l −2β4S2h
4Sh−Sl
)2
Sh
(Ssh, S
e
l ) 1−G
(
2β3S
3
h−β4S2l Sh+(4Sh−Sl)
√
Shα
Sh(2Sh−Sl)
)
SlS
2
h
(4Sh−Sl)2 (µ
2 + σ2)− 2Sh(2β4S2l Sh−β3S2hSl)(4Sh−Sl)2 µ+
(2β4S
2
l Sh−β3S2hSl)2
Sl(4Sh−Sl)2
(Ssh, S
e
h) 1−G
(
2β3Sh − β4Sh + 3
√
α
Sh
)
Sh
9 (µ
2 + σ2) +
(
β3−2β4
3
)2
S3h +
2
9 (β3 − 2β4)S2hµ
Table A.2: The Start-Up’s Optimal Survival Probability and The Established Firm’s
Expected Profit When Both Firms Make Late Capacity Investment
ψ∗ E(pi∗)
(Ssl , S
e
l ) 1−G
(
2
√
2α
Sl
+ (2β1 − β4)Sl
)
Sl
4 (µ
2 + σ2)−
(√
Slα+
β4S
2
l
2
)
µ+ α2 +
β24
4 Sl +
√
α
2Sl
β4S
2
l
(Ssl , S
e
h) 1−G
(
2
√
2(2Sh−Sl)α
(ShSl)
− β4Sh + 2β1Sl
) Sh
4 (µ
2 + σ2)−
(√
SlShα
2(2Sh−Sl) +
β4S
2
h
2
)
µ+ Slα2(2Sh−Sl)
+
β24
4 Sh +
√
Slα
2Sh(2Sh−Sl)β4S
2
h
(Ssh, S
e
l ) 1−G
(
2
√
2α
(2Sh−Sl) +
2β1S
2
h−β4S2l
2Sh−Sl
) Sl
4 (µ
2 + σ2)−
(
Sl
√
α
2(2Sh−Sl) +
β4S
2
l
2
)
µ+ Slα2(2Sh−Sl)
+
β24
4 Sl +
√
α
2(2Sh−Sl)β4S
2
l
(Ssh, S
e
h) 1−G
(
2
√
2α
Sh
+ (2β1 − β4)Sh
)
Sh
4 (µ
2 + σ2)−
(√
Shα+
β4S
2
h
2
)
µ+ α2 +
β24
4 Sh +
√
α
2Sh
β4S
2
h
Table A.3: The Start-Up’s Optimal Survival Probability and The Established Firm’s
Expected Profit When The Start-Up Invests Early and The Established Firm Invests
Late
Capacity Quantity Subgame Equilibria
Proof of Table 2.2
Proof. In case of (Esl , L
e
h), i.e., the low quality start-up invests early while the high
quality established firm invests late. pies. = (Ph − C2h)Kh = (−SlKl − ShKh + Shθˆ −
C2h)Kh = −ShK2h + (Shθˆ − SlKl − C2h)Kh. Derive the partial derivative with re-
spect to Kh, K
∗
h =
Shθˆ−SlKl−C2h
2Sh
, and pies.(Kl) =
(Shθˆ−SlKl−C2h)2
4Sh
. Note that pist.(Kl) =
(Pl − C1l)Kl = SlKl2 θˆ − SlK2l +
S2l
2Sh
K2l +
SlC2h
2Sh
Kl − C1lKl, and Pr{pist.(Kl) ≥ α} =
1−G
(
2Kl − SlKlSh −
C2h
Sh
+ 2C1l
Sl
+ 2α
SlKl
)
. Maximizing Pr{pist.(Kl) ≥ α} over Kl generates
K∗l =
√
2Shα
Sl(2Sh−Sl) , K
∗
h =
θˆ
2
−
√
Slα
2Sh(2Sh−Sl) . Then we get ψ
∗ = 1−G
(
2
√
2(2Sh−Sl)
SlSh
α− C2h
Sh
+ 2C1l
Sl
)
,
1The demand model is essentially the same as the one in (Swinney et al. 2011) except for the scale
parameter S
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ψ∗ E(pi∗)
(Ssl , S
e
l ) 1−G
(
µ
2
+ 3β3−2β2
2
Sl + 2
√
α
Sl
)
1
8
Slµ
2 + β3−2β2
4
µS2l +
(β3−2β2)2
8
S3l
(Ssl , S
e
h) 1−G
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µ
2
+
β3S2l −2β2S2h
2(2Sh−Sl) + β3Sl + 2
√
α
Sl
)
2Sh−Sl
8
µ2 +
(β3S2l −2β2S2h)µ
4
+
(β3S2l −2β2S2h)2
8(2Sh−Sl)
(Ssh, S
e
l ) 1−G
(
SlShµ+β3SlS
2
h−2β2S2l Sh
2Sh(2Sh−Sl) + β3Sh + 2
√
α
Sh
)
ShSl(µ+β3Sh−2β2Sl)2
8(2Sh−Sl)
(Ssh, S
e
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µ
2
+ 3β3−2β2
2
Sh + 2
√
α
Sh
)
1
8
Shµ
2 + β3−2β2
4
µS2h +
(β3−2β2)2
8
S3h
Table A.4: The Start-Up’s Optimal Survival Probability and The Established Firm’s
Expected Profit When The Start-Up Invests Late and The Established Firm Invests
Early
pi∗es. =
Sh
4
θˆ2 −
(√
SlShα
2(2Sh−Sl) +
C2h
2
)
θˆ + Slα
2(2Sh−Sl) +
C22h
4Sh
+
√
Slα
2Sh(2Sh−Sl)C2h, thus E(pi
∗) =
Sh
4
(µ2 + σ2)−
(√
SlShα
2(2Sh−Sl) +
C2h
2
)
µ+ Slα
2(2Sh−Sl) +
C22h
4Sh
+
√
Slα
2Sh(2Sh−Sl)C2h.
In case of (Lsl , L
e
h), i.e., both the start-up invests and the established firm invest
late. pies. = (Ph − C2h)Kh = (−SlKl − ShKh + Shθˆ − C2h)Kh = −ShK2h + (Shθˆ −
SlKl − C2h)Kh, K∗h = Shθˆ−SlKl−C2h2Sh . pist. = (Pl − C2l)Kl = −SlK2l + (Slθˆ − SlKh −
C2l)Kl, K
∗
l =
Slθˆ−SlKh−C2l
2Sl
. Combine these two first order conditions, and we get K∗h =(
1− 2Sh
4Sh−Sl
)
θˆ + C2l−2C2h
4Sh−Sl , K
∗
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4Sh−Sl
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∗
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1− 2Sh
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2Sh
(
1− 2Sh
4Sh−Sl
)(
C2l−2C2h
4Sh−Sl
)
µ+
(
C2l−2C2h
4Sh−Sl
)2
Sh. ψ
∗ = 1−G
(
2C2lSh−C2hSl+(4Sh−Sl)
√
Slα
SlSh
)
.
In case of (Lsl , E
e
h), i.e., the start-up invests late while the established firm invests
early. pist. = (Pl − C2l)Kl = −SlK2l + (Slθˆ − SlKh − C2l)Kl, K∗l = Slθˆ−SlKh−C2l2Sl .
pies. = (Ph − C1h)Kh = −ShK2h + (Shθˆ − SlKl − C1h)Kh. Substituting K∗l into pies. gen-
erates pies. =
(
Sl
2
− Sh
)
K2h +
(
Shθˆ − Sl2 θˆ + C2l2 − C1h
)
Kh, thus E(pies.) =
(
Sl
2
− Sh
)
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Shµ− Sl2 µ+ C2l2 − C1h
)
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Sl
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− Sh < 0, we get K∗h = µ2 + C2l−2C1h2(2Sh−Sl) , K∗l =
θˆ
2
− µ
4
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4(2Sh−Sl) −
C2l
2Sl
.E(pi∗) = 2Sh−Sl
8
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4
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2
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G
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µ
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+ C2l−2C1h
2(2Sh−Sl) +
C2l
Sl
+ 2
√
α
Sl
)
.
In case of (Esl , E
e
h), i.e., both the start-up and the established firm invest early.
pist.(Kl, Kh) = (Pl − C1l)Kl = −SlK2l + (Slθˆ − SlKh − C1l)Kl, thus ψ = Pr{pi∗s ≥ α} =
95
1−G
(
Kl +
α
SlKl
+ SlKh+C1l
Sl
)
. Denote K = Kl +
α
SlKl
+ SlKh+C1l
Sl
, then ∂K
∂Kl
= 0 generates
K∗l =
√
α
Sl
, and K∗ = 2
√
α
Sl
+ SlKh+C1l
Sl
. pies. = (Ph − C1h)Kh = −ShK2h + (Shθˆ −
SlKl − C1h)Kh, thus E(pies.) = (Ph − C1h)Kh = −ShK2h + (Shµ − SlKl − C1h)Kh, and
∂E(pies.)
∂Kh
= 0 generates K∗h =
Shµ−SlKl−C1h
2Sh
. Substituting K∗l into K
∗
h leads to K
∗
h =
Shµ−
√
αSl−C1h
2Sh
, K∗ = 2
√
α
Sl
+ Shµ−
√
αSl−C1h
2Sh
+ C1l
Sl
, E(pi∗) = (Shµ−SlKl−C1h)
2
4Sh
, and ψ∗ =
1−G
(
2
√
α
Sl
+ Shµ−
√
αSl−C1h
2Sh
+ C1l
Sl
)
Proof of Proposition 2.4.1
Proof. (1) We first show that (Esl , L
e
h) is an equilibrium under specific conditions. ψ
∗(Esl , L
e
h) >
ψ∗(Lsl , L
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h) could be written as 2
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The above inequality is equivalent to Sh
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monotone increasing in σ (when σ > 0), thus there exists a threshold σ1 such that
for all σ > σ1, the inequality holds. Following the proof above it is clear that nei-
ther (Lsl , L
e
h) nor (E
s
l , E
e
h) is a possible equilibrium. Next we need to show (L
s
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is not possible equilibrium as well. Note that E[pi∗(Lsl , L
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h)] is equiv-
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8(2Sh−Sl) . Similarly left hand side is monotone increasing in σ
(when σ > 0), thus there exists another threshold σ2 such that for all σ > σ2, the inequal-
ity holds. Take σ¯se = max{σ1, σ2}, as we concluded, (Esl , Leh) is an unique equilibrium
under specific conditions.
(2) For (Lsl , L
e
h) part, see proof above. For (L
s
l , E
e
h), We will show ψ
∗(Lsl , E
e
h) <
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ψ∗(Esl , E
e
h) under specific conditions. It reduces to show that
µ
2
+ C2l−2C1h
2(2Sh−Sl) +
C2l
Sl
+2
√
α
Sl
>
2
√
α
Sl
+ Shµ−
√
Slα−C1h
2Sh
+ C1l
Sl
, i.e. C2l−2C1h
2(2Sh−Sl) +
C1h
2Sh
+
√
Slα
2Sh
+ C2l−C1l
Sl
> 0. If C1l < C2l, write
C2l−2C1h
2(2Sh−Sl) +
C1h
2Sh
+
√
Slα
2Sh
as C2lSh−C1hSl+(2Sh−Sl)
√
Slα
2(2Sh−Sl)Sh . Since we have the assumption α >
(SlC1h−ShC1l)2
4Sl(Sh−Sl)2 , thus C2lSh−C1hSl+(2Sh−Sl)
√
Slα > C2lSh−C1hSl+ (2Sh−Sl)(SlC1h−ShC1l)2(Sh−Sl) >
C2lSh − C1hSl + SlC1h − ShC1l > 0, thus the inequality holds.
Proof of Proposition 2.4.2
Proof. (1) We first show that (Lsh, E
e
l ) is an equilibrium under specific conditions. Con-
sider E[pi∗(Lsh, E
e
l )] > E[pi
∗(Lsh, L
e
l )], i.e.
(SlShµ+SlC2h−2ShC1l)2
8SlSh(2Sh−Sl) >
SlS
2
h
(4Sh−Sl)2 (µ
2 + σ2) −
2Sh(2C2lSh−C2hSl)
(4Sh−Sl)2 µ+
(2C2lSh−C2hSl)2
Sl(4Sh−Sl)2 . Note that the right hand side is monotone increasing
in σ (when σ > 0). As long as the inequality above with σ = 0 holds, there would
exist some threshold σ∗1 such that for all σ < σ
∗
1, the original inequality holds. Note
that (SlShµ+SlC2h−2ShC1l)
2
8SlSh(2Sh−Sl) >
(SlShµ+SlC2h−2ShC1l)2
Sl(4Sh−Sl)2 , thus it is sufficient to check whether
(SlShµ+SlC2h−2ShC1l)2
Sl(4Sh−Sl)2 >
SlS
2
h
(4Sh−Sl)2µ
2 − 2Sh(2C2lSh−C2hSl)
(4Sh−Sl)2 µ +
(2C2lSh−C2hSl)2
Sl(4Sh−Sl)2 is satisfied, which
could be further simplified as (C1l − C2l)
(
Sh
Sl
(C1l + C2l)− Shµ− C2h
)
> 0. Note that
we have the assumption 2C2l
Sh
Sl
− Shµ − C2h < 0. If C1l < C2l, the inequality would
be satisfied. Consider ψ∗(Lsh, E
e
l ) > ψ
∗(Esh, E
e
l ), i.e.
SlShµ+SlC2h−2ShC1l
2Sh(2Sh−Sl) +
C2h
Sh
+ 2
√
α
Sh
<
2
√
α
Sh
+
Slµ−Sl
√
α/Sh−C1l
2Sh
+ C1h
Sh
, which could be written as C2h − C1h < Slµ2 − Sl2
√
α
Sh
−
C1l
2
− SlShµ
2(2Sh−Sl) −
SlC2h
2(2Sh−Sl) +
C1lSh
2Sh−Sl . Note that the right hand side in monotone increasing
in Sh, and it converges to
Slµ
4
as Sh → +∞. As long as C2h − C1h < Slµ4 , there would
exist some threshold S¯h such that for all Sh > S¯h, the original inequality holds. Next
we establish conditions which ensure that (Lsh, E
e
l ) as a unique equilibrium. It is clear
that (Esh, E
e
l ) or (L
s
h, L
e
l ) cannot be possible equilibrium under conditions specified above.
Check whether E[pi∗(Esh, L
e
l )] < E[pi
∗(Esh, E
e
l )], i.e.,
Sl
4
(µ2+σ2)−
(
Sl
√
α
2(2Sh−Sl) +
C2l
2
)
µ+
Slα
2(2Sh−Sl) +
C22l
4Sl
+
√
α
2(2Sh−Sl)C2l <
(Slµ−Sl
√
α/Sh−C1l)2
4Sl
, could be satisfied under specific con-
ditions. Note that the left hand side in monotone increasing in σ(when σ > 0). As
long as the inequality above with σ = 0 holds, there would exist some threshold σ∗2
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such that for all σ < σ∗2, the original inequality holds. Note that we have the assump-
tion µ >
√
2α
(2Sh−Sl) +
C2l
Sl
, we only need to check (C2l − C1l)
(√
α
2(2Sh−Sl) − 12
√
α
Sh
)
+
C22l+C
2
1l−2C1lC2l
4Sl
+ Slα
(
1
2(2Sh−Sl) +
1
4Sh
−
√
1
2Sh(2Sh−Sl)
)
≥ 0, and it is clear to be satisfied
if C2l > C1l. Take σ¯es = min{σ∗1, σ∗2}, then we can guarantee (Lsh, Eel ) as a unique
equilibrium under specific conditions stated.
(2) We first show that if C1h < C2h, ψ
∗(Lsh, L
e
l ) < ψ
∗(Esh, L
e
l ), thus (L
s
h, L
e
l ) is not
an equilibrium. ψ∗(Lsh, L
e
l ) < ψ
∗(Esh, L
e
l ), i.e.
−Sh(C2l−2C2h)+(4Sh−Sl)
√
Shα
Sh(2Sh−Sl) > 2
√
2α
2Sh−Sl +
2C1h−C2l
2Sh−Sl , could be simplified to 0 >
2(C1h−C2h)
2Sh−Sl +
√
Shα(2
√
Sh
√
4Sh−2Sl−4Sh+Sl)
(2Sh−Sl)Sh . Since 2
√
Sh
√
4Sh − 2Sl <
4Sh − Sl, if C1h < C2h, the right hand side is negative, thus the inequality holds. For
the (Esh, L
e
l ) part, it is clear that ψ
∗(Esh, L
e
l ) > ψ
∗(Lsh, L
e
l ) according to proof above.
Next under specific conditions we need to show E[pi∗(Esh, L
e
l )] > E[pi
∗(Esh, E
e
l )], i.e.
Sl
4
(µ2+σ2)−
(
Sl
√
α
2(2Sh−Sl) +
C2l
2
)
µ+ Slα
2(2Sh−Sl) +
C22l
4Sl
+
√
α
2(2Sh−Sl)C2l >
(Slµ−Sl
√
α/Sh−C1l)2
4Sl
.
Note the left hand side is monotone increasing in σ (when σ > 0), there exists some
threshold σ′ such that for all σ > σ′, the inequality holds. Take σ˜es = max{σ′, σ∗1} (σ∗1
from (1)), then (Esh, L
e
l ) would be guaranteed as a unique equilibrium when σ > σ˜es.
Proof of Proposition 2.4.3
Proof. We first show that (Lel , L
e
h) is an equilibrium, i.e., E[pi
∗
l (L
e
l , L
e
h)] > E[pi
∗
l (E
e
l , L
e
h)]
and E[pi∗h(L
e
l , L
e
h)] > E[pi
∗
h(L
e
l , E
e
h)]. For the first inequality, the equivalent expression is
Sl
(
Sh
4Sh−Slµ−
2C2lSh−C2hSl
Sl(4Sh−Sl)
)2
+
SlS
2
h
(4Sh−Sl)2σ
2 > (SlShµ+SlC2h−2ShC1l)
2
8SlSh(2Sh−Sl) . Since the left hand side
is monotone increasing in σ (when σ > 0), there exists some threshold σ∗1, such that for all
σ > σ∗1, the inequality holds. Then we consider the second inequality, which could be writ-
ten as Sh
(
2Sh−Sl
4Sh−Slµ+
C2l−2C2h
4Sh−Sl
)2
+ Sh
(
2Sh−Sl
4Sh−Sl
)2
σ2 >
(
2Sh−Sl
2
) (
µ
2
+ C2l−2C1h
2(2Sh−Sl)
)2
, similarly,
there exists some threshold σ∗2 such that for all σ > σ
∗
2, the inequality holds. It’s clearly
neither (Eel , L
e
h) nor (L
e
l , E
e
h) is an equilibrium. We next show that (E
e
l , E
e
h) is not a possi-
ble equilibrium by proving E[pi∗1(E
e
l , E
e
h)] < E[pi
∗
1(L
e
l , E
e
h)], i.e., Sl
(
Sh
4Sh−Slµ−
2C1lSh−C1hSl
Sl(4Sh−Sl)
)2
<
Sl
(
µ
4
− C2l−2C1h
4(2Sh−Sl) −
C2l
2Sl
)2
+ Sl
4
σ2. Similarly, there exists some threshold σ∗3 such that for all
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σ > σ∗3, the inequality holds. Take σ¯ee = max{σ∗1, σ∗2, σ∗3}, and our proof is complete.
Proof of Proposition 2.5.1
Proof of 2.5.1.1. When the following two inequalities hold
2
√
α
Sl
+
Shµ−
√
Slα− β1S2h
2Sh
+ β1Sl < 2
√
α
Sh
+
Shµ−
√
Shα− β1S2h
2Sh
+ β1Sh (A.0.1)
and
(Slµ−
√
Slα− β1S2l )2
4Sl
<
(Shµ−
√
Slα− β1S2h)2
4Sh
, (A.0.2)
we could have an equilibrium (Ssl , S
e
h), in which the start up chooses low quality while
the established firm chooses high quality.
For Inequality A.0.1, moving the right hand side to the left and then divided by
√
Sh −
√
Sl which is great than 0. It is equivalent to
2
√
α√
ShSL
+
√
α
Sh
− β1(
√
Sh +
√
Sl) < 0.
Further calculations yields
√
ShSL(
√
Sh +
√
Sl) >
5
√
α
4β1
. And Sl > (
5
√
α
4β1
)2/3 is a sufficient
condition for this inequality to hold.
For Inequality A.0.2, it is equivalent to prove
√
Slµ−
√
α−β1S3/2l <
√
Shµ−
√
α Sl
Sh
−
β1S
3/2
h . And it will be sufficient to show
√
Slµ−β1S3/2l <
√
Shµ−
√
α−β1S3/2h . Consider
function f(x) = µ
√
x− β1x3/2, which is increasing in (0, µ3β1 ] and decreasing in [
µ
3β1
,∞).
Thus a sufficient condition for Inequality A.0.2 to hold is Sh <
µ
3β1
. We proved the first
statement of Proposition 6.1.
Next, to show (Ssl , S
e
h) is the unique equilibrium, we need to find sufficient conditions
to the following two inequalities, violation of either of which will result in non-existence
of (Ssh, S
e
l ) equilibrium, which lead to the uniqueness of (S
s
l , S
e
h).
2
√
α
Sh
+
Slµ− Sl
√
α/Sh − β1S2l
2Sh
+ β1Sh > 2
√
α
Sl
+
Slµ−
√
Slα− β1S2l
2Sl
+ β1Sl (A.0.3)
(Slµ− Sl
√
α/Sh − β1S2l )2
4Sl
<
(Shµ− Sh
√
α/Sh − β1S2h)2
4Sh
. (A.0.4)
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For Inequality A.0.3, it is sufficient to show that 2
√
α
Sh
+
Slµ−Sl
√
α/Sl−β1S2l
2Sh
+ β1Sh >
2
√
α
Sl
+
Slµ−
√
Slα−β1S2l
2Sl
+ β1Sl. It is equivalent to
Slµ−
√
αSl−β1S2l
2ShSl
+ 2
√
α√
ShSL(
√
Sh+
√
Sl)
< β1.
One sufficient condition is to show
Slµ−
√
αSl−β1S2l +2
√
αSl
2S2l
< β1, which is equivalent to
µ(Sl)
−1 +
√
α(Sl)
− 3
2 < 3β1. Noticing the function of the left hand side of Sl is decreasing,
we have an sufficient condition for Inequality A.0.3 is Sl > Sl , where Sl is the solution
to µ(Sl)
−1 +
√
α(Sl)
− 3
2 = 3β1.
For Inequality A.0.4, it is equivalent to
√
Shµ−
√
α−β1S3/2h >
√
Slµ−
√
α Sl
Sh
−β1S3/2l .
Further calculations yields that the proceeding inequality is equivalent to β1(Sh + Sl +
√
ShSl) +
√
α/
√
Sh < µ. A sufficient condition will be 3β1Sh +
√
α/
√
Sh < µ. We study
the function f(x) = 3β1x +
√
α/
√
x, which is decreasing in (0, (
√
α
6β1
)3/2] and increasing
in [(
√
α
6β1
)3/2,∞), with its minimum achieved at (
√
α
6β1
)3/2. Thus a sufficient condition for
Inequality A.0.4 to hold is Sh ∈ [Sh, S¯h], where Sh, S¯h are the solutions to Sh +
√
α√
Sh
1
3β1
=
µ
3β1
.
Proof of 2.5.1.2. When the following two inequalities hold
2
√
α
Sh
+
Slµ− Sl
√
α/Sh − β1S2l
2Sh
+ β1Sh < 2
√
α
Sl
+
Slµ−
√
Slα− β1S2l
2Sl
+ β1Sl (A.0.5)
and
(Slµ− Sl
√
α/Sh − β1S2l )2
4Sl
>
(Shµ− Sh
√
α/Sh − β1S2h)2
4Sh
, (A.0.6)
we could have an equilibrium (Ssh, S
e
l ), in which the start up chooses high quality while
the established firm chooses low quality.
For Inequality A.0.5, it is sufficient to show that 2
√
α
Sh
+
Slµ−Sl
√
α/Sh−β1S2l
2Sl
+ β1Sh <
2
√
α
Sl
+
Slµ−
√
Slα−β1S2l
2Sl
+β1Sl, which is equivalent to
3
2
√
α
Sh
+β1Sh <
3
2
√
α
Sl
+β1Sl. Consider
function f(x) = 3
2
√
α
x
+ β1x which is decreasing in (0, (
3
√
α
4β1
)2/3]. Thus Sh < (
3
√
α
4β1
)2/3 is a
sufficient condition for Inequality A.0.5 to hold.
For Inequality A.0.6, it is equivalent to
√
Slµ−
√
α Sl
Sh
−β1S3/2l >
√
Shµ−
√
α−β1S3/2h .
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Thus it is enough to show that
√
Slµ−β1S3/2l >
√
Shµ−
√
α−β1S3/2h . Consider function
f(x) = µ
√
x − β1x3/2, which is increasing in (0, µ3β1 ] and decreasing in [
µ
3β1
,∞). Thus a
sufficient condition for Inequality A.0.6 to hold is Sl >
µ
3β1
.
Next, to show (Ssh, S
e
l ) is the unique equilibrium, we need to find sufficient conditions
to the following two inequalities, violation of either of which will result in non-existence
of (Ssl , S
e
h) equilibrium, which leads to the uniqueness of (S
s
h, S
e
l ).
2
√
α
Sl
+
Shµ−
√
Slα− β1S2h
2Sh
+ β1Sl > 2
√
α
Sh
+
Shµ−
√
Shα− β1S2h
2Sh
+ β1Sh (A.0.7)
(Slµ−
√
Slα− β1S2l )2
4Sl
>
(Shµ−
√
Slα− β1S2h)2
4Sh
. (A.0.8)
For Inequality A.0.7, it is equivalent to 2
√
α√
ShSl
+
√
α
2Sh
> β1(
√
Sh +
√
Sl). One sufficient
condition will be 2
√
α
Sh
+
√
α
2Sh
> 2β1
√
Sh, which is equivalent to Sh < (
5
√
α
4β1
)2/3.
For Inequality A.0.8, it is sufficient to show
(Slµ−
√
Slα−β2S2l )2
4Sh
>
(Shµ−
√
Slα−β2S2h)2
4Sh
, which
is equivalent to Slµ− β1S2l > Shµ− β1S2h. One sufficient condition will be Sl > µ2β1 .
The sufficient condition for Inequality A.0.7 is automatically satisfied given the suf-
ficient condition for existence of (Ssh, S
e
l ), thus it is also unique under the sufficient
condition.
Proof of Proposition 2.5.2
Proof of 2.5.2.1. When Inequalities A.0.7 and A.0.4 hold, we could have an equilibrium
(Ssh, S
e
h), in which both the start up and established firms choose high quality. Refer
to the proof of Proposition 2.5.1, the sufficient condition will be Sh < (
5
√
α
4β1
)2/3 and
Sh ∈ [Sh, S¯h], where Sh, S¯h are the solutions to Sh +
√
α√
Sh
1
3β1
= µ
3β1
.
Furthermore, if either A.0.5 or A.0.2 holds, then (Ssl , S
e
l ) will not be an equilibrium,
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which leads to the uniqueness of (Ssh, S
e
h). And according to the proof of Proposition
2.5.1, the condition corresponds to either Sh < (
3
√
α
4β1
)2/3 or Sh <
µ
3β1
.
Proof of 2.5.2.2. When Inequalities A.0.3 and A.0.8 hold, we could have an equilibrium
(Ssl , S
e
l ), in which both the start up and established firms choose low quality. Refer to
the proof of Proposition 2.5.1, the sufficient condition will be Sl >
µ
2β1
and Sl > Sl, where
Sl is the solution to µ(Sl)
−1 +
√
α(Sl)
− 3
2 = 3β1.
Furthermore, if either A.0.1 or A.0.6 holds, then (Ssh, S
e
h) will not be an equilibrium,
which leads to the uniqueness of (Ssl , S
e
l ). And according to the proof of Proposition 2.5.1,
the condition corresponds to either Sl > (
5
√
α
4β1
)2/3 or Sl >
µ
3β1
, and this is automatically
satisfied given the sufficient condition for existance of (Ssl , S
e
l ), thus it is also unique
under the sufficient condition.
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Appendix B PROOFS FOR CHAPTER 3
Proof of Lemma 3.4.1
Proof of Lemma 3.4.1. The first-best optimization problem is given by
ΣFB = max
e,q
rS(q)− exp{−λe}uS(q)− cq − se.
Denote Σ(e, q) = rS(q)− exp{−λe}uS(q)− cq− se. Now consider the partial derivatives
with respect to e, and we have
∂Σ(e, q)
∂e
= uλ exp{−λe}S(q)− s,
∂2Σ(e, q)
∂e2
= −uλ2 exp{−λe}S(q) < 0,
Note Σ(e, q) is concave in e for every q, hence, we can first set q and then e to achieve the
optimization sequentially. Since for the demand there exists a lower bound l satisfying
S(l) ≥ s/uλ. For any order quantity q chosen, it is obvious that q ≥ l, which yields
S(q) ≥ s/uλ, then set
∂Σ(e, q)
∂e
= uλ exp{−λe}S(q)− s = 0,
we have
e∗(q) =
1
λ
ln
(
S(q)uλ
s
)
. (B.0.1)
Then,
Σ(q) = rS(q)− cq − s
λ
− s
λ
ln
(
S(q)uλ
s
)
. (B.0.2)
The first derivative is as follow:
dΣ(q)
dq
= rG¯(q)− s
λ
G¯(q)
S(q)
− c. (B.0.3)
Note the similarity between the function (B.0.3) and (B.0.9), thus if we have IFR as-
sumption, i.e. g(q)2 + g
′
(q)G¯(q) ≥ 0, there is a unique maximizer for q, which could be
obtained from
rG¯(qFB)− s
λ
G¯(qFB)
S(qFB)
− c = 0. (B.0.4)
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Now we could conclude that the first-best optimal solution could be given by
eFB =
1
λ
ln
(
S(qFB)uλ
s
)
,
rG¯(qFB)− s
λ
G¯(qFB)
S(qFB)
− c = 0.
Proof of Corollary 3.4.1
Proof of Corollary 3.4.1. First consider qFB, it is obvious that qFB is independent of u
given the relation of (B.0.4). Let f(r, qFB) = rG¯(qFB)− s
λ
G¯(qFB)
S(qFB)
− c, then by the implicit
function theorem, we have
∂qFB
∂r
= −
(
∂f(r, q)
∂q
)−1
∂f(r, q)
∂r
∣∣∣∣
f(r,qFB)=0
.
From the arguments in the proof of Lemma 3.4.2, we know that ∂f(r,q)
∂r
∣∣∣
f(r,qFB)=0
< 0.
Along with the fact that ∂f(r,q)
∂r
∣∣∣
f(r,qFB)=0
= G¯(qFB) > 0, we have ∂q
FB
∂r
> 0 which means
that qFB is increasing in r. Similar arguments will yield qFB is increasing in λ, and
decreasing in c and s.
Next consider eFB. Function (B.0.1) is increasing in q, u and decreasing in s. Com-
bining this with the monotonicity of qFB, we have that eFB is increasing in u, r, and
decreasing in c and s.
Proof of Lemma 3.4.2
Proof of Lemma 3.4.2. We first consider the supplier’s problem. Since w and q are de-
termined by the manufacturer, the supplier’s problem could be written by
maxe pi(e)
s.t. pi(e) ≥ 0.
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Consider the first derivative
dpi
de
= (1− θ)uλ exp{−λe}S(q)− s.
Since for the demand there exists a lower bound l satisfying S(l) ≥ s/(1− θ)uλ. For
any order quantity q chosen by the manufacturer, it is obvious that q ≥ l, which yields
S(q) ≥ s/(1− θ)uλ, then set
dpi
de
= (1− θ)uλ exp{−λe}S(q)− s = 0,
we have
e∗(q) =
1
λ
ln
(
S(q)(1− θ)uλ
s
)
. (B.0.5)
Now the manufacturer’s problem would be considered as below:
Π(w, q) = rS(q)− θs
(1− θ)λ − wq. (B.0.6)
Since the manufacturer’s profit is monotone decreasing in w for every q, thus w is chosen
by the manufacturer as lower as possible. Also note that we need to guarantee the
supplier’s profit should be non-negative, i.e.,
pi(e∗) = (w − c)q − s
λ
− s
λ
ln
(
S(q)(1− θ)uλ
s
)
≥ 0, (B.0.7)
and the supplier’s profit is monotone increasing in w for every q, therefore w is chosen
as below:
c+
s
λq
+
s
λq
ln
(
S(q)(1− θ)uλ
s
)
.
In terms of profit, supplier’s objective function is binding. Substituting it into equation
(B.0.6), we could get
Π(q) = rS(q)− θs
(1− θ)λ − cq −
s
λ
− s
λ
ln
(
S(q)(1− θ)uλ
s
)
. (B.0.8)
The derivatives are as follows:
dΠ(q)
dq
= rG¯(q)− s
λ
G¯(q)
S(q)
− c, (B.0.9)
d2Π(q)
dq2
= −rg(q) + s
λ
G¯2(q) + g(q)S(q)
S2(q)
, (B.0.10)
d3Π(q)
dq3
= −rg′(qˆ) + s
λ
−2G¯3(q)− 3g(q)G¯(q)S(q) + g′(q)S2(q)
S3(q)
. (B.0.11)
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Next we evaluate the third derivative at the points where d
2Π(q)
dq2
= 0, we have
d3Π(q)
dq3
∣∣∣∣
d2Π(q)
dq2
=0
= −rg(q)G¯(q)S(q)(g
2(q) + g
′
(q)G¯(q)) + 2g2(q)G¯(q)S(q) + 2g(q)G¯3(q)
(g(q)S(q) + G¯2(q))S(q)
.
If we have weak IFR assumption, i.e. g2(q) + g
′
(q)G¯(q) ≥ 0, then d3Π(q)
dq3
∣∣∣
d2Π(q)
dq2
=0
< 0,
combined with dΠ(q)
dq
∣∣∣
q=∞
= −c < 0, which together imply dΠ(q)
dq
is either monotone or
unimodal (first increasing and then decreasing). If it is the monotone case, at most there
is a unique solution to dΠ(q)/dq = 0, which is a maximizer; and if it is the unimodal
case, there are at most two solutions to dΠ(q)/dq = 0, and the the larger one always
corresponds to the unique maximizer. We could obtain the unique maximizer qS from
rG¯(qS)− s
λ
G¯(qS)
S(qS)
− c = 0. (B.0.12)
Now we could conclude that the optimal solution set for this scenario could be given by
rG¯(qS)− s
λ
G¯(qS)
S(qS)
− c = 0, (B.0.13)
eS =
1
λ
ln
(
S(qS)(1− θ)uλ
s
)
, (B.0.14)
wS = c+
s
λqS
+
s
λqS
ln
(
S(qS)(1− θ)uλ
s
)
. (B.0.15)
Proof of Lemma 3.4.3
Proof of Lemma 3.4.3. (i)From Lemma 3.4.1 and 3.4.2, it is clearly qFB = qS, since they
satisfy the same equation. Given qFB = qS and 1− θ < 1, we have eFB > eS.
(ii)From the proof of Lemma 3.4.2, supplier’s profit objective function is binding, that
is piS = 0. Thus ΣS = ΠS.
Proof of Proposition 3.4.1. By definition, δS = ΣFB − ΣS, where ΣFB = rS(qFB)− s
λ
−
cqFB + s
λ
ln s
λuS(qFB)
and ΣS = rS(qS)− sθ
λ(1−θ) − cqS − sλ + sλ ln sλu(1−θ)S(qS) . From Lemma
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3.4.3, we have qFB = qS. Thus we have
δS =
sθ
λ(1− θ) +
s
λ
(ln
s
λuS(qFB)
− ln s
λu(1− θ)S(qS))
=
sθ
λ(1− θ) +
s
λ
ln(1− θ)
=
s
λ
(
ln(1− θ) + θ
1− θ
)
.
Proof of Lemma 3.4.4
Proof of Lemma 3.4.4. We first consider the supplier’s problem. Since w is determined
by the manufacturer, the supplier faces a two dimension optimization problem, which is
given by
maxe,q pi(e, q)
subject to pi(e, q) ≥ 0.
Clearly the objective function is concave in e for every q (may not jointly concave in both
e and q), hence, we can first set q and then e to achieve the optimization sequentially.
Consider the function
∂pi
∂e
= exp{−λe}(1− θ)uλS(q)− s.
Since θ < θ¯ = 1 − s/(uλl), the demand has a lower bound l satisfying l ≥ s/(1− θ)uλ.
As long as the supplier chooses a order quantity q, it is obvious that q ≥ l, which yields
S(q) ≥ s/(1− θ)uλ, then set
∂pi
∂e
= exp{−λe}(1− θ)uλS(q)− s = 0,
we have
e∗(q) =
1
λ
ln
(
S(q)(1− θ)uλ
s
)
. (B.0.16)
Taking (B.0.16) back into equation (3.4.2), we get
pi(q) = (w − s
λS(q)
)S(q)− s
λ
ln
(
S(q)(1− θ)uλ
s
)
− cq. (B.0.17)
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The derivatives are as follows:
dpi(q)
dq
= wG¯(q)− s
λ
G¯(q)
S(q)
− c, (B.0.18)
d2pi(q)
dq2
= −wg(q) + s
λ
G¯2(q) + g(q)S(q)
S2(q)
, (B.0.19)
d3pi(q)
dq3
= −wg′(qˆ) + s
λ
−2G¯3(q)− 3g(q)G¯(q)S(q) + g′(q)S2(q)
S3(q)
. (B.0.20)
Next we evaluate the third derivative at the points where d
2pi(q)
dq2
= 0, we have
d3pi(q)
dq3
∣∣∣∣
d2pi(q)
dq2
=0
= −wg(q)G¯(q)S(q)(g
2(q) + g
′
(q)G¯(q)) + 2g2(q)G¯(q)S(q) + 2g(q)G¯3(q)
(g(q)S(q) + G¯2(q))S(q)
.
If we have weak IFR assumption, i.e. g2(q) + g
′
(q)G¯(q) ≥ 0, then d3pi(q)
dq3
∣∣∣
d2pi(q)
dq2
=0
< 0,
combined with dpi(q)
dq
∣∣∣
q=∞
= −c < 0, which together imply dpi(q)
dq
is either monotone or
unimodal (first increasing and then decreasing). If it is the monotone case, at most there
is a unique solution to dpi(q)/dq = 0, which is a maximizer; and if it is the unimodal
case, there are at most two solutions to dpi(q)/dq = 0, and the the larger one always
corresponds to the unique maximizer. We could obtain the unique maximizer q∗ from
wG¯(q∗)− s
λ
G¯(q∗)
S(q∗)
− c = 0 (B.0.21)
Next we need to consider the manufacturer’s problem. Note that w and (e∗(q∗), q∗) are
one-to-one corresponded. As we did in the previous proof, we could substitute w by q∗
in the manufacturer’s objective function. Therefore, from equation (B.0.21) we have
w(q∗) =
c
G¯(q∗)
+
s
λS(q∗)
.
Note that w(q∗)|q∗=0 = ∞, w(q∗)|q∗=∞ = ∞ and d
2w(q∗)
dq∗2 > 0 under IFR assumption,
which implies the function w(q∗) is convex in q∗, and there exists a unique minimizer
q∗min. Furthermore, q
∗
min could be obtained by setting
dw(q∗)
dq∗ = 0, i.e.,
cg(q∗min)
G¯2(q∗min)
− sG¯(q
∗
min)
λS2(q∗min)
= 0. (B.0.22)
Since we have c ≤ w ≤ r, note that w(q∗min) > c, thus
108
(a) if c ≤ w < w(q∗min), q∗ = 0;
(b) if w(q∗min) ≤ w ≤ r, the corresponding range for q∗ would be [q∗min, q∗max] ,and q∗max
could be obtained by the larger solution to
r =
c
G¯(q∗max)
+
s
λS(q∗max)
.
In addition, we can get
dw(q∗)
d(q∗)
∣∣∣∣
q∗∈[q∗min,q∗max]
=
cg(q∗)
G¯2(q∗)
− sG¯(q
∗)
λS2(q∗)
> 0. (B.0.23)
Next substituting w(q∗) by the expression above into equation (3.4.1), we have
Π(w) = Π(q∗) = rS(q∗)− c S(q
∗)
G¯(q∗)
− s
(1− θ)λ. (B.0.24)
Next take the first and second derivatives of Π(q∗) with respect to q∗:
dΠ(q∗)
dq∗
= rG¯(q∗)− cg(q
∗)S(q∗)
G¯2(q∗)
− c, (B.0.25)
d2Π(q∗)
dq∗2
= −rg(q∗)− c(g(q
∗)G¯(q∗) + g′(q∗)S(q∗))G¯2(q∗) + 2g2(q∗)G¯(q∗)S(q∗)
G¯4(q∗)
.(B.0 26)
By similar induction as in the previous proof, we could find Π(q∗) is unimodal (first
increasing and then decreasing), and there exists a unique interior global maximizer qL
given by
rG¯(qL)− cg(q
L)S(qL)
G¯2(qL)
− c = 0. (B.0.27)
By evaluating dΠ(q
∗)
dq∗
∣∣∣
q∗=q∗min
> 0 and dΠ(q
∗)
dq∗
∣∣∣
q∗=q∗max
< 0, we could find
q∗min < q
L < q∗max.
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Proof of Corollary 3.4.2
Proof of Corollary. 3.4.2 Consider qL, which satisfies equation (B.0.27). It is obvious
that qL is independent of u, s and λ. Let f(r, q) = rG¯(q) − cg(q)S(q)
G¯2(q)
− c, then by the
implicit function theorem, we have
∂qL
∂r
= −
(
∂f(r, q)
∂q
)−1
∂f(r, q)
∂r
∣∣∣∣
f(r,qL)=0
.
From the arguments in the proof of Lemma 3.4.4, we know that ∂f(r,q)
∂r
∣∣∣
f(r,qL)=0
< 0.
Along with the fact that ∂f(r,q)
∂r
∣∣∣
f(r,qL)=0
= G¯(qL) > 0, we have ∂q
L
∂r
> 0 which means that
qL is increasing in r. Similar arguments will yield qL is decreasing in c.
Next consider eL. Function (B.0.1) is increasing in q, u and decreasing in s. Combin-
ing this with the monotonicity of qL, we have that eL is increasing in u, r, and decreasing
in c and s.
Proof of Lemma 3.4.5
Proof of Lemma 3.4.5. (i) qL will satisfy equation (B.0.21), with a w less than r. From
the proof of Lemma 3.4.4, by the monotonicity of w and q, we have qFB > qL. Given
qFB > qL and 1− θ < 1, we have eFB > eL.
(ii)From the proof of Lemma 3.4.4, we have piL > 0, i.e. ΣL > ΠL.
Proof of Proposition 3.4.2
Proof of Proposition 3.4.2. By definition, δL = ΣFB − ΣL, where ΣFB = rS(qFB) −
s
λ
− cqFB + s
λ
ln s
λuS(qFB)
and ΣL = rS(qL) − s
λ(1−θ) − cqL + sλ ln sλu(1−θ)S(qL) . Define
function f(q) = rS(q)− s
λ(1−θ) − cq+ sλ ln sλu(1−θ)S(q) , then ΣL = f(qL). Taking derivative
of f with respect to q yields f ′(q) = rG¯(q) − c − sG¯(q)
λS(q)
. From the proof of Lemma
3.4.4, for q ∈ [qL, qFB], f ′(q) > 0. Thus we have ΣL = f(qL) < f(qFB). Notice that
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ΣFB − f(qFB) = δS, thus we have δL > δS. By definition of δ, we have ΣS > ΣL. Since
piS = 0, we further have piS < piL and ΠS > ΠL.
Proof of Proposition 3.4.3
Proof of Proposition 3.4.3. From Lemma 3.4.3 and 3.4.5, qFB = qS > qL. Thus eS >
eL
Proof of Lemma 3.4.6
Proof of Lemma 3.4.6. (i) w˜S and q˜S are obtained by solving the following problem.
max
w,q
rS(q)− wq
s.t. (w − c)q ≥ 0
The solution is w˜S = c, making the supplier’s profit equal to zero. Then maximize
rS(q)− cq yields q˜S = G¯−1( c
r
).
(ii)In the pull system, w˜L and q˜L are obtained by solving the following problem.
max
c≤w≤r
(r − w)S(q∗)
s.t. q∗ = argmax
q
wS(q)− cq
We can easily get the solution by a similar arguments along the proof of Lemma 4.
Proof of Proposition 3.4.4
Proof of Proposition 3.4.4. It is clearly that q˜FB = q˜S. Since G¯ is a decreasing function,
and c + sG¯(q
FB)
λS(qFB)
> c, we have q˜FB = q˜S > qFB = qS. From the proof of Lemma 4, we
know that q˜L = qL.
Proof of Proposition 3.4.5
Proof of Proposition 3.4.5. From the function (B.0.12) and function (B.0.27), it is clear
that both qS and qS are indepedent of θ. Futhermore, from the function (B.0.5) and
111
the function (B.0.16), both qS and qS are decreasing in θ. For the push sytem, we have
shown δS is increasing in θ, which implies that ΣS is decreasing in θ. Besides, ΠS = ΣS,
so does ΠS. For the pull system, from the proof of Lemma 3.4.4, we could get
pi(qL) = c
(
S(qL)
G¯(qL)
− qL
)
− s
λ
ln
(
S(qL)(1− θ)uλ
s
)
.
Since qL is indepedent of θ, piL is increasing in θ. Besides, ΠL is decreasing in θ by By
the function (B.0.24). Sum up ΠL and piL, we could get
ΣL = rS(qL)− cqL − s
λ
(
1
1− θ + ln
(
S(qL)(1− θ)uλ
s
))
.
Take the first deriative of θ, we find that dΣ
L
dθ
< 0, which implies ΣL is decreasing in
θ.
Proof of Corollary 3.4.3
Proof of Corollary 3.4.3. Following the proofs of Lemma 3.4.2 and Lemma 3.4.4, if θ ≥
θ2 = 1− suλd , since S(q) ≤ d, then we have dpide < 0 for all e, which means e∗(q) = 0.
(i) For the push sytem, next we need to consider the manufacturer’s problem. Consider
Π(w, q) = (r − θu)S(q)− wq. (B.0.28)
Since the manufacturer’s profit function is monotone decreasing in w for every q
(may not jointly concave in both w and q), hence, we can first set q and then w
to achieve the optimization sequentially and w is chosen by the manufacturer as
lower as possible. . In addition, we need to guarantee the supplier’s profit should
be non-negative, i.e.,
pi(e∗ = 0) = (w − c)q − (1− θu)S(q) ≥ 0, (B.0.29)
and the supplier’s profit is monotone increasing in w for every q, therefore w is
chosen as below:
c+
(1− θu)S(q)
q
.
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In terms of profit, the supplier’s objective function is binding. Substituting it into
equation (B.0.28), we could get
Π(q) = (r − u)S(q)− cq. (B.0.30)
The derivatives are as follows:
dΠ(q)
dq
= (r − u)G¯(q)− c, (B.0.31)
d2Π(q)
dq2
= −(r − u)g(q). (B.0.32)
Since d
2Π(q)
dq2
< 0, there is a unique optimal solution:
qS = G¯−1
(
c
r − u
)
(B.0.33)
(ii) For the pull sytem, the supplier’s profit function could be simplified as below:
pi(q) = (w − (1− θ)u)S(q)− cq. (B.0.34)
The derivatives are as follows:
dpi(q)
dq
= (w − (1− θ)u)G¯(q)− c, (B.0.35)
d2pi(q)
dq2
= −(w − (1− θ)u)g(q), (B.0.36)
Since we have the assumption c ≤ w ≤ r,
(a) if c ≤ w < (1− θ)u+ c, considering S(q) ≤ q, then q∗ = 0;
(b) if w(1 − θ)u + c ≤ w ≤ r, considering d2pi(q)
dq2
≤ 0, there is a unique optimal
solution:
q∗ = G¯−1
(
c
w − (1− θ)u
)
. (B.0.37)
Note that the corresponding range for q∗ is [0, G¯−1( c
r−(1−θ)u)]. Next we need to
consider the principal’s optimization problem. For part (a), Π(w) = 0. For part
(b), note that w and (e∗(q∗), q∗) are one-to-one corresponded. In order to find the
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explicit value for w, it is equivalent to substitute w by (e∗(q∗), q∗) in the manufac-
turer’s profit function. Therefore, from equation (B.0.37) we have
w =
c
G¯(q∗)
+ (1− θ)u.
Substituting w by the expression above into function (3.4.1), we have
Π(w) = Π(q∗) = (r − u)S(q∗)− c S(q
∗)
G¯(q∗)
.
Then take the first and second derivatives of Π(q∗) with respect to q∗:
dΠ(q∗)
dq∗
= (r − u)G¯(q∗)− cg(q
∗)S(q∗)
G¯2(q∗)
− c, (B.0.38)
d2Π(q∗)
dq∗2
= (u− r)g(q∗)− c(g(q
∗)G¯(q∗) + g′(q∗)S(q∗))G¯2(q∗) + 2g2(q∗)G¯(q∗)S(q∗)
G¯4(q∗)
.
(B.0.39)
Next we evaluate the second derivative at the point where dΠ(q
∗)
dq∗ = 0, we have
d2Π(q∗)
dq∗2
∣∣∣∣
dΠ(q∗)
dq∗ =0
= −c
(
2g(q∗)G¯2(q∗) + 2g2(q∗)S(q∗) + (g2(q∗) + g′(q∗)G¯(q∗))S(q∗)
G¯3(q∗)
)
.
If we have weak IFR assumption, i.e. g2(q) + g
′
(q)G¯(q) ≥ 0, then d2Π(q∗)
dq∗2
∣∣∣
dΠ(q∗)
dq∗ =0
<
0, combined with Π(q∗)|q∗=0 = 0, Π(q∗)|q∗=∞ = −∞ and dΠ(q∗)dq∗
∣∣∣
q∗=0
= r−c−u > 0,
which together imply Π(q∗) is unimodal (first increasing and then decreasing), and
in the support of [0,∞) there exists a unique interior global maximizer qL given by
(r − u)G¯(qL)− cg(q
L)S(qL)
G¯2(qL)
− c = 0.
Now we need to compare qL and the upper bound of the feasible region, i.e.
G¯−1( c
r−(1−θ)u). Note that
dΠ(q∗)
dq∗
∣∣∣
q∗=G¯−1( c
r−(1−θ)u )
= −θuG¯(q∗)− cg(q∗)S(q∗)
G¯2(q∗) < 0, which
implies qL < G¯−1( c
r−(1−θ)u). Furthermore, note that pi(q
L) > pi(q∗)|q∗=0 = 0, which
has ruled out the consideration of part (a), thus now we could conclude that the
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optimal solution set for this scenario could be given by
(r − u)G¯(qL)− cg(q
L)S(qL)
G¯2(qL)
− c = 0, (B.0.40)
eL = 0, (B.0.41)
wL =
c
G¯(qL)
+ (1− θ)u. (B.0.42)
Proof of Lemma 3.4.7
Proof of Lemma 3.4.7. Using the IC Condition, taking derivative with respect to e and
set it equal to zero, we have the result.
Proof of Proposition 3.4.7
Proof of Proposition 3.4.7. Comparing Lemma 3.4.7 with Lemma 3.4.1, we have the
proposition.
Proof of Lemma 3.4.8
Proof of Lemma 3.4.8. Using the IC Condition, taking derivative with respect to e and
set it equal to zero, we have the result.
Proof of Proposition 3.4.8
Proof of Proposition 3.4.8. Comparing Lemma 3.4.8 with Lemma 3.4.1, we have the
proposition.
Proof of Lemma 3.4.9
Proof of Lemma 3.4.9. Taking derivative of ΣFB with respect to e and set it equal to
zero, we have the result.
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Proof of Lemma 3.4.10
Proof of Lemma 3.4.10. Using the IC Condition, taking derivative with respect to e and
set it equal to zero, we have the result.
Proof of Proposition 3.4.9
Proof of Proposition 3.4.9. Comparing Lemma 3.4.10 with Lemma 3.4.9, we have the
proposition.
Proof of Lemma 3.4.11
Proof of Lemma 3.4.11. Taking derivative of ΣFB with respect to e1 and set it equal to
zero. We also set eFB1 = e
FB
2 = e
FB, and the result follows.
Proof of Lemma 3.4.12
Proof of Lemma 3.4.12. Taking derivative of (IC1) with respect to e1 and set it equal
to zero. We also set eDT1 = e
DT
2 = e
DT , and the result follows.
Proof of Proposition 3.4.10
Proof of Proposition 3.4.10. Comparing Lemma 3.4.12 with Lemma 3.4.11, we have the
proposition.
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Appendix C PROOFS FOR CHAPTER 4
Proof of Lemma 4.4.1
Proof of Lemma 4.4.1. See the decentralized supply chain analysis part.
Proof of Lemma 4.4.2
Proof of Lemma 4.4.2. (i) s+ d1C
′
v(e˜) < 0.
Denote h1(e) = se+ (1− θ)d1Cv(e) and h2(e) = se+ (1− θ)(d1 +d2)Cm(e) exp{−λe}.
When e ∈ (0, e˜],
h1
′(e) = s+ (1− θ)d1Cv ′(e), (C.0.1)
h1
′′(e) = (1− θ)d1Cv ′′(e). (C.0.2)
It shows that h1(e) is a strictly convex function. Now define e
∗
1 which satisfies
s+ (1− θ)d1Cv ′(e∗1) = 0.
Note that h1(e)→ +∞, when e→ 0. Therefore, when e ∈ [0, e˜], the optimal solution
e∗ for supplier is given by min{e∗1, e˜}.
Similarly, when e ∈ [e˜,+∞),
h2
′(e) = s+ (1− θ)(d1 + d2) exp{−λe}(C ′m(e)− λCm(e)), (C.0.3)
h2
′′(e) = (1− θ)(d1 + d2) exp{−λe}[(Cm′(e)− λCm′′(e)) + (−λ)(Cm′(e)− λCm(e)].(C.0.4)
It shows that h2(e) is a strictly convex function. Now define e
∗
2 which satisfies
s+ (1− θ)(d1 + d2) exp{−λe∗2}(C ′m(e∗2)− λCm(e∗2)) = 0.
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Note that h2(e) → +∞, when e → +∞. Therefore, when e ∈ [e˜,+∞], the optimal
solution e∗ for supplier is given by max{e∗2, e˜}.
First we note that
h1
′(e˜)− h2′(e˜) = (1− θ)d1λCv(e˜) ≥ 0.
When θ = 1, we have
h1
′(e˜) = h2
′(e˜) = s > 0.
Hence the unique optimal solution is obtained at e∗1.
When θ = 0, under the assumption that s+ d1Cv
′(e˜) < 0, we have
h′2(e˜) < h
′
1(e˜) < 0.
Hence the unique optimal solution is obtained at e∗2.
Because of continuality, there exist two numbers which are denote by θ1 and θ2, such
that
when θ ∈ [θ2, 1], the unique optimal solution is reached at e∗1,
when θ ∈ [0, θ1], the unique optimal solution is reached at e∗2.
Next we need to compare the h1(e
∗
1) and h2(e
∗
2) in the interval [θ1, θ2]. Define
h¯(θ) = h1(e
∗
1(θ))− h2(e∗2(θ)),
= s(e∗1 − e∗2) + (1− θ)[d1Cv(e∗1)− (d1 + d2)Cm(e∗2) exp{−λe∗2}]. (C.0.5)
Therefore,
dh¯
dθ
= s
(
de∗1
dθ
− de
∗
2
dθ
)
− (d1Cv(e∗1)− (d1 + d2)Cm(e∗2) exp{−λe∗2})
+(1− θ)
{
d1Cv
′(e∗1)
de∗1
dθ
− (d1 + d2) [Cm′(e∗2) + Cm(e∗2)(−λ)] exp{−λe∗2}
de∗2
dθ
}
.
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By the definition of e∗1 and e
∗
2, the above equation can be simplified as following:
dh¯
dθ
=
dh¯
dθ
= s
(
de∗1
dθ
− de
∗
2
dθ
)
−
[
d1Cv(e
∗
1)−
sCm(e
∗
2)
(1− θ)(λCm(e∗2)− Cm′(e∗2))
]
+(1− θ)
(
s
θ − 1
de∗1
dθ
− s(Cm
′(e∗2)− λCm(e∗2))
(1− θ)(λCm(e∗2)− Cm′(e∗2))
de∗2
dθ
)
,
= −
[
d1Cv(e
∗
1)−
sCm(e
∗
2)
(1− θ)(λCm(e∗2)− Cm′(e∗2))
]
,
= − [d1Cv(e∗1)− (d1 + d2)Cm(e∗2) exp{−λe∗2}] . (C.0.6)
Consider the equation C.0.5, if d1Cv(e
∗
1) − (d1 + d2)Cm(e∗2) exp{−λe∗2} < 0, we have
h¯ < 0. Hence θ¯ = θ1.
On the other hand, if d1Cv(e
∗
1) − (d1 + d2)Cm(e∗2) exp{−λe∗2} > 0, we have dh¯dθ < 0.
Let h¯(θ) = 0. Hence we obtain θ¯ by solving this equation.
The result follows.
(ii)s+ (d1 + d2) exp{−λe˜}(C ′m(e˜)− λCm(e˜)) > 0.
In this setting, h′1(e˜) > h
′
2(e˜) > 0. Thus for all θ ∈ [0, 1], e∗1 is the unique minimizer.
(iii) s+ d1C
′
v(e˜) > 0 and s+ (d1 + d2) exp{−λe}(C ′m(e)− λCm(e)) < 0.
In this setting, h′1(e˜) > 0, h
′
2(e˜) could be either positive or negative. Denote θ˜ which
satisfies s+ (1− θ˜)(d1 + d2) exp{−λe}(C ′m(e)− λCm(e)) = 0. And we have for θ ∈ [0, θ˜),
h2(e˜) < 0, for θ ∈ [θ˜, 1], h2(e˜) > 0.
In the case θ˜ < t¯heta, we have if θ ∈ [θ˜, 1], e∗1 is the minimizer and if θ ∈ [0, θ˜], e∗2 is
the minimizer.
In the case θ˜ > t¯heta, we have if θ ∈ [θ˜, 1], e∗1 is the minimizer. If θ ∈ [0, θ¯], e∗2 is the
minimizer. And if θ ∈ [θ¯, θ˜], e∗1 is the minimizer.
Summarizing the above results yield part (iii) of Lemma 4.4.2.
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Proof of Lemma 4.4.3
Proof of Lemma 4.4.3. When e < e˜,
θ =
s
d1C ′v(e
∗
1)
+ 1.
Thus θ is decreasing in e∗1, which also means e
∗
1 is decreasing in θ.
When e > e˜,
θ = 1− s
(d1 + d2) exp{−λe∗2}(λCm(e∗2)− C ′m(e∗2)
.
Thus θ is decreasing in e∗2, which also means e
∗
2 is decreasing in θ.
Combining the above two arguments and the fact that e∗2 > e
∗
1, we have e
∗(θ) is
decreasing in θ.
Proof of Lemma 4.4.4
Proof of Lemma 4.4.4. For θH(e∗1(θ)), we have
θH(e∗1(θ)) =θd1Cv(e
∗
1)
=
(
1 +
s
d1C ′v(e
∗
1)
)
d1Cv(e
∗
1)
=d1Cv(e
∗
1) +
sCv(e
∗
1)
C ′v(e
∗
1)
≡W1
Taking derivatives of W1 with respect to e
∗
1, we have
dW1
de∗1
= d1C
′
v(e
∗
1) +
s[C ′2v (e
∗
1)− Cv(e∗1)C ′′v (e∗1)]
C ′2v (e
∗
1)
< 0.
With the conclusion of Lemma 4.4.3, we have dW1
dθ
> 0.
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For θH(e∗2(θ)), we have
θH(e∗2(θ)) =θ(d1 + d2)Cm(e
∗
2) exp{−λe∗2}
=
(
1− s
(d1 + d2) exp{−λe∗2}(λCm(e∗2)− C ′m(e∗2))
)
(d1 + d2)Cm(e
∗
2) exp{−λe∗2}
=(d1 + d2)Cm(e
∗
2) exp{−λe∗2} −
s
λ− C′m(e∗2)
Cm(e∗2)
≡W2
Taking derivitives of W2 with respect to e
∗
2, we have
dW2
de∗2
=(d1 + d2)(C
′
m(e
∗
2) exp{−λe∗2}+ Cm(e∗2)(−λ) exp{−λe∗2})
+
s(
λ− C′m(e∗2)
Cm(e∗2)
)2 (−1)C ′′m(e∗2)Cm(e∗2)− C ′2m(e∗2)C2m(e∗2)
Given Cm(e) =
αm
e
, C ′m(e) = −αme2 , C ′′m(e) = 2αme3 and C ′′m(e)Cm(e) − C ′2m(e) > 0, we
have dW2
de∗2
< 0. Thus dW2
dθ
> 0.
Proof of Lemma 4.4.5
Proof of Lemma 4.4.5. First consider
dh1(e
∗
1(θ))
dθ
=
d
dθ
[se∗1 + (1− θ)d1Cv(e∗1)]
=s
de∗1(θ)
dθ
+ (−1)d1(Cv(e∗1) + (1− θ)d1C ′v(e∗1)
de∗1(θ)
dθ
=s
de∗1(θ)
dθ
+ (−1)d1(Cv(e∗1)− s
de∗1(θ)
dθ
=− d1(Cv(e∗1) < 0.
Thus h1(e
∗
1(θ)) is decreasing in θ.
Next,
dh2(e
∗
2(θ))
dθ
=
d
dθ
(se∗2 + (1− θ)(d1 + d2)Cm(e∗2) exp{−λe∗2})
=(−1)(d1 + d2)(Cm(e∗2) exp{−λe∗2} < 0.
Thus h2(e
∗
2(θ)) is also decreasing in θ.
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Proof of Proposition 4.4.1
Proof of Proposition 4.4.1. (i) When s + d1C
′
v(e˜) < 0, consider θ from [0, θ¯] and [θ¯, 1]
separately. According to Lemma 4.4.4, the minimum of θH(e∗(θ)) will be achieved at
θ = 0 or θ = θ¯, depending on parameters. But we also need to take care of the IR
constraint.
From Lemma 4.4.5, h2(e
∗
2(θ)) is decreasing in θ, and there exists a θ2 in [0, θ¯] which
satisfies h2(e
∗
2(θ2)) = C¯. And for all θ ∈ [θ2, θ¯], h2(e∗2(θ)) ≤ C¯. Similarly, h1(e∗1(θ)) is
decreasing in θ, and there exists a θ1 in [θ¯, 1] which satisfies h1(e
∗
1(θ1)) = C¯. And for all
θ ∈ [θ1, 1], h1(e∗1(θ)) ≤ C¯.
Then we have the solution to the principle agent problem is θ = θ2, or θ1, depending
on parameters.
When s + d1C
′
v(e˜) > 0 and s + (d1 + d2) exp{−λe˜}(C ′m(e˜) − λCm(e˜)) < 0. In this
setting, for θ ∈ [0,min{θ˜, θ¯}], e∗2 is the minimizer. And for θ ∈ [min{θ˜, θ¯}, 1], e∗1 is the
minimizer. Thus for the principle agent problem, the optimal solution will be θ2, or θ1,
depending on parameters.
Combining the above two scenarios, we have when s + (d1 + d2) exp{−λe˜}(C ′m(e˜) −
λCm(e˜)) < 0, the optimal solution will be θ2, or θ1.
(ii)s+ (d1 + d2) exp{−λe˜}(C ′m(e˜)− λCm(e˜)) > 0.
In this setting, for all θ ∈ [0, 1], e∗1 is the unique minimizer. Thus for the principle
agent problem, the optimal solution will be θ1. And in this setting, the manufacture will
always voluntarily recall.
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Proof of Proposition 4.4.2
Proof of Proposition 4.4.2. First, consider e∗1(θ1). Given
se∗1(θ1) + (1− θ1)d1Cv(e∗1(θ1)) = C¯
and
s+ (1− θ1)d1Cv ′(e∗1(θ1)) = 0.
We could solve that
e∗1(θ1) =
C¯
2s
.
Next, consider e∗2(θ2). Given
se∗2(θ2) + (1− θ2)(d1 + d2)Cm(e∗2(θ2)) exp{−λe∗2(θ2)} = C¯
and
s+ (1− θ2)(d1 + d2) exp{−λe∗2(θ2)}(C ′m(e∗2(θ2))− λCm(e∗2(θ2))) = 0.
We have
se∗2(θ2) +
se∗2(θ2)
1 + λe∗2(θ2)
= C¯.
Further calculations yield
e∗2(θ2) =
C¯λ− 2s+
√
4s2 + C¯2λ2
2sλ
.
From
se∗1(θ1) + (1− θ1)d1Cv(e∗1(θ1)) = C¯
and plug in that e∗1(θ1) =
C¯
2s
. We have
θ1 = 1−
C¯2
4sd1αv
.
Next, from
se∗2(θ2) + (1− θ2)(d1 + d2)Cm(e∗2(θ2)) exp{−λe∗2(θ2)} = C¯
123
and
e∗2(θ2) =
C¯λ− 2s+
√
4s2 + C¯2λ2
2sλ
.
Through calculations, we have
θ2 = 1−
C¯2λ2 − (2s−
√
4s2 + C¯2λ2)2
4sλ2(d1 + d2)αm exp{− C¯λ−2s+
√
4s2+C¯2λ2
2s
}
.
Proof of Proposition4.4.3
Proof of Proposition4.4.3. This proposition follows immediately after Proposition 4.4.2.
Proof of Lemma4.4.6
Proof of Lemma 4.4.6. (i) s+ d1C
′
v(e˜) < 0.
For the first best solutions, recall
e˜ = ln
(
d1 + d2
d1
Cm
Cv
)/
λ,
When e < e˜,
min
e
l1(e) = min
e
d1Cv(e) + se.
We have
l′1(e) = s+ d1C
′
v(e),
l′′1(e) = d1C
′′
v (e) > 0.
Thus there exists a unique minimizer, denoted as eFB1 , which satisfies C
′
v(e
FB
1 ) = − sd1 .
When e > e˜,
min
e
l2(e) = min
e
se+ (d1 + d2)Cm(e) exp{−λe}).
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We have
l′2(e) = s+ (d1 + d2) (C
′
m(e) exp{−λe} − λCm(e) exp{−λe})
= s+ (d1 + d2) exp{−λe}(C ′m(e)− λCm(e))
l′′2(e) = (d1 + d2) [exp{−λe}(C ′′m(e)− λC ′m(e)) + exp{−λe}(−λ)(C ′m(e)− λCm(e))] > 0
Thus there exists a unique minimizer, denoted as eFB2 , which satisfies l
′
2(e
FB
2 ) = 0. Under
the assumption s + d1C
′
v(e˜) < 0, we have l
′
1(e˜) < 0 and l
′
2(e˜) < 0. Thus there exists a
unique solution to the first best problem, which is eFB2 , which means the manufacture do
not voluntarily recall.
(ii) s+ (d1 + d2) exp{−λe˜}(C ′m(e˜)− λCm(e˜)) > 0.
In this setting, l′1(e˜) > l
′
2(e˜) > 0. Thus for all θ ∈ [0, 1], eFB1 is the unique minimizer.
Note that eFB1 > e
∗
1 and e
FB
2 > e
∗
2
(iii)s+ d1C
′
v(e˜) > 0 and s+ (d1 + d2) exp{−λe˜}(C ′m(e˜)− λCm(e˜)) < 0.
In this setting, l′1(e˜) > 0, l
′
2(e˜) < 0, the optimal solution depends on which of l1(e
FB
1 )
and l2(e
FB
2 ) is smaller.
Proof of Proposition4.4.4
Proof of Proposition4.4.4. This proposition could be obtained after Lemma 4.4.2 and
Lemma 4.4.6.
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